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In October of 2017, before a jam-packed hearing at City
Hall in New York, Council Member James Vacca listened to a
series of testimonies that outlined two dramatically divergent
visions for the future of technology, open data, and govern-
ance. 1 ' This is the largest attendance a technology meeting
has ever had," Vacca apparently said. "How am I going to top
this next month?"2 The occasion for the hearing was a bill with
a lengthy (and seemingly snooze-worthy) title: "A Local Law to
amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in rela-
tion to automated processing of data for the purposes of target-
ing services, penalties, or policing to persons."3 Essentially,
the bill required all agencies that use algorithms or other auto-
mated processing to publish their source code for public inves-
1 Jessica McKenzie, Hearing on Algorithmic Transparency Reveals Rift in NYC
Tech Community, CMc HALL (Oct. 19, 2017), https://civichall.org/civlclst/hear-
ing-algorithmic-transparency-reveals-rift-nyc-tech-community [https://perma
.cc/S9XF-7T3G]; see Roshan Abraham, New York City Passes Bill to Study Biases
in Algorithms Used by the City, MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 19, 2017, 9:52 AM), https://
motherboard.vice.com/en-us/artcle/xw4xdw/new-york-city-algorithmic-bias-
bill-law [https://perma.cc/6GLX-NTSG.
2 McKenzie, supra note 1.
3 Agenda, Hearing on Automated Decision Systems Used by Agencies, N.Y.C.
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tigation.4 On a more abstract level, the bill would force the
government to share its processes of automated government
decision making and become essentially open source, reversing
a long-standing trend toward opacity.5
For many who care about the future of democratic trans-
parency, the proposal represented the culmination of their ob-
jective to situate the future of artificial intelligence (AI) within
the parameters of democratic governance.6 Almost immedi-
ately, however, the bill ignited a firestorm of debate that
touched on the core of the underlying conflict between private
property, the role of the government, and accountability. While
nearly everyone applauded the impetus toward government
transparency, some critics warned that increased disclosure
would expose city systems to significant security risks, causing
serious unintended consequences due to the proposal's
breadth.
7
Although concerns about government transparency are
relatively straightforward, this Article argues that the issues
raised by this debate underscore a growing divergence between
the foundational tenets of intellectual property and its tension
with AL. Ground zero for this conflict has become the murky,
4 It also required agencies to provide outputs to the user. See Int. No.
1696-2017, N.Y.C. COUNCIL (Oct. 16, 2017, 1:00 PM), http://legistar.council.nyc
.gov/MeetlngDetail.aspx?ID=564867&GUID=9567478C-C9F4-4EDE-89F2-
947E95A94ACD&Options=&Search [https: //perma.cc/R2UE-QZ8K].
5 McKenzie, supra note 1.
6 Id.; see also Benjamin Herold, 'Open Algorithms' Bill Would Jolt New York
City Schools, Public Agencies, EDUC. WK. (Nov. 8, 2017, 12:43 PM), http://blogs.ed
week.org/edweek/DigitalEducation/2017/11 /open-algorithms-billschools
.html [https://perma.cc/SFL9-3XCN (noting the bill's potential impact on the
use of educational algorithms).
7 See, e.g., Don Sunderland, Deputy Comm'r for Enter. and Sol. Architec-
ture, Dep't of Info. Tech. and Telecomms., Testimony of the Department of Infor-
mation Technology and Telecommunications on Int. 1696, A Local Law to Amend
the Administrative Code of the City of New York, in Relation to Automated
Processing of Data for the Purposes of Targeting Services, Penalties, or Policing to
Persons (Oct. 16, 2017), https://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/doitt/downloads/pdf/
DoITr/o2oTestimony0/2OInt%201696%20FINAL. pdf [https: //perma.cc/S6CR-
LACH] (discussing before the Committee on Technology perceived flaws in the
bill); see also Julia Powles, New York City's Bold, Flawed Attempt to Make Algo-
rithms Accountable, NEW YORKER (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/
tech/elements/new-york-citys-bold-flawed-attempt-to-make-algorithms-ac-
countable [https://perma.cc/NVU8-AMWY] (acknowledging the potential harms
that this legislation could have for contractual and proprietary interests). In the
end, the Council passed a law creating a task force of experts to investigate New
York City's use of algorithms, a move that represented a significant narrowing of
the bill's original goals. See Devin Coldewey, New York City Moves to Establish
Algorithm-Monitoring Task Force, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 12, 2017), https://tech-
crunch.com/2017/12/12/new-york-city-moves-to-establish- algorithm-monitor-
ing-task-force/ [https: //perma.cc/22LV-V2VU].
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messy intersection of software, trade secrecy, and public gov-
ernance. Today, algorithms are pervasive throughout public
law, employed in predictive policing analysis, family court de-
linquency proceedings, tax audits, parole decisions, DNA and
forensic science techniques, and matters involving Medicaid,
other government benefits, and educator evaluations.8 And
their results are often inscrutable, even though their results
can demonstrate significant risk of bias.9 In one example,
ProPublica analyzed the recidivism risk scores of over 7,000
people arrested during a two-year period in Broward County,
Florida, and found that only twenty percent of those predicted
to commit future crime actually did so, and that the formula
appeared to inaccurately flag black defendants as future
criminals at twice the rate of white defendants. 10
At their core, these automated systems often implicate cen-
tral issues of due process, criminal (and civil) justice, and equal
protection.1 1 Yet, because their inner workings are often pro-
tected as trade secrets, they can remain entirely free from pub-
lic scrutiny.12 In all of these cases, for example, the source
8 See Al Now INSTITUTE, LITIGATING ALGORITHMS: CHALLENGING GOVERNMENT USE
OF ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS 5 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatin-
galgorithms.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ52-PZAH] (noting these areas of use); see
also Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355,
356-57 (detailing government uses of automated decision making); A Local Law in
Relation to Automated Decision Systems Used by Agencies Testimony, N.Y.C.
COUNCIL, COMM. ON TECH. (Aug. 24, 2017) (Statement by Joshua North, Legal Aid
Society), at 80-81, available at http://legistar.councfl.nyc.gov/LegislationDetafl
.aspx?ID=3137815&GUID=437A6A6D-62E 1-47E2-9C42-461253F9C6D0&Op
tions=ID%7cText% 7cOther/o7c&Search= 1696 [https: //perma.cc/4QLT- 7X6M]
(listing the ways algorithms are used in the criminal justice system for bail,
predictive policing, DNA, family court, juvenile representation in delinquency pro-
ceedings, parole proceedings, and sex offender egistration); AARON RIEKE, MIRANDA
BOGEN & DAVID G. ROBINSON, PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF AUTOMATED DECISIONS: EARLY LES-
SONS AND EMERGING METHODS 3 (2018), https://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/
files/ filearchive / Public%20Scrutiny/o2OoP/o2OAutomated%2ODecisions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4DN-DXC4] (noting that the government uses algorithms to
screen immigrants and allocate social services).
9 See generally Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of
Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2018) (noting issues of
opacity in decision making).
10 See Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine
Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-
bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https: //perma.cc/EXU9-2JF9].
For a different perspective on the ProPublica study and related matters, see Ar-
thur Rizer & Caleb Watney, Artficial Intelligence Can Make Our Jail System More
Efficient, Equitable and Just, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 181, 210-13 (2019).
11 See Rizer & Watney, supra note 10, at 197; see also N.Y.C COUNCIL, supra
note 8, at 81 (Statement by Joshua North).
12 See Rebecca Wexler, When a Computer Program Keeps You in Jail, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/how-
computers-are-harming-criminal-justice.html [https: //perma.cc/G7GF-JGM4]
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code that underlies and governs automated decision making is
hidden from public view, comprising an unregulated "black
box" that is privately owned and operated. 13
This Article argues that the constitutionally inflected con-
flict that we now face is, in no small part, attributable to the
failure of our system of intellectual property law to definitively
address the boundaries of software protection and its implica-
tions for source code secrecy. As Pamela Samuelson recently
put it, software protection has waxed and waned through copy-
right and patent protection at different points, at times ex-
tending the boundaries of protection, and at other times
constricting it. 14 As a result, these uncertain and porous
boundaries, subject to inconsistency, variation, and indetermi-
nacy, have basically ushered in a system where the most risk-
averse option, rationally, is to rely on trade secrecy to protect
source code and to limit disclosure to the public as a result.
But this reliance on source code secrecy does not come
without a price. Today, it appears that algorithms, rather than
elected officials, are becoming a primary source of governance,
(-The root of the problem is that automated criminal justice technologies are
largely privately owned and sold for profit. The developers tend to view their
technologies as trade secrets."). See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and
Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1343 (2018) (discussing this problem) [hereinafter, Wexler, Life, Liberty, and
Trade Secrets].
13 See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGO-
RITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (discussing this problem). For
more on the issue of opacity in machine learning, see generally ROB KITCHIN, THE
DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONSE-
QUENCES (2014) (analyzing and summarizing the use of big data, open data, and
data infastructures); Mike Ananny, Toward an Ethics of Algorithms: Convening,
Observation, Probability, and Timeliness, 41 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 93 (2015)
(discussing the ethical dilemmas in networked information algorithms); Jenna
Burrell, How the Machine 'Thinks': Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning
Algorithms, 3 BIG DATA & SOC'Y 1 (2016) (considering opacity in regards to the
social consequences of algorithms related to personal and trace data); Danielle
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REv. 1 (2014) (arguing for due process safeguards in the
use of algorithms for those who are adversely impacted); Kate Crawford, Can an
Algorithm Be Agonistic? Ten Scenes from Life in Calculated Publics, 41 SCI. TECH. &
HUM. VALUES 77 (2016) (discussing the use of political theory to help understand
how algorithms operate in public life); Nicholas Diakopoulos, Algorithmic Account-
ability: Journalistic Investigation of Computational Power Structures, 3 DIGITAL
JOURNALISM 398 (2015) (considering how the hidden nature of algorithms rein-
forces societal power structures and biases); Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of
Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITIY, AND
SOCIETY 167 (Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., 2014) (discussing how algorithms de-
fine and produce knowledge).
14 Pamela Samuelson, Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the




hidden from view. 15 Computer software appears in almost eve-
rything-computational biology, 3D printing, automobiles,
home appliances, and much more. 16 But its dominance in the
public sector of governance and AI, as I and others have ar-
gued, has become a significant source of concern in part due to
the issue of privatization. 17 In a world of delegated decision
making, the consistent power of closed code has a number of
deleterious results for the public.18
This Article argues that source code carries a paradoxical
character that is peculiar to software: the very substance of
what is secluded often stems from the most public of origins,
and often produces the most public of implications. It is the
shortcomings of intellectual property law that have made this
possible.
In this Article, I argue that the law of software has been
willing to entertain a unique-and paradoxical-overlap be-
tween copyright, patent, and trade secrecy, even though the
three regimes have somewhat opposing public goals. Copyright
and patent law are oriented toward a spectrum that values
dissemination and the circulation of ideas. In contrast, trade
secrecy is motivated by opacity and seclusion. Yet software law
has openly tolerated-indeed invited-a regime of opposites by
15 For foundational perspectives on the view of code as governance, see gener-
ally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) (analyzing how
cyberspace has changed regulation); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The
Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REv. 553
(1998) (suggesting that legislators need to understand information technology in
order to regulate); James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE
L.J. 1719 (2005) (analyzing the impact of regulation on software); Kenneth A.
Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88
TEx. L. REv. 669 (2010) (discussing the power that regulation of software gives to
computer programmers to determine compliance with minimal transparency).
For an interesting, more recent account of the prospects of code regulation, see
Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1672 (2016).
16 Manny Schecter, The Changing Trade Secret and Patent Equilibrium, TECH-
CRUNCH (June 20, 2016,4 https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/20/the-changing-
trade-secret-and-patent-6quilibrium/ [https: //perma.cc/C9EL-HHQ9].
17 See generally Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54 (2019).
18 Of course, it is important to note that there are many other areas of poten-
tial accountability and transparency aside from source code, including training
data, data models, implementation guidelines, and even the business decisions
that affect design and development. See WHITrAKER ET AL., AI Now INsT., Al Now
REPORT 2018, at II (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/AI Now 2018_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/299L-92FQ] (listing these areas in addition to source code).
While this Article primarily focuses on the intersection between trade secrecy and
source code, these other areas (particularly the secrecy of training data) are im-
portant areas for future research as well. See Erik Stallman & Sonia Katyal,
Contracting for Transparency (abstract on file with author).
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enabling developers to commit to all three simultaneously,
even though their underlying values can be at cross purposes.
While this overlap of protection in software seems, at first
glance, to be a good thing for the proprietary software industry,
it has proven deleterious for the larger public in the context of
automated decision making, particularly citizens who are now
increasingly governed by an invisible hand that they can no
longer investigate or question.19 But, as I argue, this overlap
may also be deleterious for other innovators as well.
Almost fifteen years ago, in a brilliant article, James Gib-
son identified the risks to democracy that inhere in closed
code, particularly regarding its potential to encroach upon our
everyday lives without transparency or accountability.20 Those
fears are no longer speculative; they have become an everyday
reality for criminal defendants and others who are swept up by
the specter of automated government decision making.2 1 As a
result, it is entirely possible to imagine a world where all of us
face some form of automated regulation-all without detection,
in part because the code is closed from public view and
investigation. 22
While many software scholars have focused on issues re-
garding copyright and patent protection, I argue that a greater
focus on trade secrecy-and specifically source code secrecy-
is gravely overdue in these current circumstances.23 In this
Article, I investigate an overlooked paradigm associated with
source code, one that stems from the current failures of both
private and public law to incentivize disclosure, leading to a
domain where source code is largely dominated by trade se-
crecy. In both abstract and practical terms, this failure to in-
19 See generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: How HIGH-TECH
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2017) (arguing that government use of
automated data further disenfranchises the poor); SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGO-
RITHMS OF OPPRESSION: How SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018) (discussing
the way algorithms in search engines perpetuate oppression and create new kinds
of racial profiling); CATHY O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION (2016) (noting that
although algorithms are seen as neutral because of their mathematical basis, they
perpetuate discrimination).
20 James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 190
(2005).
21 N.Y.C. COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 80-81 (Statement by Joshua North).
22 See David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile
Bodies, in SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINA-
TION 13, 13 (David Lyon ed., 2003), http://www.felfel.is/sites/default/ffles/
2016/Lyon,_D._(2003)._Surveillance and social-sorting/o26_computer codes_
andmobile bodies%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/G7RQ-XKWJI.
23 It bears mentioning that this Article is written mostly for a non-tech expert
audience. For a related and excellent study of the role of trade secrecy in criminal
proceedings, see Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets, supra note 12.
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centivize disclosure has produced significant public law
implications, ones that we are now grappling with due to the
rise of Al.
To understand further the origins of source code secrecy
and its implications, however, we need to look back through
the complicated history of legal protection for software. In the
first half of this Article, focusing primarily on intellectual prop-
erty law, I describe the dominance of trade secrecy over source
code, attributing it to a complex, dyadic relationship between
law and the marketplace over the last several decades. As I
describe, the specific qualities of software, with its short shelf
life and abstract qualities, seem at first glance to be an imper-
fect fit for patent and copyright protection. Yet both areas of
law were extended to protect software after some period of re-
luctance, leading to a regime where these different areas of law
were essentially treated as complementary to trade secret
protection.
Despite the extension of copyright and patent protection
over software (or perhaps because of it), software garnered a
unique position within the law: it remains one of the few
spheres to enjoy concurrent protections from trade secrecy,
copyright law, and patent law. Yet this state of affairs has
produced dramatic implications for both the surrounding
software industry and the public, who have become increas-
ingly dependent on mass market software.
In the second half of the Article, I examine the implications
of this shift toward mass market software for the public inter-
est. Here, I examine the increasing rise of "closed code govern-
ance," which involves government's delegation of core
government functions to private, automated decision mak-
ing.2 4 As I show, the consequences of this reliance on automa-
tion are particularly significant for marginalized groups who
are often governed by closed code without a formidable ability
to challenge or address their situation due to trade secrecy.
This Article has five parts. In Parts I and II, after a brief
introduction to software and source code, I outline how both
administrative and common law decisions have invited the co-
existence of copyright and trade secrecy, allowing software to
be widely disseminated and yet consistently underscored by
source code secrecy at the same time.25 In Part III, turning to
software patentability, I argue that the shifting boundaries of
24 See Citron, supra note 8, at 360.
25 Schecter, supra note 16, at 190.
[Vol. 104:11831190
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protection have produced a more complicated story. Since the
boundaries of software patentability have also narrowed, trade
secrecy becomes an even more attractive default avenue for
protection, essentially displacing all other possibilities.
In Part IV, turning toward public law, I examine the civic
implications of source code secrecy. Here, I argue that closed
source code produces a dilemma for public transparency in an
age of Al. At a time when so many government functions are
being delegated to private companies, the rise of trade secrecy
raises critical questions of accountability and oversight. In the
final part of this Article, I address how governments-and
courts-can address this problem, both through common law
and regulatory reform.
In Part V, I make a case for limiting source code secrecy in
certain contexts, offering an architecture of what I call "con-
trolled disclosure." The Article concludes with a brief discus-
sion of ways to offer greater transparency for source code and
automated decisionmaking through reforming areas of intellec-
tual property, contract law, and discovery. Here, I argue that
the particular significance of source code necessitates a more
granular set of efforts by legislators and courts toward trans-
parency. Finally, returning to the City Council law that opened
this paper, I offer a modest set of possibilities to engage greater
norms toward disclosure in cases of significant public interest.
I
SOURCE CODE SECRECY AND COPYRIGHT
Over twenty years ago, Lawrence Lessig famously pro-
claimed, "Code is law."2 6 That statement, at the time, was
largely taken to suggest that computer code regulated human
conduct in the same way that law regulated human conduct.27
Today, however, many years later, we see that Lessig's observa-
tion was more than just a metaphor for regulating human be-
havior. In our modern age of algorithms, it is literally the case
that code is law, and that law is code, because our government
has delegated so many of its functions to automated decision
making.28 Yet to understand both the rise of trade secrecy, and
its significant implications for democratic transparency, we
must start with studying the history of code, its emergence,
and its relationship to other areas of intellectual property.
26 LESSIG, supra note 15, at 5.
27 Id.
28 See Citron, supra note 8, at 360; Ohm & Reid, supra note 15, at 1673
(noting how physical functionality of devices has become replaced by code).
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Since the onset of the computer age, the law has struggled
to find a way to protect software through intellectual property
principles, and it has rarely reached a consistent conclusion.
At various times, different types of legal protection-copyright,
patent, trade secret-have all dominated the landscape, leav-
ing software law to become an area of considerable murkiness.
In an influential article, now-Justice Stephen Breyer expressed
concerns about the harm that might result from copyrighting
software, reasoning that copyrighting code would increase
transaction costs and impede the sharing of information that
characterized the industry's expansion.29 If parties had to li-
cense content from others, Breyer argued that they would ex-
pend efforts on designing around protected code, wasting
precious resources to avoid litigation.
30
As Breyer's observations suggest, software's integration
with hardware, coupled with the absence of protections in cop-
yright and patent law, led to an initial focus on trade secrecy
and contract law for protection, what some have described as
the first phase of software protection under intellectual prop-
erty law.3 1 Later, as mass market licenses entered the picture,
leading to greater separation between hardware and software,
copyright law became an increasingly attractive engine for pro-
tection, facilitated in no small part by a cadre of commentators
and Congressional eaders who urged greater propertization,
ushering in a second phase of protection.
32
Afterward, in the early 2000s, software entered yet another
shift, one that has been described as a third phase of protec-
tion, attributable to the limited scope of copyright protection
and the increasing attractiveness of software patenting.33 At
first, this third phase seemed to offer developers some certainty
of protection by enabling parties to pursue patentability in ad-
dition to the other options.34 Copyright law protected software;
29 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 348 (1970).
30 Id.
31 See Bradford L. Smith & Susan 0. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Prop-
erty Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. CHI.
L. REv. 241, 242 (2004) (describing various phases of the software industry's
development, starting with contract law).
32 See id. at 242, 245.
33 Id. at 242.
34 MARK A. LEMLEY, PETER S. MENELL, ROBERT P. MERGES & PAMELA SAMUELSON,
SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 3 (3d ed. 2006).
[Vol. 104:11831192
2019] THE PARADOX OF SOURCE CODE SECRECY 1193
patent law protected computer hardware and, increasingly,
new processes and structures embodied in software.35
Today, due in no small part to the narrowing of software
patentability and other forces, I would argue that we see that
software's relationship to intellectual property law is now en-
gaged in yet another revision. This fourth phase (if it can even
be described as such) demonstrates a robust reliance on the
backdrop of trade secrecy at the cost of more disclosure-ori-
ented regimes like copyright and patent law. As I show in the
Parts below, copyright and patent developments in software did
little to incentivize disclosure, making trade secrecy even more
attractive as a default mode of protection.
A. Code: An Introductory (and Incomplete) History
On a very basic level, a computer can perform a variety of
different functions depending on the software it is fed. 36 These
instructions to the computer are comprised of binary digits-
ones and zeroes-and encode, step by step, a series of direc-
tions to the computer's physical hardware. This chain of ones
and zeroes is called a computer's "object code" and is largely
unreadable by humans.37
The first programming languages were originally motivated
by the desire to replace the painstaking nature of specialized
code with mathematical formulas.3s Fortran, the first widely
known computer language, was introduced by IBM in 1957.39
Eventually, programmers began to develop other kinds of com-
puter languages, like BASIC, Pascal, and C.40 These high-level
35 Id. at 3 (concluding in 2006 that "the main contours of legal protection for
computer technology are relatively clear").
36 Gibson, supra note 20, at 174.
37 Id.
38 Niklaus Wirth, A Brief History of Software Engineering, IEEE ANNALS HIST.
COMPUTING, July-Sept. 2008, at 32-33.
39 Id.
40 Gibson, supra note 20, at 174. This summary of software history is admit-
tedly all too brief. For various perspectives on the history of computing, see
generally Thomas Haigh, Historical Reflections: The Tears of Donald Knuth, 58
CoMMs. ACM 40 (2015); Martin Campbell-Kelly, The History of the History of
Software, IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING, Oct.-Dec. 2007, at 40. Donald E. Knuth
& Luis Trabb Pardo, The Early Development of Programming Languages, in A
HISTORY OF COMPUTING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 197 (N. Metropolis et al. eds.,
1980); STEVE LOHR, Go To: THE STORY OF THE MATH MAJORS, BRIDGE PLAYERS, ENGI-
NEERS, CHESS WIZARDS, MAVERICK SCIENTISTS AND INCONOCLASTS-THE PROGRAMMERS
WHO CREATED THE SOFTWARE REVOLUTION (2001); GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE: INSIDE
LrNux AND THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION (2001); James W. Cortada, Researching the
History of Software from the 1960s, IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING, Jan.-Mar.
2002, at 73; JEAN E. SAMMET, PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES: HISTORY AND FUNDAMENTALS
(1969); HISTORY OF PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES (Richard L. Wexelblat ed., 1981);
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languages, while still largely intelligible to only the most skilled
programmers, came to be known as "source code," in part be-
cause they abstract away from the object code.4 1 While the
definition of object code seems relatively straightforward,
source code can be defined in both broad and narrow terms.
42
But it essentially comprises everything that matters in
software. Source code represents the commands that control a
computer program, comprising a series of alphanumeric char-
acters that are legible to humans.4 3 Since computers only un-
derstand object code, use of a compiler is necessary to
translate the source code into assembly code, which is an inter-
mediate-level language; an assembler then translates the as-
sembly code into object code.
44
But source code is much more than just lines of com-
mands-it comprises the lifeblood of software, embodying both
the potential of the creativity that produces the code and the
functionality that the code achieves. Although it mainly gener-
ates ready-to-use binaries, source code is essential for a variety
of other practical reasons.45 From a developer's perspective, it
is generally considered much more versatile and informative
Thomas Ball, A Brief History of Software-From Bell Labs to Microsoft Research,
2009 6f" IEEE International Working Conference Mining Software Repositories
(May 16, 2009), in IEEE XpLoRE, June 2009. Christof Ebert, A Brief History of
Software Technology, IEEE SOFTwARE, Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 22.
41 Gibson, supra note 20, at 174.
42 A typical description of source code in litigation is the following:
source code, object code (i.e., computer instructions and data defi-
nitions expressed in a form suitable for input to an assembler, com-
piler, or other translator), any text written in any high-level
programming language defining firmware and/or software function-
alities implemented on an integrated circuit, microcode, register
transfer language ("RTL"), firmware, and hardware description lan-
guage ("HDL"), as well as any and all notes, annotations, and other
comments of any type related thereto and accompanying the code.
For avoidance of doubt, this includes source files, make files, inter-
mediate output fies, executable fies, header fies, resource fies,
library files, module definition fies, map files, object fies, linker
files, browse info fies, and debug files.
David Maiorana, Diagrams Not Considered Source Code Under Modified Protective
Order, JONES DAY (Nov. 10, 2017), http: //jonesdayitcblog.com/source-code-modi-
fled-protective-order/[https://perma.cc/VSV3-3M6B].
43 Christian Chessman, Note, A "Source" of Error: Computer Code, Criminal
Defendants, and the Constitution, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 181 (2017).
44 Gibson, supra note 20, at 175; see also Glenn J. MacGrady, Protection of
Computer Software-An Update and Practical Synthesis, 20 HOus. L. REv. 1033,
1036 (1983) (explaining the conversion of source code into machine-readable and
loadable instructions). Note, however, that many computer languages today,
Javascript being one example, are not compiled to object code but are interpreted
instead.
45 See Source Code Definition, LINUX INFO. PROJECT, http://www.linfo.org/
source code.html [https://perma.cc/UAP6-PR22] (last updated Feb. 14, 2006).
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than object code, since access to the source code usually en-
sures that the system administrator can better tailor the
software to particular requirements.46 Having access to the
source code also means that it is easier to fix bugs, determine
error rates, respond to viruses, or locate other forms of mali-
cious content.47 It is also a core source of information to en-
sure interoperability, enhances learning for both new and
experienced programmers, and assists with the purposes of
software reusability.
48
Yet because source code and software are often synony-
mized and treated alike in the case law and literature, it is often
hard to realize, on a more granular level, that much of the case
law involving source code involves something that is generally
secret. The public prominence of software often overshadows
its private, secret source code. However, the best way to figure
out how a program actually works, particularly to assess its
reliability and accuracy, is to start by reading the source
code.
4 9
B. The Birth of Source Code Secrecy
If we are to understand the rise of secrecy in software, then
we must start at the place where mass market software began.
One of the biggest shifts in computing took place in the late
1950s when computers, which had previously only been availa-
ble to research institutions and universities, began to enter the
world of business.5 0 Initially, many companies developed
software in house to keep up with the demands of customiza-
tion.5 1 This meant that most agreements were governed by
contract law and, relatedly, trade secrecy, rather than other
forms of intellectual property protection. Yet, over time,
software development firms began to recognize that more and
more clients were demanding the same sorts of projects, and
they began to develop programs for a wider market.5 2 As com-
puting capacity began to expand, more attention came to be
paid to the value of automation and structured programming. 
53
Around this time, the field of computer science began to




49 Chessman, supra note 43, at 182.
50 Wirth, supra note 38, at 32.
51 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 3.
52 Id.
53 Wirth, supra note 38, at 33.
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guages did not fit either the domain of mathematics nor elec-
tronics.5 4 In 1975, software developers howed that high level
languages could be used on microcomputers, reducing the
need for expensive, sophisticated compilers.55 Around this
time, more and more software firms began to emerge to satisfy
the more general purpose needs of their customers.56 Thus,
the market for software began to expand from custom program-
ming to the development of products that required very little
customization.57 At that point, as expert Niklaus Wirth de-
scribes, "[sluddenly, there was a mass market. Computing
went mainstream."58
The computer industry grew by leaps and bounds from the
1960s to the 1970s, so that by the end of the 1970s, almost one
hundred percent of Fortune 500 companies used computers.5 9
By the end of the 1970s, almost fifty percent (or more) of the
software used by organizations consisted of commercially avail-
able packages.60 Although most developers had been relying
on simple contract law (coupled with confidentiality provisions)
to govern disputes, given the increased mass market potential,
the industry turned to copyright law to seek protection.6 1 But
their efforts became complicated by the increasing complexity
of the process of software development. In the 1960s and
1970s, for example, the industry began to actively differentiate
the designing of software from the development of code; com-
puter scientists focused on design principles first and then on
writing computer code second.6 2
As software became more complex, the role of the software
engineer started to look less and less like a traditional "author"
of the code.63 The advent of software engineering dramatically
increased the complexity of programs, bringing both modu-
larization and structure, but it also contributed to a growing
division between what came to be known as "literal" versus
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 31.
57 Id.
58 Wirth, supra note 38, at 35.
59 Cortada, supra note 40, at 73.
60 Id.
61 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 32.
62 See Wirth, supra note 38, at 32-33; see also Michael S. Mahoney, What
Makes the History of Software Hard, 30 IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING, July-Sept.
2008, at 8 (describing the emergence of software engineering).
63 See Wlrth, supra note 38, at 34-35.
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"nonliteral" forms of protection.64 By diverging from the literal,
code-based characteristics of software from the previous era,
these programs opened the door to more challenges under
copyright protection because they toed a fine line between idea
and its expression, and thus were vulnerable to merger-related
challenges.
65
What emerges, then, from this (admittedly brief and incom-
plete history) is that software increasingly became more than
just a program, it began to comprise also the design, involving
more abstract ideas, rather than just code.6 6 As software sys-
tems grew in complexity, the concept of modularization began
to take on greater significance, and the rise of the personal
workstation led, in no small part, to the development of the
concept of object orientation, which led to the creation of win-
dows, buttons, toolbars, icons, and menus.67 By the mid-
1980s, enormous advances in hardware led to a massive rise in
computing power, blending the fields of computer and commu-
nications technologies with the advent of the Internet.
68
During the last decade, of course, perhaps the most atten-
tion has been focused on the development of Al, which is a field
that develops computer systems to perform tasks normally per-
formed by humans, including those that implicate learning and
decision making.69 Al has grown significantly in recent years,
in no small part due to the development of machine learning,
which relies on developing algorithms that can create analyti-
cal models from data, without relying on a human to program a
solution.70 Before the advent of machine learning, software
developers had to manually code a variety of functions into a
system; today, machine learning can do all of this much more
64 At the lowest level of abstraction is the source or object code of a computer
program, its literal element. A higher level of abstraction involves things like
design features (its "architecture"), which constitute nonliteral elements. See
LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 35 (noting this distinction).
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 Wirth, supra note 38, at 37.
68 Id. In the last few decades, computer-aided software engineering (CASE)
provided automated assistance in software design and development.
69 Digital Decision-Making: The Building Blocks of Machine Learning and Artifi-
cial Intelligence, 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (statement of Dario Gil, Vice President, Al
and Quantum Computing, IBM).
70 Id. at 2. For an explanation, see Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz,
Learning Algorithms and Discrimination, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
ARIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 88 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) (noting
that "machine learning is nonparametric and does not involve devising any partic-
ular mathematical model in advance").
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efficiently.7 1 In addition, advances in processing speed and
power, and the emergence of specialized processing devices like
graphical processing units, have enabled the use of artificial
neural networks in a variety of embedded technologies and
home devices.
72
All of these developments, while great for the software in-
dustry, have posed complexities for intellectual property law,
which has maintained relatively porous boundaries around
areas of software protection. These shifts also usher in a kind
of inescapable hybridity between literal and nonliteral forms of
software protection.73 As one commentator explains:
[S]oftware is a very cumbersome expression of an idea. If
asked about details of a software system by a mid-level man-
ager, a programmer would never hand that manager pages of
computer code, but instead, would choose an intermediate
level of the design, perhaps a combination of some dataflow
diagrams and some text description, to express her idea....
The design expresses the idea and the code expresses the
idea; in the modem software engineering environment, the
two are inextricably tied. The design represents the code
and, as demonstrated above, the design is the code.7 4
As a result, software in and of itself is a chimera: it can be
classified so narrowly that it can fall into multiple categories of
intellectual property protection; or, it can be classified so
broadly that it fits into none of them at all. And the law has
supported this variance with its own shifting boundaries of
intellectual property protection.
C. The Copyrightability of Software
In the early years of software development, particularly
from the 1960s to the 1980s, programmers regularly shared
source code, in part because much of the core aspects of com-
puter operating systems were developed in an academic setting
or in central corporate research labs with a great deal of auton-
71 Digital Decision-Making: The Building Blocks of Machine Learning and Artifi-
cial Intelligence, supra note 69, at 2 (statement of Dario Gil, Vice President, Al and
Quantum Computing, IBM).
72 Id.
73 Joseph G. Arsenault, Software Without Source Code: Can Softwawre Pro-
duced by a Computer Aided Software Engineering Tool Be Protected?, 5 ALB. L.J.
SCl. & TECH. 131, 143 (1994) (questioning whether the software design is copy-
rightable, and if so, at what level it is protectable).
74 Id_ at 156.
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omy.75 In these settings, highly cooperative software develop-
ment projects emerged, with little effort made to establish the
boundaries of intellectual property ownership or to restrict
reuse. 
76
Soon after the introduction of high-level programming lan-
guages like FORTRAN and others, software developers began to
turn to contract law, along with copyright, patent, and trade
secret law to protect their work.77 Early programmers wrote
software much like authors wrote manuscripts: they would
come up with an idea and write down the program necessary to
make the idea come to fruition. 78 A program, therefore, com-
prised a sequence that ran from the beginning to its end, and
the programmer would write and rewrite the code until it ac-
complished its task.79 In such cases, protection against verba-
tim copying was usually enough to protect the information.8 0
Although the original Copyright Act understandably made
no reference to computer programs,8 1 the Copyright Office in
the mid-1960s began to allow registration-concluding that
computer programs were readable, written works of author-
ship, but noting that the registrations could only issue under
its "rule of doubt."8 2 Yet this move represented a first bold step
toward hybridizing copyright and trade secret protection in
mass market software. As Diane Zimmerman explains,
[tlhis [mass-market] change led those in the software indus-
try to see the advantage in trying to take advantage of copy-
right while retaining the benefits of trade secrecy. The use of
copyright would enable them to distribute copies of their
works in object code (that is, computer-readable) form to the
public backed up by the threat of sanctions for infringe-
ment .... At the same time, developers wanted to maintain
the economic value of their programs and ward off competi-
75 Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Simple Economics of Open Source 200 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 7600, 2000), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w7600.pdf [https: //perma.cc/6ES3-LB5R].
76 Id.
77 Gibson, supra note 20, at 176.
78 Arsenault, supra note 73, at 142.
79 Id. at 144.
80 Id. at 149.
81 Richard Raysman, Protection of Proprietary Software in the Computer In-
dustry: Trade Secrets as an Effective Method, 18 JURIMETRICS J. 335, 337-38
(1978).
82 Deposit of Computer Programs and Other Works Containing Trade Secrets,
48 Fed. Reg. 22,897, 22, 951 (May 23, 1983) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 202); Jay
Dratler, Jr., Trade Secret Law: An Impediment o Trade in Computer Software, 1
SANrA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH-TECH. L.J. 27, 42, n.64 (1985) (observing that object
code was protected almost entirely by copyright law until the early 1980s).
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tion by keeping the expression that embodied the design of
these programs-their source code-a secret.
8 3
Both objectives, Zimmerman writes, were achieved by con-
vincing Congress to adopt a rule of doubt,8 4 suggesting that the
Copyright Office deferred to the courts' judgment.8 5 Later,
Congress established a National Commission on New Techno-
logical Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), which concluded
that copyright was the most appropriate form of protection for
computer programs.8 6 As Peter Menell has explained, at the
time that CONTU was created, neither patent nor copyright
had played a key role yet because the industry had developed
mostly in reliance on trade secret protection and contract law
instead.87
In these early days, computers were so specialized that
they were not sold through traditional retail channels, and
since hardware and software were often bundled together,
there was only a minimal need to consider separate protection
for software.88 For hardware, patent protection ensured an
adequate reward for the cost of innovation.8 9 Thus, at least
initially, contract law and trade secrecy provided much of the
necessary protection against misappropriation, leading one
leading commentator to conclude in 1978 that "[tirade secret
protection is, without question, the most effective current
means of protecting valuable computer software," noting that
one of the greatest drawbacks to patent and copyright was the
requirement of disclosure.90 During this period, companies re-
lied heavily on secrecy and contract law; for example, in 1983,
IBM started to include restrictions on the distribution of its
source code for its operating systems, and also to require licen-
sees to agree to refrain from reverse engineering.9 1 In the years
afterward, many more companies followed suit. But as the
83 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Trade Secrets and the 'Philosophy' of Copy-
right: A Case of Culture Clash, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HAND-
BOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 299, 301 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J.
Strandburg eds., 2011).
84 Id.
85 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 35.
86 Samuelson, supra note 14, at 11.
87 Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection
for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2644, 2652 (1994).
88 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 33. For an interesting discussion of the
source of the distinction between hardware and software, see James Grim-
melmann, The Structure and Legal Interpretation of Computer Programs 18 (2019)
(draft on file with author).
89 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 33.
90 Raysman, supra note 81, at 350.
91 Dratler, supra note 82, at n.64.
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mass market for software began to develop, it became clearer
and clearer that developers needed other forms of protection as
well. 92
1. Early Accommodations of Trade Secrecy
Throughout the history of intellectual property's relation-
ship with software, concerns about the secrecy of source code
have carried a special significance given the potential overlap
between trade secrecy and copyright. Initially, the Copyright
Office required deposit of the full source code, just as it did for
every other copyrighted work. Yet this proved to be a powerful
initial deterrent to copyrightability, as trade secret law had
already been the default mechanism.93 Because of the fear of
disclosure, only about 1,200 copyright registrations were is-
sued between 1966 and 1978.9 4 During this period, most of
the registered programs belonged to the largest computer hard-
ware manufacturers, who were in a better position to copyright
programs and to disclose the nature of the programs to the
public, because they stood to make more profit from selling
hardware than software.
95
Nevertheless, the choice to extend copyright protection to
software, at that point, seemed like a speculative gamble in
order to protect a nascent field of technology.9 6 As the leading
casebook on the topic explains:
As CONTU recognized, it was impossible in 1978 to establish
a precise line between copyrightable expression of computer
programs and the uncopyrightable processes that they im-
plement. Yet the location of this line-the idea/expression
dichotomy-was critical to the rough cost-benefit analysis
that guided CONTU's recommendation. Drawing the line too
liberally in favor of copyright protection would bestow strong
monopolies upon those who develop operating systems that
become industry standards and would thereby inhibit other
creators from developing improved programs and computer
systems. Drawing the line too conservatively would allow
programmers' efforts to be copied easily, thus discouraging
the creation of all but modest incremental advances.
97
92 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 4.
93 Id at 34.
94 Id.
95 Raysman, supra note 81, at 338.
96 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 33; see Note, Copyright Protection of Com-
puter Program Object Code, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (1983) (recommending
protection).
97 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 35; see also Peter S. Menell, An Epitaph for
Traditional Copyright Protection of Network Features of Computer Software, 43
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As a consequence of reviewing the results of the first few
years of software protection, in 1989 Congress decided to facili-
tate a remarkable break from its previous system: it decided to
forego the deposit requirement for source code and set up a
new system to respect the secrecy of source code instead.
Federal sources indicate that Congress decided to do so
after receiving a number of comments that argued for the es-
tablishment of "special deposit procedures to mitigate the al-
leged uncertainties associated with depositing material
containing trade secrets in a public office." 98 One additional
constituency that was particularly focused on gaining dual pro-
tection involved standardized test preparers, who desired the
ability to reuse their questions over multiple rounds of testing,
but still keep the questions secret.99 As the Register of Copy-
rights, Ralph Oman explained around that time:
The Office originally asked for [protectability of] source code,
because that best represents the copyrightable authorship.
But many copyright owners say that the source code version
of a program contains valuable trade secrets .... So the
Office gave special relief to allow registration without disclos-
ing trade secrets. Usually, we accepted an abbreviated de-
posit or a deposit with the trade secret material blocked
out. 100
There were other strategic reasons that weighed in favor of
a dual system. As Zimmerman explains,
By securing the source code behind a wall of secrecy, owners
could get remedies for breach where access to the product
was granted only sparingly and conditionally. But designers
of software for PCs could not be sure that courts would treat
their programming devices and choices as "secrets" once
thousands, even millions, of copies of the programs embody-
ing them were being sold (albeit in the impenetrable form of
object code). Being able to claim copyright was a kind of legal
insurance policy against the risk that a court might refuse to
recognize the existence of trade secrets in software distrib-
uted to the public at large.101
ANTITRUST BULL. 651, 654 (1998) (recognizing the role of courts in maintaining the
proper boundaries of copyright law).
98 Registration of Claims to Copyright Deposit Requirement for Computer
Programs Containing Trade Secrets and for Computer Screen Displays, 54 Fed.
Reg. 13,173, 13,173 (Mar. 31, 1989) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 202).
99 Zimmerman, supra note 83, at 311.
100 Ralph Oman, Software as Seen by the U.S. Copyright Office, 28 IDEA 29,30
(1987).
101 Zimmerman, supra note 83, at 311.
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The Copyright Office, rather than Congress, decided to step in
to solve the problem. Instead of requiring total deposit of the
source code, the Copyright Office decided to require registrants
to file the first and last twenty-five pages (or equivalent) of
source code with the trade secret sections blocked out, so long
as they were "proportionately less than the material remaining,
and the deposit reveals an appreciable amount of original com-
puter code."10 2 In one of the few court challenges to address
these special deposit requirements, the Seventh Circuit held
that these specialized rules did not require public disclosure,
and the Copyright Office was well within its purview of discre-
tion in designing specialized rules for secret, copyrighted
material. 103
Yet this shift toward accommodation, I would argue, repre-
sented a contradiction in terms. The deposit requirements
were historically motivated to promote access to the public;
whereas the administrative tolerance for closed code was es-
sentially designed to enable circumvention of disclosure alto-
gether. 1o4 As a result, source code remains, even to this day,
marred by its underlying incoherence between its expression
as a (potentially public) authorial creation and its function as a
closely held trade secret.
2. Copyrighting Code
While most software shops behaved collaboratively in the
early years, relying on mostly contract and trade secrecy, that
began to change in the early 1980s, when AT&T began to
102 Registration of Claims to Copyright Deposit Requirement for Computer
Programs Containing Trade Secrets and for Computer Screen Displays, supra
note 98, at 13,176; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE PRACTIcEs § 1509.1(C)(4)(d) (3d ed. 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/
comp3/docs/compendium. pdf [https://perma.cc/73VY-44XM] (detailing the
U.S. Copyright Office's instructions on the appropriate method for blocking out
source code that contains trade secret material); Joseph Potvin, How Is Copyright
Relevant to Source Data and Source Code?, TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. REV. (Feb.
2008), https://timreview.ca/article/121 [https://perma.cc/NC3Q-7WS7] (out-
lining how copyright law relates to source data and source code); Scott Bell, Aly
Dossa & Timothy M. Smith, To Protect Your Source Code, Treat It Like Intellectual
Property, SOFrWARE DEV. TIMES (July 12, 2011), https://sdtimes.com/intellectual-
property/to-protect-your-source-code-treat-it-like-intellectual-property/ [https: /
/perma.cc/XEW5-5HEM] (differentiating the protections for source code between
trade secrets, copyrights, and patents).
103 See Zimmerman, supra note 83, at 312 (discussing Nat'l Conference of Bar
Examiners & Educ. Testing Serv. v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692 F.2d 478
(7th Cir. 1982)).
104 See id. at 313 (discussing how deposit requirements became loosened after
fixation, rather than publication, became the focus of protection, and also due to
space considerations at the Library of Congress).
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threaten litigation to enforce its rights to Unix, an operating
system that could run on multiple platforms. In response,
Richard Stallman of the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
started the Free Software Foundation, which aimed to dis-
tribute code openly and with restrictions in place to preclude
assertions of proprietary control. 10 5
As the Unix dispute demonstrated, the question of how
source code and its secrecy intersected with intellectual prop-
erty began to take on more importance before courts, the Copy-
right Office, and Congress. Today, despite the initial
application of the rule of doubt in the case of software protec-
tion under copyright, it is well settled that copyright law pro-
tects the original, literal elements of both a program's source
code and its object code.1 0 6 Object code, too, is protectable
105 There is a vast literature exploring the dynamics of the open source move-
ment. See, e.g., Greg Madey et al., The Open Source Software Development Phe-
nomenon: An Analysis Based on Social Network Theory, AMCIS 2002 PROCS. 247
(2002) (discussing the way the open source software community works in order to
improve reliance on open source software); Joachim Henkel, Simone Sch6berl &
Oliver Alexy, The Emergence of Openness: How and Why Firms Adopt Selective
Revealing in Open Innovation, 43 RES. POL'Y 879, 879-90 (2014) (discussing coop-
eration in the open source software community); ERIC STEVEN RAYMOND, THE CATHE-
DRAL AND THE BAZAAR (2000), http://www.catb.org/esr/writings/cathedral-
bazaar/ cathedral -bazaar [https://perma.cc/LXF6-WNKG] (discussing open
source development); Brian Fitzgerald, The Transformation of Open Source
Software, 30 MIS Q. 587, 587 (2006) (arguing that the open source software
movement has shifted from a "proprietary-driven model" to "a more mainstream
and commercially viable form"); ROD DIXON, OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE LAW (2004)
(introducing the legal framework that has evolved to support the open source
software community); Michael Schwarz & Yuri Takhteyev, Half a Century of Public
Software Institutions: Open Source as a Solution to Hold-Up Problem, 12 J. PUB.
ECON. THEORY 609 (2010) (arguing that proprietary software causes underinvest-
ment in complementary products due to fears of hold up, and using this thesis to
explain the success of open source in software development platforms like operat-
ing systems); Jeevan Jaisingh, Eric W.K. See-To & Kar Yan Tam, The Impact of
Open Source Software on the Strategic Choices of Firms Developing Proprietary
Software, 25 J. MGMT. INFO. SYs. 241 (2014) (comparing the effect of open source
software on the marketplace for software innovation); Eric von Hippel, Open
Source Software Projects as User Innovation Networks (unpublished manuscript)
(draft on file with author) (studying conditions for user innovation); Maxim V.
Tsotsorin, Comment, Open Source Software Compliance: The Devil Is Not so Black
as He Is Painted, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 559 (2013) (explor-
ing dimensions of open source software compliance in licensing); V.K. Unni, F/fty
Years of Open Source Movement: An Analysis Through the Prism of Copyright Law,
40 S. ILL. U. L.J. 271 (2016) (providing a broad overview of the history of the open
source software movement); Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluat-
ing Free and Proprietary Software, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 265 (2004) (offering a frame-
work for assessing the value of free and proprietary software).
106 See Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir.
1992) ("It is now well settled that the literal elements of computer programs, i.e.,
their source and object codes, are the subject of copyright protection."). The
Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices further explains that it "considers
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under copyright. 10 7 The argument, as it goes, follows this rea-
soning: "Since source code is copyrightable, and since source
code can readily be translated into object code, object code
must also be copyrightable."10 8
As Samuelson explains, the early cases that followed the
1980 Amendments focused on either the copying of audiovisual
elements, code, or both. ' 0 9 For cases of line-by-line copying of
source and object code, i.e., literal infringement, copyright
served as a useful vehicle of protection.1'0 The basic case es-
tablishing copyright infringement for the literal elements of
program code was Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., in which Franklin copied, verbatim, Apple's operating
system and several application programs.' 11 While Franklin
did not dispute the question of appropriation, it argued that
Apple's operating system was not protectable under copyright,
because unlike books or literary works, code was not intended
to be read by a human. 112
While the earliest code-related cases were relatively
straightforward cases of misappropriation,113 over time, the
cases that raised more complexity involved "nonliteral" in-
source code to be the best representation of the copyrightable authorship in a
computer program" for the purposes of examination, particularly because object
code cannot be examined since it is unintelligible to humans. U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, supra note 102, § 1509. 1(C).
107 While there was some initial trepidation over its copyrightability, due to its
functionality, its protection is now well settled. LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at
35.
108 Id. at 37 (citing Dan L. Burk, Software as Speech, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
683, 687-88 (1998) (noting that courts have rejected arguments that source code
is not copyrightable)).
109 Samuelson, supra note 14, at 12.
110 Arsenault, supra note 73, at 138-39.
111 Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983).
112 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 33-34. Indeed, the court's argument
mirrored, almost perfectly, the observations offered by one CONTU Commissioner,
who wrote in his dissent that "[programs are profoundly different from the vari-
ous forms of 'works of authorship' . . . [which] have always been intended to be
circulated to human beings and to be used by them-to be read, heard, or seen,
for either pleasurable or practical ends." Id. at 36-37 (quoting FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 28 (1978)
[hereinafter CONTU FINAL REPORT]). Yet despite these arguments, the court firmly
concluded that object code could be protectable, reasoning that section 101 in-
cluded an expansive list of categories of literary works, including those that com-
prised "numbers, or other.., numerical symbols or indicia." Apple Comput., Inc.,
714 F.2d at 1247 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
113 See, e.g., Cadence Design Sys., Inc., v. Avantl Corp., 125 F.3d 824 (9th Cir.
1997) (software manufacturer brought an action against a competitor for misap-
propriation of trade secrets); Engenium Sols., Inc. v. Symphonic Techs., Inc., 924
F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (same).
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fringement claims-the program's structure, its sequence, its
organization, including some of the various steps that a
programmer might take prior to even drafting the code itself. 114
The need for a theory to address those cases became even more
prevalent as more and more cases of appropriation made their
way to the courts. 11
5
For example, structural, nonliteral claims proliferated
throughout the courts, beginning with landmark cases like
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., cul-
minating in cases involving the "structure, sequence, and or-
ganization" (SSO). 116 Whelan marked a watershed shift in the
area of software protection, because it represented the first of a
few cases that readily extended copyrightability to structure
and organization, and to other nonliteral elements. 1 17 Later,
courts began to narrow the breadth of Whelan's applicability,
articulating tests like Altai that encouraged courts to separate
out unprotectable elements by first identifying which parts of
the software comprise abstract ideas (as divorced from expres-
sion), then to filter out all unprotectable elements (like ele-
ments from the public domain), and then finally to compare all
remaining elements to determine infringement.1 18
Afterward, courts and scholars tended to focus mostly on
nonliteral forms of infringement, like the program's structure
and organization, including flow charts, intermodular relation-
ships, parameter lists, and macros.119 Literal forms of in-
fringement, such as source or object code appropriation,
remained a deceptively simplified area of intellectual property
114 See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Copyright Infringement of Computer
Software and the 'Altai' Test, 235 N.Y. L.J., May 9, 2006, at 1-2 (discussing
cases).
115 For such cases, the operable question became how far courts were pre-
pared to depart from the literal expression of the code to protect other elements
under copyright principles. See Arsenault, supra note 73, at 140 (discussing this
in more detail).
116 Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1240 (3d
Cir. 1986).
117 See id. at 1239 (explaining that the structure of a program is part of the
expression, not the idea, of that program); see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. S&H Comput.
Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (recognizing the extent that a
competitor copied the organizational and structural details of SAS); Apple Com-
put., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing user
interfaces, input formats, and output reports); Eng'g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural
Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342-43 (5th Cir. 1994) (endorsing the abstraction-
filtration-comparison method).
118 Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
119 Raysman & Brown, supra note 114, at 1 (quoting Comput. Assocs. Int'l,
Inc., 982 F.2d at 702).
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protection, even though cases continued to quietly percolate
through the courts.
D. The Continuing Overlap Between Copyright and Trade
Secrecy
Nevertheless, despite the potential role of copyright protec-
tion, secrecy continued to dominate, even though one of the
most significant developments in the history of software was
the rise of the open source movement, which emerged out of a
distrust of software secrecy in the 1990s.120 The movement
generally comprises a combination of two core principles: the
first involves the visibility of source code; the second involves
the right to create relatively unencumbered derivative software
for any purpose, including education or commercial.1 2 1 Since
the 1990s, the open source movement has also given rise to a
growth of collaborative activity, where commercial and open
source endeavors bundle cooperatively-developed software
with proprietary code. 122
Today, in the context of proprietary software, most compa-
nies market products in object code format only; the source
code remains firmly in the developer's hands, secluded from
the public and only shared upon the execution of a contract to
protect its secrecy. 123 There are many reasons for this, not the
least of which is secrecy.124 Object code is easier to install,
since file sizes are smaller, and preserves the secrecy of the
source code. 1
25
But this makes source code an awkward fit for copyright
law as a result. As Gibson has explained, too much private
control over copying and dissemination could deny the public
120 Wirth, supra note 38, at 37. For a great discussion of issues facing the
open source community, see Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J.
ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 6-16 (2002); see also supra note 105.
121 See Diomidis Spinellis & Clemens Szyperski, How Is Open Source Affecting
Software Development?, IEEE SoFrwARE, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 28, 29 (recognizing
these two core principles); Source Code Definition, supra note 45. As one commen-
tator observes, "Open source appeared as the welcome alternative to industrial
hegemony and abrasive profit, and also against helpless dependence on commer-
cial software." Wirth, supra note 38, at 37.
122 Lerner & Tirole, supra note 75, at 7.
123 Gibson, supra note 20, at 175.
124 See Source Code Definition, supra note 45.
125 Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software
Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REv. 255, 272-73 (1997) (discussing the reliance on trade
secrecy in software); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F.
Supp. 340, 359 (D. Mass. 1993), affd, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that
object code distribution does not disclose trade secrecy).
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access to goods and raw materials necessary for innovation.12 6
But too little private control risks underproduction. 12 7 For this
reason, the traditional architecture of copyright offers a limited
scope of protection to the owner, but tempers this private right
with a number of dedicated entitlements to the public, includ-
ing a finite term of protection (which then dedicates the work to
the public domain), the first sale doctrine, or fair use protection
in certain cases. 128
In other words, as Gibson notes, traditional copyright law
is intended to force a choice onto authors: if they keep the work
from the public, they forego profiting from it; or, they can bring
their creative works to the public and enable the public to see
the expression. 129 In most cases of copyrighted works like lit-
erary works, motion pictures, or musical recordings, the au-
thor has a sustained interest in publication, since it promotes
sales of the underlying work. The value of the copyrighted
work is thus inherently tied to the expectation of publication.
The exact opposite is true in the case of source code se-
crecy: its very value lies in its seclusion from the public. The
expected unification between publication and marketability
simply does not exist in the context of software, where secrecy
represents no obstacle to marketability. 130 As Gibson further
observes:
With software, however, we have a copyrighted work whose
unique architecture allows its author to profit without re-
vealing either its creative expression or its ideas to the pur-
chaser. The software developer thus receives the benefit of
copyright protection-the right to sue anyone who engages in
unauthorized reproduction or adaptation of the program-
without conferring the corresponding benefit on the rest of
us. Whatever ideas exist in the creative source code of a
computer program remain with the developer; all the public
encounters is an impenetrable and unrevealing string of ones
and zeroes. 131
In other words, as Gibson concludes, "[olnly with software may
authors have their cake and eat it too."
132
In contrast to object code, which has a public nature,
source code's content can be kept secret, even without any
126 Gibson, supra note 20, at 170-71.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 178.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 181 (footnote omitted).
132 Id. at 178.
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detrimental effect to its marketability.'3 3 Further, the Su-
preme Court has suggested that there is no disclosure obliga-
tion under copyright. 134 As Laura Heymann notes,
Copyright law may be justified by the ultimate goal of dissem-
inating works of authorship to the public, but since the move
in the 1976 Copyright Act from publication to fixation as the
triggering event for protection, the diary tucked away in a
desk drawer receives just as much protection as the best-
selling novel. 1
35
In the context of software, this means that both copyright and
trade secret law can overlap-producing something that can be
protected because of its content, but also kept from the public
because it is a trade secret. 136
Moreover, there are other ironies to this situation: copy-
right law protects object code, which manifests no creativity
but is largely functional in nature, whereas trade secret law
(traditionally the legal vehicle for protecting functional
processes) has now become the vehicle to protect source code
(despite its creativity). ' 7 The issue of functionality in copy-
rightable processes has troubled courts for years, starting back
in 1880 with Baker v. Selden, when the Supreme Court rejected
the copyrightability of an accounting system on the grounds
that it would confer protection over the system or process it-
self. ' 3 8 The same idea of limiting copyrightability for actual
processes, such as those found in software architecture, as
operations within modules, or as algorithms, has remained a
consistent source of judicial attention. 139 Similarly, courts
have expressed concerns over the copyrightability of facts, and
have defined "facts" in the software context to include not only
'33 Id. at 173.
134 See Laura A. Heymann, Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Elec-
tion of Rights Versus Selection of Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 239, 257-58
(2013) (noting that in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court noted that "our references to a
quid pro quo typically appear in the patent context") (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft,




138 Bakerv. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880), superseded by statute, Copyright
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). See also generally Pamela
Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between
Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159 (Jane C. Ginsburg
& Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (detailing the impact of the case on
copyright law analyses).
139 See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 837 (10th
Cir. 1993). See generally Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisitek The Case Against
Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions,
39 Emory L.J. 1025 (1990).
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parts of data structures, but also material that is literally ex-
pressed within source or object code as well. 140 Here, when
material that is in the public domain comprises part of a pro-
gram, courts have advocated the need to filter out the unorigi-
nal parts of a program by relying on both the merger and
scnes 4 faire doctrines to aid in the filtration. 141
Yet-paradoxically-the intersection of trade secrecy with
copyright in software runs contrary to the value of disclosure,
further impoverishing the public domain that is at the heart of
copyright's architecture. 142 The result is that our existing re-
gime fails to ensure the availability of public domain aspects of
software, and precludes evaluation of the protectability of the
code altogether. 14 3 The resulting irony, Gibson notes, is partic-
ularly striking: "[Tlhe law tells us that software comprises more
public domain elements than other copyrighted works, but the
architecture of closed code protects software more thoroughly
than any of its copyrighted counterparts."144
II
THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF SOFTWARE PATENTABILITY
As the above section suggested, software has a hybrid
character: like other copyrighted works, it expresses various
concepts, but, like a patented invention, it has the power to
physically implement those ideas only with the assistance of a
computer.145 This potentially rivalrous relationship between
copyright and patent to software produced an especially lively
debate from the mid- 1980s to 1990s.14 6 The issue rightfully
led commentators, then-Professor Stephen Breyer among
them, to question the need to extend copyright to computer
programs on the grounds that there were already substantial
incentives in place to encourage their production. 14 7 Although
some of those controversies waned a bit after the 1990s when a
few appellate courts began to narrow the scope of copyright-
ability in software due to its functionality, the debate has more
140 Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 837-38.
141 Id.
142 Gibson, supra note 20, at 178.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 181.
145 Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection-Integrating Patent, Copyright and
Trade Secret Law, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 151, 151 (1987).
146 Samuelson, supra note 14, at 1.
147 See Breyer, supra note 29, at 344; Samuelson, supra note 14, at 5. For a
modem-day response to Justice Breyer's article, see Pamela Samuelson, The
Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1746
(2011).
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recently picked up steam with the advent of the Oracle America,
Inc. v. Google Inc. case, which reinvigorated the overlap be-
tween copyright and patent claims for program interfaces.
148
The patentability of code also suffers from similar issues that,
like the copyright regime discussed above, tends to push devel-
opers toward the domain of trade secrecy. 149
If copyright's regime is directed toward maximizing the
benefits of publication, the patent system is equally motivated
toward maximizing the benefits of disclosure. 150 Both of these
policy goals contradict the comparative value of secrecy, how-
ever, in the context of source code, and therein lies the
problem.
Of course, law is also not the only reason to opt for secrecy.
The market also tends to support similar choices. 1
51 Surveys
have shown that company executives rank trade secrets as the
area of primary importance in their intellectual property portfo-
lios. 15 2 Secrecy also becomes incredibly attractive when the
nature of the invention is more easily able to be kept secret, as
in software, unlike industries like pharmaceuticals or con-
148 Samuelson, supra note 14, at 2 (referring to Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc.,
750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015)).
149 For more discussion of the trade secrecy/patent interface, see generally
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Se-
cret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
371 (2002) (discussing the legal and business considerations for an Inventor in
choosing between reliance on patent or trade secret law); David S. Almeling, Seven
Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1091 (2012) (detailing the rise in trade secret reliance); Michael Risch, Trade
Secret Law and Information Development Alternatives, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF
TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra note 83, at 167-76
(exploring different incentives underlying trade secret law versus patent law);
Bruce T. Atkins, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law
Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 1151, 1174-75 (noting the decline of
trade secret protection in the internet era).
150 Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pamela Samuelson & Ted
Sichelman, High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the
2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1317 (2009); see also
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 81, 111 (discussing the benefits of disclosure
under the patent system).
151 See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74
OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 624 (2013).
152 See Hamid Sakaki & Karn Thapar, Trade Secrets Protection and Corporate
Tax Avoidance, J. ACCT. & FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3) (discussing a
National Science Foundation survey that found that certain for-profit companies
across all industries ranked trade secrets as the most important kind of intellec-
tual property for their businesses). In 2008, a Berkeley Patent Survey revealed
that in industries like software, internet, manufacturing, and chemical process-
ing, patenting was perceived to be far less Important as a means to ensure a
competitive advantage. See Graham et al., supra note 150, at 1260; see also J.
Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 927 (2011).
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sumer products, where the nature of an invention is more ac-
cessible to the public. 153
Even aside from these market-based reasons to opt for
secrecy, the law has taken a curious path that has only further
served to quietly marshal resources toward trade secrecy. The
Court, for example, has entertained its own set of debates over
whether software is patentable, first rejecting the prospect,
then reversing itself, only to return to a more cynical view over
patentability more recently. 154 As I argue below, the result of
these shifts has only underscored the comparative attractive-
ness of trade secrecy, largely at a cost to the public interest in
transparency.
A. Patentability vs. Secrecy
In general, patent and trade secret protection are ideally
supposed to be mutually exclusive, since the patent system
does everything it can to discourage secrecy.1 55 Rather, the
patent system uses the powerful grant of a monopoly power as
the proverbial carrot in order to compel inventors to reveal the
nature of their inventions to the public. 156 This way, the patent
grant forces society to essentially "pay" for secrets which would
be otherwise unavailable to them by making the nature of the
invention informationally available upon conferral of the patent
and by enabling the public to practice the invention after the
term of protection has expired. 15 7
The idea that an applicant is supposed to "elect" between
patent and trade secrecy is a powerful, meaningful aspect of
our system of intellectual property. And disclosure to the pub-
lic is a core goal of patent law, as Jeanne Fromer has argued in
her work, because it promotes follow-on innovation. 158 But in
actuality, even in the context of software patents, the disclo-
'53 Anderson, supra note 152, at 927; see also Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protect-
ing Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufactur-
ing Firms Patent (or Not) 3, 24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7552, 2000), http://ssm.com/abstract=214952 [https://perma.cc/M7NN-
3CEQ]. For an excellent study of the role of secrecy in startups, see David S.
Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 751, 753 (2018).
154 See infra subpart Il.B.
155 Anderson, supra note 152, at 928.
156 Id-
157 Ic at 929.
158 Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IowA L. REv. 539, 541 (2009).
Disclosure, she argues, stimulates productivity In two ways: first, by enabling
society to use the information after the patent expires; second, by enabling inven-
tors to design around the invention or to conceive of new inventions even during
the patent term. Id. at 548-50.
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sure requirements are so relaxed that they are minimally effec-
tive. 159 There is no requirement for source code disclosure,
and because a patent might only cover only one small portion
or module of the code, trade secrecy can still attach to the rest
of the product. 160 And software distribution models are set up,
essentially, to protect secrecy at all costs; even when these
practices migrate to the cloud, for example, they still take
pains to protect secrecy above anything else. 161 As Greg Vetter
explains:
Given the opportunity to continue to rely on trade secrecy,
most proprietary software vendors will continue to do so and
obtain patents when it matters strategically. Patent protec-
tion is much more costly for the software product vendor
than the other modes of protection. It requires a parallel
stream of activity alongside the development of the patent.
... In contrast, trade secret protection and copyright protec-
tion in the software is essentially without additional cost
given that the business practices of the software industry
give these modes of protection by default. 1
62
But even outside of the particular question of software pat-
entability, there are several fundamental differences between a
patent and a trade secret that may-generally-compel seclu-
sion over disclosure. 163 First, consider duration. A trade se-
cret can be limitless in its duration, as long as it remains a
secret, in contrast to the twenty-year protection afforded to
patents. 164 The twenty-year protection period is of little value
in the software industry because software typically becomes
obsolete by the time a patent even issues. 1
6 5
Second, the process of obtaining a patent can be onerous,
time consuming, labor intensive, and expensive. 16 6 Patent at-
torneys must disclose the nature of the invention and prove
that it meets the requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and
utility. 16 7 After an initial application is filed (which is often
rejected), the inventor must engage in a lengthy back-and-forth
159 Greg R. Vetter, Are Prior Use Rights Good for Software?, 23 TEX. INTELL.
PRoP. L.J. 251, 305 (2015).
160 Id.
161 Id
162 Id. at 306.
163 Anderson, supra note 152, at 923.
164 Id.
165 See Patents, Copyrights, and Your Software Innovation, U. WASH., https://
comotion.uw.edu/what-we-do/patents-copyrights-and-your-software-innova-
tion/ [https://perma.cc/VT3P-7JEU] (making this observation).




process with a patent examiner, often necessitating amend-
ments, further filings, and complicated negotiations with the
patent office. 168 With patentability, the process is uncertain,
may lead to years of time-consuming and costly amendments,
and may not always result in a protectable patent. 169
Finally, even after a patent is granted, they are difficult to
enforce. Patent litigation can be extremely costly and expen-
sive, and inventors are required to constantly monitor the mar-
ket for possible infringement, which can often be complicated
depending upon the nature of the invention and the ease of
monitoring. 1
70
By contrast, trade secrecy reduces significant administra-
tive and judicial costs associated with acquiring a patent.17 1
There is no central office to register trade secrets; a mere asser-
tion of trade secrecy is all that is needed in order to keep that
information from the public. 172 Given the expense of time and
resources that are required to acquire a patent, plus the oner-
ous costs of patent litigation, many inventors rationally choose
the trade secret route. 173 "By choosing secrecy," one author
maintains, "inventors avoid the cost of obtaining a patent, and
the risky, costly business of patent enforcement."174 In the
case of source code protection, the uncertainty of patent pro-
tection, especially in a post-Alice world, can push inventors
toward the rational belief that the code is much more valuable
as a secret than as a patented invention-thus eliminating the
comparable costs of seeking a patent. 175 If the costs of patent-
ing an invention are higher, and the grant of protection uncer-
tain, inventors may rationally opt for a trade secret solution
instead.
Amplifying this point, Mark Lemley has argued that source
code presents particular characteristics that make trade se-
crecy even more desirable. 176 Because source code cannot be
discerned by purchasing the product (unless it is reverse engi-
neered), trade secrecy gives owners an advantage because it
168 Id. at 925.
169 See Hlmanshu S. Amin, The Lack of Protection Afforded Software Under the
Current Intellectual Property Laws, 43 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 19, 22-23 (1995).
170 Anderson, supra note 152, at 925.
171 Id. at 920.
172 Id.
173 Id
174 Id. at 925.
175 Id. at 920 (discussing these benefits in trade secrecy generally).
176 See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 339-40 (2008); see also Risch, supra note 149, at
165-81 (making a similar point).
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allows them to keep the invention secret, whereas patents can
be invalidated or designed around.177 For this reason, when
secrecy is possible, it is often chosen over patent protection. 1
7 8
At the same time, however, trade secrecy is a weaker form
of protection than patent protection, because a trade secret can
be destroyed by independent invention or reverse engineering,
both of which do not serve as defenses in our patent system. 1
79
In situations where independent discovery or reverse engineer-
ing is possible or likely, patent protection may be the better
choice. 18 0 But in cases where independent discovery or reverse
engineering is less likely, trade secrecy may be a more prefera-
ble route. 181
Many of these same characteristics have led others, Robert
Bone most prominently, to question the value of trade secrecy,
arguing that justifications that focus on the shortcomings of
the patent system operate like "a stop-gap measure, like a rag
used to plug a hole in a pipe that actually requires a more
extensive repair job."'182 While trade secrecy might incentivize
owners to share information with potential business partners,
it does very little to encourage sharing with the public or to
encourage follow on innovation.1 83 While Lemley argues that
trade secrecy reduces the need to overinvest in secrecy, be-
cause it acts as a substitute for investments in physical se-
crecy, I would point out that software is an example to the
contrary, because physical seclusion is of very low cost. 1
84
But trade secrecy is not a costless enterprise, either. In-
ventors who take the secrecy route are also required to engage
in self-help measures to deter discovery, physically protect the
trade secret, and administer a maze of nondisclosure and em-
ployee confidentiality agreements.185 These agreements, as
177 See Lemley, supra note 176, at 340.
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See id. at 340-41; Gregory V. Novak & Matthew Frontz, Tipping the Scales:
Weighing IP Protection Options Post-DTSA and Post-Alice, TEx. LAw., Dec. 2016, at
42, 42.
181 Lemley, supra note 176, at 340-41.
182 Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEx.
L. REV. 1803, 1814 (2014) [hereinafter Bone, Shaky Foundations]; see also Robert
G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of JustificatiorL 86
CALIF. L. REv. 241, 265-70 (1998) [hereinafter Bone, A New Look] (considering
whether trade secret law improves efficiency).
183 Bone, Shaky Foundations, supra note 182.
184 See Lemley, supra note 176, at 333-34.
185 Anderson, supra note 152, at 925.
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well, are not always enforceable by courts, introducing added
risk factors to the cost-benefit continuum. 18 6
Despite the costs of secrecy, there are many reasons for its
preferability from a software developer perspective, not always
involving profit and protection. 18 7 Because trade secret protec-
tion can extend to both the underlying design concepts of a
computer program and its expression of those concepts, it is
considered to be particularly suitable for software. 188 Physi-
cally, source code secrecy can easily be maintained, in contrast
to other inventions (like an improved pop-top soda can), which
are disclosed by their public nature. 18 9 Inventions that can be
easily shielded from public view or are difficult to reverse engi-
neer, like source code, can be a particularly attractive fit for
trade secrecy. 190
Other motivations for secrecy can also stem from wanting
to protect against security-related risks like malware and other
forms of viruses.19 1 Still other reasons are motivated toward
authorial self-protection; that is, to avoid the risk that disclo-
sure of the source code could expose developers to charges of
plagiarism if the code is not considered to be sufficiently origi-
nal, or even to place obstacles regarding being used as evidence
in legal decisions. 19 2 Or, the desire to protect the code might
also stem from concerns that clients may try to modify the
source code for their own purposes, instead of contacting the
developer directly. 19 3 And there may also be concerns about
revealing the internal commentary inserted by programmers
within the source code, which can often be colorful or offensive
in nature. 194 All of these reasons further undercore the attrac-
tiveness of trade secrecy, particularly in light of the shifting
sands of patentability, which I discuss below.
B. The Rise and Fall of Software Patentability
In the mid- 1960s, the U.S. Patent Office first opposed issu-
ing patents not only for programs but also for processes that
186 Id.
187 See Source Code Definition, supra note 45.
188 Arsenault, supra note 73, at 136.
189 Anderson, supra note 152, at 925.
190 See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Legal Tangle of Secrets and Disclosures in Trade:
Tabor v. Hoffman and Beyond, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CON-
TESTED CONTOURS OF IP 271 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds.,
2014).
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were embodied in programs, on the ground that the former
category were authorial works and the latter were mental
processes. 195 Further, there was no established body of prior
art in place for the Patent Office to conduct comparisons to
previous advances in the field to determine things like novelty
and nonobviousness.196 It further reasoned that it would be
extremely difficult to compile a suitable database of prior art
and design a system of classification on what it had not yet
investigated.197 No centralized patent registry existed for
software, nor does one exist today.198 As a result, when
software receives patent protection, it may be very difficult to
protect due to the difficulties in detecting infringement. 199
All of these rationales collectively made patenting less de-
sirable than, say, copyright for practical reasons. But courts
did not always share the Patent Office's early reluctance, and
began, albeit slowly, to open the door toward patentability.
Consider this illustration: Back in 1972, in Gottschalk v. Ben-
son, an applicant was unable to obtain a patent on a method to
convert binary-coded-decimal (BCD) numbers into pure binary
numerals, due to the fact that the algorithm was an abstract
idea, rather than a process.20 0 Yet the Court was careful to
note, even at that time, that its holding should not be taken to
suggest a complete preclusion of patents for computer pro-
grams.20 1 It further characterized the debates over patentabil-
ity as a "policy matter," suggesting the need for further
legislative intervention to decide the issue.
20 2
195 See Samuelson, supra note 14, at 8.
196 See Gibson, supra note 20, at 189.
197 See Samuelson, supra note 14, at 8.
198 See Gibson, supra note 20, at 189.
199 See Patents, Copyrights, and Your Software Innovation, supra note 165
(making this observation).
200 See 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (describing applicant's claim as "so abstract
and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure
binary conversion"); see also Samuelson, supra note 139 (discussing Gottschalk).
201 Because the mathematical formulas only worked with a computer, the
court feared that a patent would "pre-empt the mathematical formula and in
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself." Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at
71-72.
202 See id. at 72. Specifically, the Court also noted the position of the Presi-
dent's Commission on the Patent System, which rejected the idea that computer
programs were patentable because of the lack of fit regarding subject matter and
the inability to classify or search prior art. Id. "Without this search," the Commis-
sion concluded, "the patenting of programs would be tantamount to mere regis-
tration and the presumption of validity would be all but nonexistent." Id. The
Court continued to refrain from extending patentability to software-related inven-
tions in Parker v. Flook, a later case that raised similar issues of patentability. See




1. The Opening of the Window of Patentability
Eventually, a small window of patentability began to open
in the 1981 case of Diamond v. Diehr,20 3 which extended pat-
entability to a process of curing rubber that relied, in part, on a
computer program.20 4 In that case, however, the Court ex-
tended protection to the program on the grounds that it repre-
sented only one element of the process, not because it could be
protected on its own as a software patent.20 5 Nevertheless, in
the mid- to late 1980s, as Samuelson explains in her detailed
account, it became clearer that the window for patentability
began to open wider, and the Patent and Trademark Office
began to issue more and more software patents.20 6
Although developers largely welcomed the rise of copyright
and patentability involving software, the overlap between them
raised critical questions regarding the accommodation of non-
literal forms of infringement.20 7 Limiting copyrightability to
source code would have been too narrow, but broadening
copyrightability beyond source code risked intruding onto pat-
ent law's domain. "If copyright protection was only available to
literal code, it would be easy to rewrite the same program de-
sign in noninfringing source code," Samuelson explained.20 8
On the other hand, however, if copyright is considered more
broadly, that is, if it "extended to the logic, design, structure,
performance, or even the output of the computer program,"
this would risk giving the owner more patent-like protection,
with a longer duration than patent protection and without
meeting the comparably more rigorous requirements of patent-
ability.20 9 The ongoing instability over how to protect software,
over time, led to a vigorous series of debates about whether the
frameworks for nonliteral infringement were too broad and
203 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981).
204 See Samuelson, supra note 14, at 9-15, 15 n.81 (discussing Diamond v.
Dlehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); and Maureen A. O'Rourke, The Story of Diamond v.
Diehr: Toward Patenting Software (Patents), in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES,
supra note 138, at 212-13).
205 See Samuelson, supra note 14, at 15 n.81. In fact, Samuelson argues that
had Whelan not framed software copyrights so broadly, we might have seen even
more of an upsurge. Id.
206 See id. at 15-16.
207 See id.
208 Id.
209 See id. at 16 (citing OFFICE of TECH. ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 81 (1986)). Samuelson describes
how, back in 1989, IP lawyers would "characterize nonliteral software structures
as methods when they wanted to patent them and as SSO when asserting copy-
right." Id. at 40 n.258.
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about the impact of software patents and copyrights on
innovation.2 10
Eventually, courts began to narrow the scope of nonliteral
infringement in cases like the Second Circuit's AltaP" deci-
sion, which criticized Whelan2 12 and was followed by other cir-
cuits.2 13 Altai, in effect, produced a trend that led to greater
discernment among courts in differentiating the roles of patent
and copyright in protecting software.2 14 But it also indirectly
facilitated another outgrowth of software patenting, particu-
larly due to the Federal Circuit's blessing of software patenting
in the early 1990s.2 1 5 In 1994, the Federal Circuit, in In re
Alappat,2 16 built on previous jurisprudence and, over the rec-
ommendations of the PTO, found that a "computer operating
pursuant to software may represent patentable subject mat-
ter," in a case where the computer relied on an algorithm to
transform a digital screen to display smooth waveforms in a
digital oscilloscope.2 17 There, the court explained that program
instructions from software essentially transformed the ma-
chine from a "general purpose computer" into, in effect, a "spe-
cial purpose computer" deserving of patentability.2 18
Looking back, if Diehr cracked a window to software pat-
entability, Alappat opened it even further. And, after Alappat,
the Federal Circuit decided State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc.,2 19 which, in effect, did more
than further open the window-it literally threw open the door
to software patenting. State Street found that mathematical
algorithms, previously dismissed as an abstract concept, could
be patentable if they "transformed" a machine or were "per-
formed" by a machine and provided "useful, concrete, and tan-
gible" results.220 This decision, more so than anything else,
210 See id. at 18.
211 Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altal, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992).
212 Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1240 (3d
Cir. 1986).
213 See Samuelson, supra note 14, at 19.
214 See id. at 21-22.
215 See id. See generally Alan D. Minsk, The Patentability of Algorithms: A
Review and Critical Analysis of the Current Doctrine, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 251, 277 (1992) (referencing the federal circuit cases).
216 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
217 See Fablo E. Marino & Teri H.P. Nguyen, From Alappat to Alice: The Evolu-
tion of Software Patents, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2017).
218 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1566 n.28.
219 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
220 See Marino & Nguyen, supra note 217, at 4.
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dramatically opened the door to software patenting, particu-
larly in the world of business method patents.
22 1
With State Street, and eventually AT&T Corp. v. Excel Com-
munications Marketing, Inc.,222 the golden era of software pat-
ents soon arrived. The PTO addressed this shift by classifying
a specific type of patent for business methods, Internet, and
software-related patents, known as a Class 705 patent.2 23 By
the 1990s and 2000s, companies were patenting software in
droves compared to previous eras.2 2 4 In 1998, there were
1,320 patent applications; by 2001, that number rose to nearly
8,000, peaking at over 10,000 applications in 2008.225
During this period, advocates of software patenting lauded
the system's values of openness, interoperability, protection,
and innovation due to its predication of disclosure and strong
protection.226 Yet, even then, software patents had their wide
share of critiques.2 27 In one representative example of this
perspective, which came to be even more pronounced in later
years, Simson Garfinkel, along with Richard Stallman and
Mitchell Kapor, warned in 1991 that software patents were
"being granted at an alarming rate," arguing that "most of the
patents have about as much cleverness and originality as a
recipe for boiled rice-simple in itself but a vital part of many
sophisticated dishes."228 To them, the patents covered every-
thing from small and specific algorithms to techniques used in
a wide variety of programs that were often used by others.
221 See id.
222 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
223 Class 705 includes a "generic class for apparatus and corresponding meth-
ods for performing data processing operations, in which there Is a significant
change in the data or for performing calculation operations wherein the apparatus
or method is uniquely designed for or utilized in the practice, administration, or
management of an enterprise, or in the processing of financial data." See Marino
& Nguyen, supra note 217, at 6 (quoting the PTO's classification of Class 705).
224 See Samuelson, supra note 14, at 22.
225 See Marino & Nguyen, supra note 217, at 6-7 (citing PTO statistics and
Starling Hunter's Article).
226 See Smith & Mann, supra note 31, at 256.
227 For critiques of software patenting, see Robert E. Thomas, Debugging
Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial
Reform of Software Patent Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191
(2008). See also James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, 18 B.U. J. ScI.
& TECH. L. 241, 242 (2012) (challenging the benefits of software patenting in the
software industry); Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the
Administrative Process, 51 Hous. L. REv. 503, 504 (2013) (arguing that software
patents are of poor quality and outlining ways to improve them at the FFO level).
228 See Simson L. Garfinkel, Richard M. Stallman & Mitchell Kapor, Why
Patents Are Bad for Software, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Fall 1991, at 50, 51.
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Because computer programs from 1991 were so complex,
covering thousands of algorithms and techniques they posed
enormous transaction costs for licensing, particularly when
many of the newfound patents seemed overly broad.229 The
authors offered the example of a lawsuit against Apple for its
violation of a patent that covered a specific technique for scrol-
ling through a database. While apparently scrolling and dis-
play techniques were ubiquitous throughout software,
separately, the patent at issue covered the combination of the
two.
Aside from being overly broad at times, the length of time,
plus the confidentiality of applications under review, made it
very difficult for other parties to discern the likelihood of an
application being granted.230 It remained nearly impossible for
applicants to search for prior art because the PTO had not yet
developed a system for classifying algorithms and because the
field of computer science literature is extraordinarily broad and
hard to navigate. As a result, many patents were granted not
because they were truly novel but because the examiner and
the applicant may have been unaware of prior art on the sub-
ject.2 3 1 The influx of so many patents meant that developers
either rewrote code to avoid allegations of infringement or de-
cided to avoid introducing new features entirely, thereby im-
peding innovation as a result. And their cost and complexity,
not to mention the great amount of time they required, meant
that many companies were shut out of the patenting process.
One report, examining patents over an eight year period
ending in 1996, found that 46% of all patents were invalidated;
when only software patents were considered, the number rose
to two-thirds, attributable to the absence of a body of prior art,
lower standards for non-obviousness, and PTO institutional
pressures.23 2 Other studies argued that software patents, far
from encouraging innovation, actually led to more investment
in building patent portfolios and enforcing them in court in-
stead of research and development.233 This was, the authors
229 See id. at 52.
230 See id.
231 See id. at 53.
232 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-06, 217 (1998); Mark H. Webbink, A
New Paradigm for Intellectual Property Rights in Software, 2005 DuKE L. & TECH.
REV. 12.




argued, partially attributable to the drop in costs or the in-
crease in cost effectiveness to obtain a software patent in the
1990s compared to the 1980s.
2 34
And even under a regime of software patentability-per-
haps most ironically-source code secrecy remained firmly in
place. It bears mentioning that, even when software patents
were being registered, the law continued to offer more solici-
tude to source code secrecy than one might imagine given our
patent system's preference for disclosure.2 3 5 Greg Vetter has
pointed out that, just like copyright law, it was not necessary to
provide source code in patent disclosure; rather, all that is
needed is a description of the process implemented in the
source code.
236
2. Narrowing the Window of Patentability
It was only in the year 2010 that everything suddenly be-
gan to change with the onset of Federal Circuit intervention in
the case of In re Bilski,237 which dramatically changed the
landscape for software patents. In that case, which addressed
a method of hedging risk in commodity trading, the Federal
Circuit explained that the claims were unpatentable on the
grounds that the recited method simply comprised a computer-
ized representation of some fundamental principles of financial
risk and liability. 238 In order to satisfy the boundaries of pro-
tection, the court directed that the applicant had to either
demonstrate that the claim was tied to a machine or trans-
formed an article. In this case, however, the method was not
patentable because "transformations or manipulations [of] ...
business risks[] or other such abstractions cannot meet the
test because they are not physical objects or substances.
'" 239
Although the decision retained some possibility for busi-
ness method protection, it explicitly pulled back on State
Street's standard requiring a "useful, concrete, and tangible
234 See id. at 9.
235 See Vetter, supra note 159, at 256 (noting that the owner may lose little
from this choice).
236 Id.
237 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), affd sub norm. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593 (2010).
238 See id. at 963. The fact that the claimed method was performed on a
computer could not transform it into something protectable, because it was basi-
cally a staple of any introductory course in finance See id. at 1013 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
239 See id. at 963; see also In re Bilski, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FoUND., https://
www.eff.org/cases/re-bilski [https: //perma.cc/64VB-R6NLI.
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result."2 40 By the time the issue reached the Supreme Court,
the Court simply upheld the rejection of the patent application
on the grounds that Bilski had tried to patent an abstract idea,
which was impossible under existing law.
2 4 1
Suddenly, things had come full circle. Congress, too, be-
gan to involve itself in addressing the dubious breadth of busi-
ness method patents by creating three special procedures for
their review in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: 2 4 2 inter
partes review, covered business method patent review, and
post-grant review of issued patents.2 4 3 Each of these proce-
dures raised the stakes for business method patents, making it
all the more likely that they could face additional challenges by
others. In his discussion of the Act, Senator Leahy specifically
stated that these new provisions were motivated, in no small
part, by the onslaught of dubious patents that had been
granted as a result of State Street, noting: "Patents of low qual-
ity and dubious validity, as you know, are a drag on innovation
because they grant a monopoly right for an invention that
should not be entitled to one under the patent law."244
Things further narrowed after Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank In-
ternational245 was handed down by the Supreme Court. Before
Alice, in 2012, the Supreme Court had already unanimously
invalidated a business method patent involving a blood diag-
nostic test in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labo-
ratories, Inc.2 4 6 The Mayo test added an additional wrinkle to
claims that implicated laws of nature, by asking whether the
claim added something more to the relevant field of analysis.2 47
Then, in Alice, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of
computer-based patents, invalidating another process for man-
aging risks on the grounds that the patents did not amount to
"significantly more" than just the abstract concept of managing
risk with the use of a computer.248 Alice directed the use of a
two-step test to determine patentability:
(1) whether the claim is directed to an abstract idea; and (2) if
an abstract idea is present in the claim, determining whether
240 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60 (quoting State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Fin. Grp, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
241 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. at 611.
242 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2011).
243 See Marino & Nguyen, supra note 217, at 10.
244 Id.
245 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
246 566 U.S. 66 (2012); see Marino & Nguyen, supra note 217, at 11-12.
247 See Marino & Nguyen, supra note 217, at 11-12.
248 See id. at 12-13.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
any part of the claim amounts to significantly more than the
abstract idea to qualify as an "inventive concept." If not, the
claim is deemed patent ineligible.
249
In the years after Alice, the Federal Circuit has largely con-
tinued to evince significant uncertainty in the field of software
patents.2 50 Part of the problem, commentators explain, is that
both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have largely
failed to offer clear guidance on what comprises an abstract
idea.25 1 Since Alice, the trend has militated against protecting
business method patents, with only a few exceptions.2 52 One
of the only Federal Circuit cases to do so, DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.corn, L.P.,2 5 3 affirmed two patents that involved methods
of generating a web page that combined certain visual elements
of a host site with content from a third-party merchant on the
grounds that it added enough to the abstract idea to justify
patentability.
254
In one of its clearest discussions regarding software pat-
enting, the Federal Circuit explained in May of 2016 that it did
not think that claims directed to software were inherently ab-
stract after Alice, observing:
Software can make non-abstract improvements to computer
technology just as hardware improvements can, and some-
times the improvements can be accomplished through either
route. We thus see no reason to conclude that all claims
directed to improvements in computer-related technology, in-
cluding those directed to software, are abstract and necessa-
rily analyzed at the second step of Alice, nor do we believe
that Alice so directs. Therefore, we find it relevant to ask
249 See id. at 13.
250 See id. at 13-19; see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
717 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding online advertising method is not patent-eligible
subject matter on abstraction grounds); Buysafe, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d
1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding claims are invalid on abstraction
grounds); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 Fed. Appx. 1005, 1008 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (affirming invalidity for a system of managing a bingo game on abstraction
grounds).
251 See Marino & Nguyen, supra note 217, at 13-19; see also B.J. Ard, Notice
and Remedies in Copyright Licensing, 80 Mo. L.R. 313, 315 (2015); John ClIzer,
Note, Exploring the Abstract: Patent Eligibility PostAlice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 80 Mo.
L.R. 537, 551 (2015) (noting that Alice did not give concrete guidance on how an
abstract Idea is defined).
252 See, e.g.. Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank,
Nat'l Assoc., 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that the patent-at-issue
disclosed an abstract idea using a scanner and computer, and therefore was
ineligible for protection).
253 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
254 See Marino & Nguyen, supra note 217, at 20 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
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whether the claims are directed to an improvement to com-
puter functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea,
even at the first step of the Alice analysis.
2 55
Because the patents were not directed to an abstract idea, but
instead to a specific improvement in the way that the computer
operated, the patent survived.
25 6
In a smattering of post-2016 cases, the Federal Circuit has
remained strongly suspicious of software patents, allowing just
a small window for protectability. For example, in June of
2016, the Federal Circuit found that software improvements to
a filtering content tool were eligible for protection in BASCOM
Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC.2 5 7 But
then, two months later, it invalidated a system for real-time
performance monitoring of an electronic power grid on the
ground that it focused on independently abstract ideas that
used a computer merely as a tool and was thus insufficiently
inventive.258 In short, the claims were too result-focused and
functional, and they ran the risk of preempting innovation with
their breadth.25 9 In any event, the post-Alice era suggests that
there is a stronger tendency to cast software patents as ab-
stract ideas, requiring a stronger focus on whether there are




TRADE SECRECY AS DESTINATION
All of the roads I have just detailed lead back to the same
place: trade secrecy as default and destination. And while this
is an underlying problem from a transparency perspective, as
I've argued, the roots of this problem lie in the foundational
indeterminacy of software protection. In a powerful, founda-
255 See id. at 23 (quoting Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).
256 See id. at 23-24.
257 827 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Marino & Nguyen, supra note 217, at
23-24 (citing BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).
258 See Marino & Nguyen, supra note 217, at 24-25.
259 See id.
260 See Daniel J. Burns, Patent Practice After Alice, in DEVELOPING A PATENT
STRATEGY 43, 44 (2016) ("One way to approach this analysis is to assume that
software patent claims will be characterized as abstract ideas by the USPTO or by
the courts and then to ask whether there are additional claim elements in the
independent claims that contain an inventive concept that can transform the
patent-ineligible subject matter into patent-eligible subject matter per the second
part of the Mayo framework.").
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tional article (actually, a manifesto), Pamela Samuelson, Ran-
dall Davis, Mitchell Kapor, and J.H. Reichman, two lawyers
and two technologists, warned that the extension of both copy-
right and patent law to software might "impair the effectiveness
of both forms of protection," pointing out that such overlap
creates uncertainties about the scope of protection under each
regime and concluding that "[n]o one knows just where the
boundary line between these domains does or should lie."
26 1
The real-life result of this indeterminacy is also plainly evi-
denced by the fact that source code remains secret at all times,
irrespective of whatever regime it falls under.26 2 Consider this
excellent description, using a hypothetical of a person named
Ariel who develops a computer program:
Notably, Ariel does not need to publish her source code to
receive protection under the intellectual property laws. She
can register her program for copyright without disclosing
much of the source code or executable code; rather, Copy-
right Office regulations require her only to disclose a portion
of the code. From that portion she may even redact any trade
secrets or other proprietary material. On the other hand, in
order to obtain a patent, she must disclose the invention;
however, such disclosure would only require a description of
the invention used in the software that would enable another
person working in the field to make and use the invention. It
would not require her to disclose the specific code she used to
implement it, or the other code that comprised the rest of the
program. Thus, Ariel can receive a copyright with essentially
no disclosure, and a patent with only a narrow disclosure.
Moreover, if she uses trade secret law to protect the program,
publication is counterproductive.
2 63
In other words, as this quote demonstrates, irrespective of the
changing boundaries of patent and copyright protection dis-
cussed in parts I and II, disclosure is never required, nor incen-
tivized in any appreciable manner.
In this section, I turn toward evaluating trade secrecy on
its own terms, showing how the law's own accommodation of
trade secrecy in software-further cemented its underlying
dominance, posing particular obstacles to the public interest in
transparency.
261 Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 2308, 2346-47 (1994).
262 See Burns, supra note 260, at 44.
263 Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV.
25, 30 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
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A. The Lingering Monopoly of Trade Secrecy
Around the early 90s, scholars began to argue that copy-
right was the most prudent and effective area of IP to protect
source code.2 6 4 Patentability, they reasoned, was a poor fit for
source code, given its lengthy duration of protection (in com-
parison to the short shelf life of software) and narrow subject
matter.2 65 And trade secret protection could essentially be
claimed over much else that was kept from the public-protect-
ing everything from disclosure, particularly whatever copyright
or patent did not cover, it seemed.266 Because much of early
software was individually commissioned between a software
developer and the client, the written contract became the
principal way to protect against misappropriation by character-
izing the software as a trade secret and requiring
confidentiality.
267
Within these practices, computer hardware companies
bundled the sale of their products with software in order to
optimize their hardware's capabilities and also further custom-
ized their models for the client.268 Their client-centric business
models thus enabled them to recoup their investments, Samu-
elson explains, without the need for copyright or patent protec-
tion.269 And when they wanted some assurances against
misappropriation, they simply characterized their source
code as a trade secret and only licensed the object code to
customers.
Indeed, the informal and yet ubiquitous role of trade se-
crecy in software beautifully illustrates its foundational justifi-
cations and tensions between them. In one influential article,
Mark Lemley asserts that trade secrecy can be justified by ref-
erence to several specific areas of law-contract, tort, commer-
cial morality, and property-and commentators and courts can
vary according to their definition of which approach is the dom-
inant one, or even if one dominates at all. 270 But is it the
264 See James Ryan, Comment, The Uncertain Future: Privacy and Security in
Cloud Computing, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 497, 532-33 (2014).
265 See id.
266 There are a great deal of articles exploring trade secrecy in software. See,
e.g., David Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 909,
914 (1970) (arguing that trade secrecy provides the optimal form of protection).
267 See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1243-45 (1995).
268 See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 14, at 8 n.38 (discussing IBM's use of this
practice).
269 See id. at 8.
270 See Lemley, supra note 267, at 1270; see also Robert C. Scheinfeld & Gary
M. Butter, Using Trade Secret Law to Protect Computer Software, 17 RUTGERS
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nature of the property at issue that is secret? Or is it the
relationship vis-d-vis the misappropriation that is at issue? At
times, it is difficult to tell the difference between them, and this
is especially true in the context of software.2 7 1
Federal law defines a trade secret to include
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to main-
tain its secrecy.
2 7 2
In the context of source code specifically, as the previous sec-
tions have suggested, trade secret protection extends not just
to protect information that cannot satisfy the requirements of
patentability or copyrightability-it extends to information that
is also protected by those regimes as well. 2 7 3 Source code
might be protected by copyright as a literary work, even though
it is functional, but its functionality might also be protected by
patent law through flowcharts and other representations.2 74
And trade secrecy law, as Michael Risch has pointed out, re-
wards inventors for keeping material that is neither new nor
original away from public eyes.2 7 5
However, without first disclosing and examining the source
code, it is impossible to know whether it even qualifies as a
trade secret.276 But disclosure would potentially jeopardize its
status as a trade secret. To avoid this issue, most entities
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 381, 384 (noting that some reject a property approach in
favor of one that focuses on the breach of confidential trust).
271 See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100,
101 (1916) (considering the conflict of property rights and disclosures).
272 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1985). There are also
other federal protections in place. See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 3488 (protecting trade secrets against theft or
misappropriation in various areas such as industrial espionage); Defend Trade
Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (providing a federal civil
cause of action). See Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a
Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 833
(2017) (noting the development of federal protection).
273 See Samuelson, supra note 14, at 2-4.
274 See id.
275 See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 1, 11 (2007).
276 See Charles Short, Guilt by Machine: The Problem of Source Code Discovery
in Florida DUI Prosecutions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 177, 190 (2009) (discussing a case
where the code underlying supposedly proprietary breathalyzer software was re-
vealed to consist of nothing more than widely available, open-source code).
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simply assert trade secrecy even when the underlying informa-
tion may not actually qualify as a trade secret. There is no way
to tell otherwise, absent some form of disclosure. It is also well
settled that even a wide distribution of software programs does
not compromise the intrinsic secrecy of the program as long as
the program is not readily ascertainable.
277
This strange situation, in the case of source code, produces
a puzzle of inconsistency. First, consider the fact that much of
source code is actually drawn from other sources, often from
the public domain. Yet, because so much of the code material
(i.e., the "source" of some "source code") is public in nature, the
ability to keep source code from public view means that mate-
rial that is closely guarded as a trade secret may not actually be
secret at all.2 78 Even in cases where the source code is derived
from the public domain, this outcome is particularly ironic be-
cause the trade secrecy is keeping information secret that is
already within the public domain. But because it is secret, we
may never know this fact and never be able to challenge the
source code's origins altogether.
In the past, most of the time, as James Gibson has sug-
gested, this was completely fine with the public because the
purchasing public cared not about the intricacies of the code
but whether the software functions as expected.279 The divide
between public-minded protections and private controls be-
comes especially apparent in the software context where, as
Gibson notes, "a quirk of technology allows software developers
to hide from the public the very expression that earns their
products copyright protection in the first place."
280
B. Judicial Accommodation in Kewanee
The Supreme Court, too, has been largely untroubled by
the potential rivalry between trade secrecy and patentability,
and it probably never foresaw the public interest implications
of this rivalry in the context of transparency.28 1 For example,
in the landmark case of Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., a case
that involved synthetic crystals, the Court extensively consid-
277 See LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 15.
278 See Risch, supra note 275, at 11.
279 See Gibson, supra note 20, at 175.
280 See id. at 171.
281 See Anderson, supra note 152, at 929.
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ered the question of whether the Patent Act preempted state-
protected trade secrets.282
Because of a seemingly clear delineation between the two
areas of law, the Court concluded that the patent policy of
encouraging invention was "not disturbed" by the existence of
trade secrecy.28 3 To justify its conclusion, the Court listed
three categories of trade secrets affected by the patent regime:
(1) those who were considered to be unpatentable; (2) those
whose patentability was considered dubious in nature; and (3)
those who were believed to qualify for patentability.
Consider the category of inventions that would be unpat-
entable, for example. Here, the Court reasoned, abolishing
trade secret protection would not benefit disclosure in any ma-
jor way because the patent alternative would be unavailable.284
Filing doomed applications, in this instance, would not benefit
disclosure to the public, it observed, because they are still kept
confidential by the Patent Office. 28 5
By contrast, the Court reasoned, because trade secret pro-
tection stimulates invention in areas that patent law does not
cover, trade secret still encourages competition and enables the
innovator to still exploit her invention.28 6 Nevertheless, be-
cause trade secrecy's duration is uncertain, the Court argued
that inventors would face an added push toward
commercialization.28 7
But without trade secret protection, the Court reasoned,
society would suffer, even in the case of unpatentable subject
matter.2 8 Innovative companies would be forced to engage in
expensive self-help, security precautions would have to in-
crease, and companies with limited resources would be forced
to choose between the costs of added securitization or innova-
282 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). For an excellent analysis of Kewanee, see
Sharon Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles to Determine the
Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.R. 299, 301 (2008).
283 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484.
284 See id. at 485.
285 Id. Note that this rule has now changed, so that filings are now public
eighteen months after filing. See Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Will Begin Pub-
ishing Patent Applications (Nov. 27, 2000), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/
news-updates/uspto-will-begin-publishing-patent-applications [https://perma
.cc/M73J-DHRN]. For a different view, see John F. Martin, The Myth of the 18-
Month Delay in Publishing Patent Applications, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 3, 2015), https: /
/www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/08/03/the-myth-of-the- 18-month-delay-in-pub-
lishing-patent-applications/id=60185 [https: //perma.cc/AR5G-RBXJ].
286 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 485.
287 See id. at 485, 494; see also Anderson, supra note 152, at 930 (stating that
the uncertain duration of protection incentivizes commercialization).
288 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484-86.
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tion. Licensing and other forms of strategic discussions would
level off without binding obligations of secrecy, and the public
would be deprived of the benefit of the invention because fewer
companies would strike agreements.
What about inventions of dubious patentability? Here, too,
the Court continued to remain untroubled by the relationship
between trade secrecy and patent protection. Those who have
genuine doubts regarding patentability will simply opt out of
the patent system, the Court predicted.289 Others, the Court
reasoned, would probably try to obtain a patent, despite the
doubts, because of the comparable benefits of patent protec-
tion over trade secret protection. For those "on the line" inven-
tors, the Court wrote, the abolition of trade secret protection
would likely push them toward applying for a patent, despite
the dubious outcome.290 The nonpatentable ones will be inval-
idated by the Patent Office, the Court predicted. The Court
explained further:
Eliminating trade secret law for the doubtfully patentable
invention is thus likely to have deleterious effects on society
and patent policy which we cannot say are balanced out by
the speculative gain which might result from the encourage-
ment of some inventors with doubtfully patentable inventions
which deserve patent protection to come forward and apply
for patents. There is no conflict, then, between trade secret
law and the patent law policy of disclosure .... 291
For the final category, those that are clearly patentable, the
Court noted that the disclosure value is at its peak, and the
systems of trade secret versus patent protection weigh very
strongly in favor of patentability. "[N]o reasonable risk of deter-
rence from patent application by those who can reasonably
expect to be granted patents exists," the Court stated, explain-
ing that trade secrecy provides a much weaker level of protec-
tion because it cannot bar independent inventions or reverse
engineering, all of which may risk exposure and destruction of
the trade secret.292 "Where patent law acts as a barrier," it
explained, "trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve."
293
In the years since, Kewanee has gone on to stand for a founda-
tional presumption: trade secrecy and patent protection go
hand-in-hand, and a choice between them, including the vari-
289 See id. at 487-88.
290 Id. at 488.
291 Id. at 489.




ables that go into that choice, are distinctly untroubling, often
incentivizing patentability over trade secrecy.
C. Rethinking Complementarity in Software
However, there are strong reasons in place to rethink
Kewanee's assurances, particularly in the area of software gen-
erally. As Sharon Sandeen has argued, the Court's analysis is
deeply dependent on a set of factual assumptions and its un-
derstanding about the boundaries of each area of intellectual
property protection at that point in time.2 94 At the time, the
majority of the Court was under the impression that the availa-
bility of trade secrecy would have only a marginal effect on
patent strategy because its protection seemed so much less
desirable as compared to the strength of a patent grant.295
Today, however, things have certainly changed; as
Sandeen notes, "Itlo the extent such assumptions and laws
have changed, the reasoning underlying Kewanee must change
as well or, at the very least, be re-examined."296 Further, em-
pirical research has shown that the reliance on trade secrecy
has dramatically expanded since the 1980s, making it useful to
reexamine Kewanee's presumptions.2 9 7 First, much of the
opinion appears motivated by a foundational belief that trade
secret law is meant primarily to protect items that might fall
outside of the protectable boundaries of patent protection
items, "which would not be proper subjects for consideration
for patent protection," as the Court put it.298
However, the reality today is that many trade secrets might
constitute otherwise patentable material.299 Partly because of
the time, effort, cost, and indeterminacy of patentability, many
inventors make the rational decision to avoid patenting some-
thing when they might otherwise keep it secret. But there is
294 Sandeen, supra note 282, at 327.
295 Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy:
Reordering Information Privileges in Environmental, Health, and Safety Law, 78 U.
COLO. L. REv. 465, 495 (2007).
296 Sandeen, supra note 282, at 327.
297 See Lyndon, supra note 295 (first citing Richard Levin et al., Appropriating
the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. AcrTVrny 783 (1987); then citing Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson &
John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), 12-15 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (noting the growing reliance on trade
secrecy)).
298 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482 (1974).
299 Michael R. McGurk & Jia W. Lu, The Intersection of Patents and Trade
Secrets, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 189, 199 (2015).
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also another reason that pushes applicants toward secrecy: as
Sandeen explains, since Kewanee, the law has broadened the
subject matter and scope of disclosure in patent law.
3 0 0 In
1974, the only information that was disclosed to the public was
an issued patent application, which required a trip to the of-
fices of the USPTO to obtain.30 1 Since 1999, the law has made
all applications public eighteen months after filing, whether or
not they are even issued.30 2 As a result, as Sandeen notes, the
end result of these developments "is that today's patent disclo-
sure policies result in the disclosure of more information and,
arguably increase innovators' interest in trade secrecy as an
alternative."
30 3
Second, the opinion presumes that it is easy (or even possi-
ble) for an inventor to predict ex ante whether the inventor will
be able to obtain a patent on their invention. Especially in the
case of software, most developers in a post-Alice world would
characterize their prospects as indeterminate at least. The in-
determinacy, coupled with the cost and effort of an application,
actually deters rather than encourages a provisional filing,
making trade secrecy that much more attractive.
Third, Kewanee dealt with a very different type of inven-
tion-something that was comparably more ascertainable-
than the black-box source code of today. Its assurances, there-
fore, about the likelihood of the "ripeness-of- time concept of
invention"-which suggests that others would likely reach the
same solution eventually-is not always the case for software,
which is sometimes heavily guarded.30 4 Since source code is
often outside of the public view, it makes the likelihood of such
collaborative (or even comparative) innovation impossible.
These differences seriously call into question the presup-
posed balance between trade secrecy and patentability in the
software context, justifying a need for reexamination.30 5 As
300 Sandeen, supra note 282, at 329.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 330.
303 Id. In fact, Justice Marshall, in a sharply worded concurrence, disagreed
strongly about the remoteness of the risk that an inventor with a patentable
invention would opt for trade secret protection instead of patent protection. Be-
cause a trade secret's duration is potentially unlimited, Marshall argued that the
existence of trade secret protection deprives the public of the benefit of disclosure,
particularly in this case. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 494-95 (Marshall, J., concurring).
304 Sandeen, supra note 282, at 325.
305 As an example, just consider the CONTU final report, mentioned at the
opening of the predominant casebook on software:
Although many proprietors feel secure when using trade secrecy,
there are several problems they must face with respect to its use in
protecting programs. Because secrecy is paramount, it is inappro-
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Lemley has explained, in situations of non-self-revealing tech-
nologies, like source code (which is not evident from the sale of
the product-unlike a paper clip, whose innovation is evident),
secrecy can be preferable over patentability because there is
more indeterminacy in the patent system.30 6 As he points out,
patents can be designed around, or they can be invalidated,
and will eventually expire.30 7 But this result produces some
inefficiency because the benefits of public disclosure of the
information are lost.30 8 In such circumstances, it is important
to note that the indeterminacy of the patent system may com-
pel parties to opt for trade secret protection, though they might
have chosen differently if the patent system were a stronger
choice for protection.
30 9
In those circumstances, Lemley notes, citing Kewanee, the
defenses of independent development and reverse engineering
exist to avoid a reflexive choice toward trade secrecy over pat-
entability.3 10 These defenses help make trade secrecy much
less preferable, Lenley assures us as well, thereby keeping
patentability within the range of attractive options.3 11 While I
share Lemley's views generally, I would suggest that the partic-
ular difficulties associated with reverse engineering in the
software context might push the scale back toward trade
secrecy.3 12
priate for protecting works that contain the secret and are designed
to be widely distributed. Although this matters little in the case of
unique programs prepared for large commercial customers, it sub-
stantially precludes the use of trade secrecy with respect to pro-
grams sold in multiple copies over the counter to small businesses,
schools, consumers, and hobbyists. Protection is lost when the
secret is disclosed, without regard to the circumstances urround-
ing the disclosure. The lack of uniform national law in this area
may also be perceived by proprietors as reducing the utility of this
method of protection.
LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 5-6 (quoting CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note
112, at 34-35). Trade secrecy, the Commission noted, also reduces a company's
ability to do business freely because it necessitates the signing of nondisclosure
contracts. Id. And it also noted that the reduced flow of information due to
secrecy reduces the consumers' ability to comparison shop, leading to higher
prices. Id.
306 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 339-40.
307 Id. at 340.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 340-41.
311 Id.
312 A similar comment on Lemley is offered by Jeanne Fromer, who points out
that there is evidence from some industries that innovators will still take excessive
precautions to protect their secrets because the legal remedies for misappropria-
tion are often incomparable to the losses faced from the extinguishing of a secret.
Fromer, supra note 190, at 15-16.
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Closed code also carries deleterious impacts for software
innovation. Not only does the public lose more of the public
domain, but other developers are unable to build on others'
innovations, making it impossible to optimize efficiency or in-
crease interoperability without licensing the code first.3 13 The
CONTU report, for example, noted that humans waste a lot of
effort trying to create what is already held in secret.3 14
Because the code is unavailable to anyone outside of the
company, third parties who might seek to improve upon the
code are unable to do so without permission, stymying the
development of markets for innovation.3 1 5 Since trade secret
laws encourage designers to "build fences" around their
secrets, information is often only sparingly revealed, and then
only under stringent conditions of nondisclosure.3 16 These
conditions intrinsically discourage the sharing of information,
impeding market-wide vertical interoperability.3 17 As Jeanne
Fromer has observed, the failure to share this information with
the wider public contributes to an information asymmetry be-
tween the initial innovator and the follow-on competitor, reduc-
ing the democratization of innovation.3 18 Moreover, the trend
toward secrecy also means that a developer may not actually
detect infringement because a programmer may find them-
selves stymied from proving piracy without expending consid-
erable resources to obtain discovery.3 19
Further, a trade secrecy regime not only makes it impossi-
ble to compare works with those that exist in the public do-
main, it also shrinks the size of the public domain
altogether.3 20 Fair use may be a laudable public right of ac-
cess, but it is meaningless in the face of access restrictions that
deny entrance to all unlicensed uses, fair and nonfair alike.32 1
While some courts have used the fair use doctrine to protect
temporary, technically infringing behavior, like copying code or
313 Gibson, supra note 20, at 181.
314 LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 6 (citing CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note
112, at 34-35).
315 Gibson, supra note 20, at 184.
316 Lemley & O'Brien, supra note 125, at 290-91.
317 Id.
318 See Fromer, supra note 190, at 14.
319 Gibson, supra note 20, at 187.
320 Id. at 183; Strandburg, supra note 150, at 105-06.
321 Gibson, supra note 20, at 171. As an example of this complexity, consider
the longstanding litigation in the Google/Oracle fair use case. See Peter S. Menell,
API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and Repairing the Oracle v. Google
Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515, 1521-62 (2016) (discussing the
many stages of litigation).
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copyrightable material if it is the only way to access material in
the public domain, the doctrine is limited by its imprecision.
3 22
Since most source code remains unpublished, it becomes
harder to avail oneself of fair use protections in that context.
3 23
Not only are unpublished works subject to greater protection
than published works, but since fair use is usually considered
only a defense, it does not provide the means to actually access
closed code.
3 24
As a result of these shortcomings of intellectual property
protection to incentivize disclosure and access, source code
remains entirely secluded from outside view, maximizing the
developer's control, irrespective of whether the goals of third
party access lie in innovation, competition, or investigation.
IV
DUE PROCESS IN AN AGE OF DELEGATION
The ubiquity of trade secrecy in the arena of source code,
as I suggested above, has dramatic implications for innovation,
interoperability, and competition. Although those implications
can be deleterious in the context of private industry, more
troubling is the implications of closed code on the functions of
public governance.325 Danielle Citron, ten years ago, observed
that the administrative state was slowly being overtaken by
closed-proprietary systems in areas of public benefits, elec-
tronic voting, and agency-gathered ata, among others.326 To-
day, the issue is not just that government decision making is
becoming entirely privatized, it is also that these systems are
closed and proprietary, often due to assertions of trade secrecy.
David Levine offers several examples-from telecommunica-
tions to traditional government operations, like voting-that
are now being provided by private industry and immunized
from transparency by trade secret doctrine.3 2 7 Particularly in
the realm of public infrastructure, secrecy has skyrocketed in
importance-one study cited by Levine mentions that in
322 Gibson, supra note 20, at 192.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 193.
325 Citron, supra note 8, at 363-71.
326 Id.
327 David S. Levine, The Impact of Trade Secrecy on Public Transparency, in
THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH,
supra note 83, at 406, 407.
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twenty-four out of thirty-three manufacturing industries, se-
crecy was ranked as first or second in importance.32 8
Although the risks of privatization are not at all new to
legal scholarship,32 9 few scholars have linked the rise of priva-
tization to the reliance on closed code, automated governance,
and the rise of trade secrecy. As I suggested in an earlier arti-
cle, we continue to view trade secrecy as somehow separate
from civil rights concerns, and that presumption has facilitated
the absence of accountability.3 3 0
In this section, I first discuss the rise of delegation to pri-
vate industries and the range of trade secrecy claims that have
pervaded attempts toward transparency. In the second sec-
tion, I discuss some of the ways in which similar issues of
privatization and delegation have emerged in source code dis-
putes in the criminal context, and the implications of those
decisions on the liberty and due process interests of criminal
defendants. Finally, in the last section, I discuss the increased
reliance on trade secrecy and the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act to preclude attempts toward greater transparency and
disclosure.
A. The Rise of Closed Code Governance
As the story that opened this Article demonstrates, many
municipalities are confronting the implications of enabling pri-
vate industry, instead of the government, to make decisions
about the lives and services provided to citizens.3 31 When au-
tomated decision making and trade secrecy facilitates this in-
termingling of public and private, it produces a crisis of
transparency. In this context, private businesses now play the
roles that government used to play but can utilize the princi-
ples of trade secret law to insulate themselves from the very
328 Id. at 408 (citing Gerald Carlino et al., Matching and Learning in Cities:
Urban Density and the Rate of Invention 5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working
Paper No. 04-16, 2006)).
329 See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Privatization of Public Water Services: The
States' Role in Ensuring Public Accountability, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 561, 562 (2005);
Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT'L L.
383, 384-85 (2006) (privatization of military support services); Matthew Diller,
Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1739, 1739 (2002); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for
the New Religion, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1229, 1230-31 (2003) (school privatization
efforts); David E. Pozen, Managing a Correctional Marketplace: Prison Privatization
in the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 J.L. & POL. 253, 253 (2003)
(privatization of prisons).
330 See Katyal, supra note 17, at 118.
331 McKenzie, supra note 1.
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expectations of accountability under which that government
operated.
3 32
These tensions-between democratic transparency and
commercial seclusion-have become particularly pronounced
in the current day, where government has become increasingly
intermingled with private industry through privatization and
delegation throughout infrastructure involving telecommuni-
cations, government operations, and energy.333 As Gillian
Metzger has observed, "[plrivatization is now virtually a na-
tional obsession."334 Her work describes privatization in the
context of the sharing of responsibility between public and pri-
vate but with a twist: instead of the government ensuring con-
trol over its programs, the private industry takes the lead.
335
In an exhaustive account, Metzger describes the expansion of
privatization in areas like Medicare, Medicaid, welfare pro-
grams, public education, and prisons.3 36 In each of these con-
texts, private contractors exercise a broad level of authority
over their program participants, even when government offi-
cials continue to make determinations of basic eligibility and
other major decisions.
3 37
While Metzger's focus is on the privatization of government
services, each involving a delegation to a private entity, I would
underscore that much of the privatization that she studies is
also facilitated by an additional focus on automated decision
making. As Robert Brauneis and Ellen Goodman have elo-
332 See Katyal, supra note 17, at 118-19; Levine, supra note 327, at 2.
333 Levine, supra note 327, at 2; David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unac-
countability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REv. 135, 135
(2007).
334 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367,
1369 (2003); see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need
for a New Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1700-03 (2002) (discussing
democracy issues raised by privatization of prisons and social services for the
poor); Matthew Diller, Going Private-the Future of Social Welfare Policy?, 35
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 491, 491 (2001) (discussing "broad movement to 'privatze'
government [poverty] programs"); Mathew Diller, Introduction: Redefining the Pub-
lic Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1307, 1308 (2001) (describing privatization of government services,
including "contracting out the delivery of services, divestiture of government
owned resources and institutions, the establishment of private communities with
quasi-governmental powers, the creation of voucher programs to replace the di-
rect delivery of services, the movement toward incentive-based or private forms of
regulation, and the possible replacement of the Social Security system with indi-
vidual savings accounts"); Mark H. Moore, Introduction, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1212,
1212 (2003) (introducing a symposium "focus[ed] on the increased 'privatization'
of the public sphere").
335 Metzger, supra note 334, at 1370.
336 Id at 1380.
337 Id. at 1387.
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quently noted, "[tihe risk is that the opacity of the algorithm
enables corporate capture of public power."338 There are also
secondary, less visible forms of automated decision making
that can also amount to a significant, though related, degree of
delegation to private entities involving contracting with private
entities for the purposes of information gathering or
distribution.
In this context, the government can and has asserted its
own trade secret protection as an exemption to disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act.3 39 David Levine has
documented a number of situations where the government has
claimed trade secrecy in a wide variety of scenarios, including
situations where a government entity is directly competing with
a private sector entity or acting as a provider of particular
goods, and where the government has contracted with a private
entity.340 Examples involve government record keeping, gov-
ernment-run student loan assistance,34 1 and even a govern-
ment firearm registry.342 In another case, Cincinnati Public
Schools maintained that their ninth-grade multiple choice and
essay questions were protected trade secrets.343 In yet an-
other, the United States Air Force maintained that details re-
garding pricing and particular options on a private contract
with McDonnell Douglas Corporation were protected trade
secrets free from public transparency.344
In the context of private firms, the issue of opacity deepens
even further. Here, firms have learned to obfuscate trans-
338 See Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the
Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 109 (2018); see also Will Knight, The Dark
Secret at the Heart of Al, MIT TECH. REv. (Apr. 11, 2017), https://
www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/
[https://perma.cc/PA6F-HYDT] ("No one really knows how the most advanced
algorithms do what they do.").
339 See David S. Levine, The People's Trade Secrets?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 61, 82 (2011).
340 See generally infra pt. II; Levine, supra note 339, at 84 (discussing situa-
tions in which governments have asserted trade secrecy).
341 Levine, supra note 339, at 82 (citing Pelto v. Connecticut, No. FIC 2008-
341 q 32 (Conn. Freedom of Info. Comm'n May 13, 2009) (final decision), https://
www.state.ct.us/foi/2009FD/20090513/FIC2008-341 .htm [https://perma.cc/
U2C6-CWJA]); see also Hoffman v. Pennsylvania, 455 A.2d 731, 733 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1983) (where a plaintiff sought magazine subscriber mailing lists).
342 See Levine, supra note 339, at 90; see also OFF. OF THE INFO. COMM'R OF
CAN., ANNUAL REPORT INFORMATION COMMISSIONER 1999-2000, at 60 (2000) (explain-
ing the Canadian government's firearm registry).
343 Levine, supra note 339, at 83; see State ex rel. Perrea v. Cincinnati Pub.
Schs., 916 N.E.2d 1049, 1052-53 (Ohio 2009).
344 Levine, supra note 339, at 99; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Widnall, 57
F.3d 1162, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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parency by relying on assertions of trade secrecy to avoid dis-
closure of data in the context of environmental, health, and
safety data.3 4 5 Even when disclosures are mandated by regula-
tion, Mary Lyndon has argued that nondisclosure privileges
have grown, leading to trends that tend to favor commercial
interests over public ones.3 46 The issue of trade secrecy imped-
ing the public interest has come up in a variety of disputes,
including health care devices and clinical trials, voting ma-
chines, breathalyzer disputes, and search-engine algo-
rithms.34 7  Particularly in the context of health or
environmental concerns, which are often underestimated be-
cause they are not immediately visible, firms may resist dis-
closing information on the grounds that it may disadvantage
them commercially.348 Annemarie Bridy has shown how medi-
cal device manufacturers have attempted to keep their pricing
information secret as a way to keep information away from
their customers.34 9 In another environmental context, after
chemicals leaked from a West Virginia coal processing plant,
denying over 300,000 people access to water, the plant suc-
cessfully refused to turn over the specific makeup of its com-
pounds to the public.
3 50
WI-ile the sheer variety of these instances deserves a more
comprehensive and searching investigation in the context of
AI, 3 5 1 these cases suggest wo notable elements, each linked to
one another. The first involves the element of privatization,
exemplified by the existence of a contractual relationship with
a private party. The second element is one of (what I call)
"information insulation," involving an increased willingness to
assert trade secret protection in cases where transparency
345 See Lyndon, supra note 295, at 471.
346 Id. at 509.
347 See Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401,
1443-44 (2014); Lyndon, supra note 295; see also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015)
140-44; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity,
in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH,
supra note 83, at 467, 470.
348 Lyndon, supra note 295.
349 See Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices: How
Medical Device Manufacturers Are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices,
17 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 191 (2009), which is discussed in Varadarajan,
supra note 347, at 1442-43.
350 Varadarajan, supra note 347, at 1443.
351 In future work, I plan to investigate these cases and others. See generally
Sonia K. Katyal, Delegated Decision Making and Government Transparency (ab-
stract) (on file with author).
1240 [Vol. 104:1183
2019] THE PARADOX OF SOURCE CODE SECRECY 1241
might be justified due to public interest concerns.3 52 While
Metzger focuses on the dangers of narrowing state action in
such contexts, highlighting the vagaries of discretionary deci-
sion making, Levine and others emphasize, troublingly, how
these powers can become even more insulated from the public
eye through protections from disclosure to the public. Added
to these risks today is the even greater power of government-
sponsored automated decision making, amplifying even further
the risks to government accountability and due process.
The risks to accountability and transparency affect both
individualized cases as well as our democratic system. But
they become particularly pronounced in cases involving source
code secrecy. Consider an example. In more than one voting
issue, assertions of trade secrecy prevented election officials
from releasing software to independent auditors to enable re-
view and testing.3 53 In 2005, a voting machine company,
Diebold Election Systems (now called Premier Election Solu-
tions), refused to follow a North Carolina law that required
electronic voting machine manufacturers to place its software
and source code in escrow with a state Board of Elections-
approved agent.354 Over a series of court battles, Diebold re-
fused to comply, eventually withdrawing from the state alto-
gether, rather than reveal its source code.3 5 5 In another event,
also discussed by Levine, when hackers successfully accessed
(and manipulated) a series of Diebold machines, Diebold chose
to characterize the events as "potential violations of licensing
agreements and intellectual property rights," rather than re-
352 See Levine, supra note 339, at 111 (discussing the public interest concerns
at stake).
353 See Andrew Massey, "But We Have to Protect our Source": How Electronic
Voting Companies' Proprietary Code Ruins Elections, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 233, 235 (2004); Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Individual Liberties and Intellectual
Property Protection-Proprietary Software in Digital Electronic Voting Machines:
The Clash Between a Private Right and a Public Good in an Oligopolistic Market 19
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 689, 742-43 (2009).
354 Levine, supra note 327, at 96. For an excellent article exploring the use of
software-independent voting systems, compliance audits, and risk-limiting audits
in elections, see P.B. Stark & D.A. Wagner, Evidence-Based Elections, IEEE SE-
cuRIrrY & PRIVAcY, Sept. 2012, at 33 (spec. issue on electronic voting).
355 Michael A. Carrier, Vote Counting, Technology, and Unintended Conse-
quences, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 645, 667-68 (2005); Levine, supra note 327, at 13;
Doris Estelle Long, "Electronic Voting Rights and the DMCA: Another Blast from the
Digital Pirates or a Final Wake Up Callfor Reform?", 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 533, 545-48 (2005).
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spond to the threat to the democratic dignity of the voting
tabulation process.
3 56
B. The Constitutional Cost of Secrecy
As I have suggested above, one of the primary obstacles to
greater transparency involves the increasing privatization of
government functions. While the prior section addressed this
issue in the context of trade secrecy, it is also important to
understand the significance of this difference in the context of
comparing how private, data-driven decisions are often free
from scrutiny, as compared to decisions made directly by the
state.
Nowhere is this becoming more apparent than in the con-
text of criminal law. In the criminal law context, computer-
processing technologies have been employed in criminal prose-
cutions involving fingerprinting, DNA match analysis, facial
recognition, drunk driving, and file sharing.3 57 A further com-
plexity within criminal law lies in the use of Automated Suspi-
cion Algorithms (ASAs), which apply machine learning to data
with the purpose of identifying individuals who may be engaged
in criminal activity and may produce conflicts with the Su-
preme Court requirement of individualized suspicion under the
Fourth Amendment.3 58 In an eloquent and comprehensive ar-
ticle, Rebecca Wexler examines a host of these automated eci-
sion-making procedures in the life cycle of a criminal justice
case, including bail investigations, trial evidence, sentencing,
and parole, noting the substantial deference that courts have
extended to trade secret owners in every one of these areas,
even though their processes (and the decisions that they reach)
often implicate the difference between liberty and
imprisonment.
3 59
Issues of admissibility and reliability further highlight the
contradictory paradox of source code secrecy: on one hand,
companies argue that their methods are sufficiently known and
proven to be broadly accepted by the scientific community and
yet, on the other hand, companies will go to enormous lengths
356 Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability, supra note 333, at 182 (quoting Leon
County Supervisor of Elections Ion Sancho: "I really think they're not engaged in
this discussion of how to make elections safer.").
357 Chessman, supra note 43, at 180-81.
358 See Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms,
and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 871, 886 (2016) (discussing ASAs
and individualized suspicion).
359 See Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets, supra note 12, at 9.
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to keep their source code confidential so as to preclude further
investigation. 
36 0
Assertions of trade secret privilege in most states are cov-
ered by sections of the evidence code, which provides for pro-
tection from disclosure as long as it will not "conceal fraud or
otherwise work injustice."36 1 Courts have interpreted this pro-
vision to also include a requirement hat the defense in a crimi-
nal case must also show that the trade secret is relevant and
necessary to the defense in order to obtain disclosure under a
protective order.362 In one criminal case involving DNA analy-
sis and its TrueAllele program, Cybergenetics maintained that
it kept the source code secret because of the "highly competi-
tive commercial environment," and it provided defense experts
with its methodology and underlying mathematical model, ar-
guing that its source code was unnecessary to assess the pro-
gram's reliability. 36 3 The court agreed with Cybergenetics,
concluding that its source code was not necessary to determine
the software's reliability and that the defense had failed to
demonstrate a particularized showing of need.3 64 It further
rejected the prospect of a Sixth Amendment violation, holding
that the Confrontation Clause did not require pretrial discovery
of privileged information.365 This outcome is hardly an
anomaly.366
Yet, according to experts, TrueAllele's match statistic val-
ues dramatically diverge from the findings of other competi-
tors.36 7 Whereas other competitors found DNA analysis to be
360 See Katherine L. Moss, Note, The Admissibility of TrueAllele: A Computer-
ized DNA Interpretation System, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1033, 1071-72 (2015); see
also William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of
the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 59-60 (1989) (noting that
asserting trade secrecy shields companies from scrutiny by the scientific commu-
nity); Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Note, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science
Problem, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1536 (2017) (discussing "constraints on judges'
abilities to recognize and address problems with forensic science").
361 See, e.g., CAL. EV[D. CODE § 1060 (West 2018); People v. Chubbs, No.
B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at *10-14 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 09, 2015).
362 See Chubbs, 2015 WL 139069, at *6-7.
363 Id. at *8.
364 Id. at *10; see also Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 889-90 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2012) (reaching the same conclusion).
365 See Chubbs, 2015 WL 139069, at *11.
366 Several other courts have reached similar conclusions on TrueAllele. See
Foley, 38 A.3d at 890; see also Moss, supra note 360, at 1062-68 (citing cases).
367 See Brief of the Innocence Project, Inc. et al. as Amicl Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 13, People v. Johnson, No. F07 1640 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019); see also
Chessman, supra note 43, at 198 (discussing how widely a RMP calculated by




too unreliable, TrueAllele offered "match statistics of astound-
ing confidence."3 68 At the same time, TrueAllele's repeat analy-
ses have reached different outcomes with the same data,
raising concerns about admissibility due to these internal in-
consistencies.369 Under these circumstances, it is virtually im-
possible to detect errors. And errors can often mean the
difference between liberty and imprisonment. For example,
consider that source code errors in other genotyping software
programs, like STRmix, produced materially-altered match sta-
tistics in over sixty cases.3 70 It is precisely to address that
problem that STRmix now provides access to its source code
when it is used to generate evidence in prosecutions.3 7 1 Nota-
bly, it is also the key reason why, in September 2016, New York
City decided to retire Forensic Statistical Tool, a previous in-
house tool, in favor of STRmix.3 7 2
I have discussed the risks of privatization in a variety of
contexts, but consider another set of scenarios that illustrate
its implications. In one criminal case, a defendant was unable
to acquire the source code to challenge his breath-alcohol score
for a simple but surprising reason.3 73 Since discovery orders
are limited to items or information within the custody, posses-
sion, or control by the State, and since the source code was
held by the manufacturer and considered to be a trade secret,
the court refused to require it to be turned over because it was
essentially out of the boundaries of the discovery order.374 At
least eight states have denied defendants access to source code
due to similar issues of trade secrecy.375 In some cases, states
will argue that they lack possession of the source code and
therefore cannot turn it over for investigation.3 76 And the court
will adopt this rationale even to the detriment of the defendant.
In at least one case, in order to assist prosecutors, law enforce-
ment deliberately avoided taking possession of the source code
368 Brief of the Innocence Project, Johnson, No. F071640, at 12.
369 Id. at 13.
370 Id. at 18-19 (citing David Murray, Queensland Authorities Confirm 'Mis-
code' Affects DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases, COURIER MAIL (Mar. 20, 2015),
https: //www.couriermail. com. au/news/queensland/queensland-authorities-
confirm-miscode-affects-dna-evidence-in-crimlnal-cases/news-story/833c580d
3f1c59039efd la2ef55af92b [https://perma.cc/YCR7-ZLZW]).




373 State v. Kuhl, 741 N.W.2d 701, 708 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007).
374 IdL
375 Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets, supra note 12, at 7.
376 Chessman, supra note 43, at 213-14.
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in order to avoid turning the code over to defense counsel or the
defense's expert.
3 77
Imagine the effect of such a finding on the landscape of
constitutional or human rights-it would essentially mean that
every time the state handed over information to a private party
that then asserted trade secret protection, it would be out of
the bounds of discovery unless the party was willing to seek a
subpoena. Effectively, these cases suggest hat through asser-
tions of trade secrecy, the state is practically able to immunize
itself from investigation regarding its forensic techniques. In
other criminal cases, defendants have lost because courts
would reject the proposition that access to the source code was
necessary for a defense. Wexler details the case of a California
appeals court that upheld a software developer's refusal to
comply with a trial court order to turn over the source code for
a forensic software program used to convict the defendant on
the grounds that the code was not relevant or necessary to the
defense.3 78 Similar refusals to compel source code have oc-
curred in the context of the Intoxilyzer, which is used to mea-
sure alcohol intoxication.379 In a similar context involving
Alcotest, a popular breath test device, the company refused to
sell its device to non-law enforcement entities to enable inde-
pendent verification on trade secrecy grounds.
38 0
More troublingly, consider the lines between privatization
and public responsibilities. Here, the private status of the
manufacturer facilitates the striking dismissal of core constitu-
tional protections regarding the right to confront witnesses at
trial. However, as Christian Chessman observed, there is an
even greater irony operating here.38 1 In these decisions, both
state and federal courts routinely presume the reliability and
accuracy of the techniques they rely upon.3 8 2 And yet, com-
puter scientists would argue exactly the reverse: that the pro-
grams themselves do not automatically or inherently ensure
reliability.383 As Chessman writes, "computer programs are
not more reliable than human statements because they are
377 ICL
378 Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets, supra note 12, at 7 (discussing
People v. Chubbs, No. B258569, 2015 WL 139069 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015)).
379 See Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 Nw. U. L. REv. 659, 662
(2018).
380 Id. at 672 (citing State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114 (N.J. 2008)).
381 Chessman, supra note 43, at 183.




human statements-and no more than human statements."384
Since they are tools of human design, they are often subject to
human error, faulty assumptions, and mistakes, just like any
other kind of evidentiary tool.385 This is perhaps the strongest
reason for why machine testimony deserves the benefit of ad-
versarially-generated scrutiny.38 6 Errors can constantly
reproduce because each program update can interact nega-
tively with preexisting code.3 7
These issues are by no means limited to the government.
In the context of scientific research, academics often offer gen-
eral conceptual and functional descriptions of scientific-cre-
ated software and withhold source code in favor of releasing
only the binary, executable version.38 8 This affects the process
of peer review, making it impossible to detect errors from repro-
ducing results, leading some to allege that the disclosure prob-
lem has led to a "credibility crisis" in research computation.3 89
C. The New Secrecy: Information Insulation
As the previous sections have demonstrated, source code
secrecy can have dramatic implications for the public interest,
particularly in the area of criminal justice. Here, rather than
recognizing the deep complexity of trade secret law (and its
limitations), courts are tending to defer to trade secret owners,
often to the detriment of the public interest.390
Today, the circumstances under which trade secrecy is as-
serted, I would argue, change the traditional function of trade
secrecy from protecting against a competitor's misappropria-
tion to a function that impedes public investigation. Early
trade secret cases raise paradigmatic fact patterns that involve
some form of misappropriation: circumstances where depart-
ing employees sought to continue their business; or competi-
tors copied another's products; or contracts to keep certain
384 Id. at 186.
385 Id. at 184.
386 Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1976-78 (2017).
387 Chessman, supra note 43, at 185.
388 See Darrel C. Ince et al., The Case for Open Computer Programs, 482
NATURE 485, 486-87 (2012) (expressing concern about the need to share source
code among scientific researchers); A. Morin et al., Shining Light into Black Boxes,
336 Sci. 159, 159 (2012) (expressing the same concern).
389 Morin et al., supra note 388, at 160. In 2010, of the twenty most-cited
science journals, only three had policies requiring source code disclosure, in
contrast to near-universal agreement requiring the availability of other forms of
data. Id. at 161.
390 I am grateful to Tait Graves for this helpful observation.
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business information confidential.39 1 In one of the earliest de-
scriptions of trade secrets, the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts observed in 1868:
If [a person] invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process
of manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not,
he has not indeed an exclusive right to it as against the
public, or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge
of it; but he has a property in it, which a court of chancery
will protect against one who in violation of contract and
breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or
to disclose it to third persons.
392
Hundreds of years later, this summary still applies to most
cases of trade secrecy.3 9 3 The typical defendant in trade se-
crecy cases involves a competitor who has allegedly misappro-
priated the plaintiffs trade secret for profit and unfair
competition.
3 94
Yet, more recently, the circumstances I discuss in this Arti-
cle demonstrate three core differences from the classic cases
involving trade secrecy. First, in all of the examples we have
examined here, the defendant's motivation is not to compete
with a trade secret holder but rather to investigate a particular
source of information. Here, the concern is not motivated by
misappropriation for the purposes of competition, but rather
for the purposes of discovery or investigation. Second, unlike
the classic trade secrecy cases, the parties that are usually at
odds with one another have no formal, preexisting contractual
relationship-the source code is sought for the purposes of
disclosure to the public or for the purposes of investigation of
bias, not for the purposes of financial gain. Third, in many of
these examples, the government plays some key role, either
because it is prosecuting the case or because it is acting in a
decision-making capacity.
All of these differences, I think, help to underscore the role
of trade secrecy as an obstacle to the public interest. But it
requires us to think differently about how to address the role of
391 See Lemley, supra note 176, at 315.
392 See Risch, supra note 275, at 13 (quoting Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass.
452, 458 (1868)).
393 See Charles Tait Graves & Brian D. Range. Identification of Trade Secret
Claims in Litigation: Solutions for a Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 NW. J. TECH & INTELL.
PROP. 68, 72 (2006) ("A trade secret case usually begins shortly after a former
employee has resigned and either joined a competitor or formed a new, competing
business.").
394 See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 195
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (involving such a claim); see also Risch, supra note 275, at 15
(noting that this may be the modem view of trade secrets litigation).
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trade secrecy in these cases of information insulation. As the
importance of trade secrecy has increased, so has surrounding
litigation, which has grown exponentially since the 1980s.3 9 5
And as litigation has increased, in the civil context, so have
the attempts to insulate trade secrets from inquiry and investi-
gation. As two leading trade secret experts have explained, it is
typical for the plaintiff to avoid a specific identification of the
trade secret precisely to obfuscate inquiry.3 96 Instead, the
plaintiff argues "that the defendant already knows what the
alleged trade secrets are because the defendant knows what it
stole, and thus no identification is necessary."397 In these
cases, the plaintiff will rarely provide a precise and complete
identification of the trade secrets unless a court forces them to
do So.
3 9 8
If the trade secret owner avoids identifying its trade secrets
in a classic departing-employee case on the grounds of famili-
arity, imagine how much more difficult it can be to obtain the
information when the interest at stake involves allegations of
bias. Such cases do not involve misappropriation for the pur-
poses of unfair competition, but they implicate core concerns
about fairness and accountability to the public. These inter-
ests would only escalate the plaintiffs impetus to avoid discov-
ery and identification.
Three results flow from this observation. First, assertions
of trade secret protection, just as the prior section suggests,
remain a key obstacle for researchers and litigants seeking to
test the efficacy and fairness of government algorithms and
automated decision making.39 9 Even the most effective investi-
gations, like ProPublica's projects, which have addressed a
myriad number of issues (Uber's surge pricing, Amazon's pric-
ing algorithm, and the COMPAS recidivism algorithm, among
others), have been undertaken without access to the underly-
395 See David S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapoznikow, Whitney E.
McCollum & Jill Weader, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REv. 291, 293 (2009).
396 Graves & Range, supra note 393, at 72.
397 Id.
398 Id. at 68.
399 Christian Sandvig et al., Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for De-
tecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms 9 (Paper Presented to Data and Dis-
crimination: Converting Critical Concerns into Productive Inquiry, 64th Annual
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ing source code, forcing investigators to perform audits without
access to key data.
Second, the conventional exceptions to trade secret protec-
tion within the law-reverse engineering, for example-are
usually unavailable in the context of Al. If the source code is
unavailable, the only way to obtain the code is to engage in
reverse engineering, but this is often difficult, costly, and re-
stricted, either by copyright law (which prohibits reverse engi-
neering for the purposes of copying or duplication) or by
contract.4 00 Michael Mattioli has argued, "unlike software, big
data practices cannot be reverse engineered. That is, an expert
cannot decipher just how a set of data was assembled with
nothing more to work from than the data itself."4 0 1 Because
the computer code for an algorithm is so complex, simply read-
ing the code does not make it interpretable without the ability
to plug in data and see how the algorithm actually functions.
40 2
In addition, because algorithms increasingly depend on the
input of unique personal data, the outcomes may be obscure
and difficult to study in a systematic capacity without access to
the data.40 3 Finally, there are other issues raised from relying
on self-reporting data as well.
4 04
Last, legal threats have stymied attempts toward investiga-
tion and transparency. Consider this example. In 2005, an
employee of Internet Security Systems, Michael Lynn, was
asked to reverse engineer Cisco's Internet Operating System
(lOS), which served as the operating system for Cisco's routers
used by both private and public entities.40 5 Lynn discovered
that the system had a security vulnerability, known as "exploit
400 See Source Code Definition, supra note 45, at 3.
401 See Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REv. 535, 550-53
(2015) (citing Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property
Protection for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2652 (1994) (noting the
use of trade-secret protection in software industry)).
402 Sandvig et al., supra note 399, at 10.
403 I& (noting that the input of unique personal data means that "the same
programmatically-generated Web page may never be generated twice"). It is also
difficult to investigate when the data itself is proprietary, which is often the case.
See generally Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelli-
gence's Iplicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L.R. 579, 605, https://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3024938 [https://perma.cc/P93M-RX351 (discuss-
ing how copyright law, which restricts access to training data, limits algorithmic
accountability, including transparency).
404 Noninvasive user audits, which involves sharing the search queries from
users and their results (with their consent), have the advantage of not disturbing
the platform itself but can result in a serious sampling issue if the users queried
are not representative of the entire database, and so run the risk of reproducing
other kinds of errors. Id. at 11.
405 Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability, supra note 333, at 177.
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code," which could potentially allow a remote intervention into
the system.40 6 Although Cisco corrected the flaw and ceased
distributing the code that enabled the issue, Lynn remained
concerned that Cisco had failed to do enough to encourage its
customers to update its system and correct the error.40 7 For
this and other reasons, Lynn desired to give a presentation at
Black Hat. When Cisco instructed him not to give the presen-
tation, he quit his job, even though the presentation would not
have provided enough detail to enable anyone to take advan-
tage of the exploit without a great deal of effort.40 8 Neverthe-
less, Cisco then sought a court order against Lynn, preventing
him from presenting on the grounds that there was a risk that
he would disclose Cisco's trade secrets to the public.
Although the case eventually settled with an agreement
that Lynn would refrain from disseminating the information, it
serves as a powerful example of the growing reliance on trade
secrecy to impede the circulation of important public informa-
tion. This case, according to David Levine, "meant that this
information remained subject to laws designed to protect
Cisco's interest, not the public's," running the risk that it
would deter others from reverse engineering for fear of suffering
the same fate.40 9
V
TOWARD CONTROLLED DIscLosuRE
As Frank Pasquale and others have explained, disclosure
of source code is a deceptively simple solution to the problem of
algorithmic transparency.410 At best, it represents only a par-
tial solution to the issue of accountability in Al because of the
complexity and dynamism of machine-learning processes.4 11
Many systems have also not been designed with oversight and
406 Id. at 178.
407 Id.; see also Jennifer Granick, More Tales From 'Ciscogate', WIRED (Aug. 8,
2005), https://www.wired.com/2005/08/more-tales-from-ciscogate/ [https://
perma.cc/HV6Q-ME291 (offering a first-hand account).
408 Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability, supra note 333, at 178.
409 Id. at 180.
410 PASQUALE, supra note 347, at 142. See also Pasquale's work on qualified
transparency in Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Trans-
parency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 105, 162, 164 (2010) [here-
inafter Beyond Innovation] (describing qualified transparency as an "excellent
method" for creating a self-sustaining public).
411 Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REv. 633, 638,
660 (2017). A code audit, sometimes referred to as "white box testing," can in-
clude examinations of, as one report describes, "specific system behavior-logs
that record data access, calculations, decision trees, and errors," and, in some
cases of automated systems, might include a review of the statistical models used
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accountability in mind and, thus, can be opaque to the outside
investigator.4 12 Auditing, too, has significant limitations, de-
pending on the technique.4 13 Further, even if source code dis-
closure reveals some elements of a decision reached through
automated processing, it cannot be fully evaluated without an
accompanying investigation of the training data-why certain
types of data were selected (or not), the choice of rules of opera-
tion, and the steps taken to validate the decision.4 14 Trans-
parency, then, does not mean interpretability.4 15 And then
there is the problem of the dynamic nature of algorithmic deci-
sion making, which often amplifies issues of opacity as well.4 16
All these critiques are certainly true in demonstrating that
access to the source code is only one part of a larger issue of a
lack of transparency in Al. However, at the same time, a legion
of civil and criminal cases involving software have demon-
strated that access to the source code is often an essential
starting place in performing a full investigation or independent
validation of an automated decision.4 17
As I have suggested, the seclusion of source code masks an
underlying problem within intellectual property law that intel-
lectual property reform alone cannot solve. The problem, es-
sentially, is two-fold: one involves the dynamics of a closed,
privatized system of governance, and the other involves the
failure of intellectual property principles to incentivize harmo-
nization and disclosure in cases of significant public interest.
Both these issues have crystallized around source code secrecy
as a major area of concern.
to rank, sort, and score inputs. See the excellent study by RIEKE ET AL., supra note
8, at 19.
412 Kroll et al., supra note 411, at 649-50. For a discussion of Kroll's article,
see Pauline Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
189 (2017).
413 Kroll et al., supra note 411, at 650-52.
414 Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 338, at 130-31.
415 Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 338, at 131. For an excellent discussion
of different types of transparency in automated decision making, see Cary Cog-
lianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance 26 (U. Penn. Law
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 18-38),
https: //papers. ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3293008 [https: //perma
.cc/2PQU-LRKR] (discussing fishbowl and reasoned transparency).
416 Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 338, at 131-32.
417 See, e.g., Chessman, supra note 43, at 207 ("[A]ccess to source code is
especially significant when evidence produced by a computer plays a prominent
role in a defendant's trial ... limiting source code access means... 'the defendant
is effectively disabled from answering the one question every rational juror needs
answered:' why does a computer think that you are guilty?" (footnotes omitted)).
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Because of the complexity of the problem, we need to study
a wide range of variables in reaching an individualized solu-
tion, interrogating the degree, depth, scope, timing, and audi-
ence of the disclosure.4 18 Each of these elements will vary
according to the type of issue presented, particularly whether it
implicates state or privately sponsored deprivations of entitle-
ments. At times, therefore, some limited disclosure-to ex-
perts, for example-might be more appropriate for investigative
purposes.
4 19
Source code is especially paradoxical, as I have argued,
because its very nature is composed of both public and private
property: many programming companies, as I have suggested,
integrate open source code into their proprietary software.
4 20
Evidence suggests that over two-thirds of companies build pro-
prietary software using open source code.42 1 Other companies,
as Chessman and others have pointed out, rely on code, algo-
rithms, or software that draws from industry standards that
are publicly available.422 And yet, we have no way of knowing
when a company asserts trade secret protection whether the
underlying asset would satisfy the doctrinal definition.
42 3
The problem, as I have suggested, is not just a problem of
opacity-it may also implicate problems of privatization.424 In
such cases, building accountability does not simply mean en-
suring greater transparency, it also encompasses, at times,
some form ofjudicial review to ensure accountability as well.
425
In addition, any menu of potential solutions must be situ-
ated within the background of the fluid nature of intellectual
property protection for software, which I have argued has only
served to heighten the attractiveness of trade secrecy protec-
tion for source code. At the same time, however, one must be
pragmatic about the prospects for a solution. Patent protection
for software is indeterminate and unlikely at best. And copy-
right law has largely bent over backwards to accommodate the
secrecy of source code, essentially eviscerating its own system
418 Id. For an excellent study of disclosure and its effects, see Bert I. Huang,
Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REv. 2227 (2013); see also Sandeen's excellent
discussion of disclosure, supra note 282.
419 PASQUALE, supra note 347, at 142.
420 Chessman, supra note 43, at 210.
421 Id. at n.224.
422 Ic at 210.
423 Id. at 209-10.
424 As Ken Bamberger has observed in a related context, "even though the
functions involved are traditionally those of a public actor, the management of
those functions is private." Bamberger, supra note 15, at 726.
425 Id. at 726-27.
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of deposit requirements that serve the public interest. These
scenarios make trade secrecy an especially attractive backup
option, but they also impede a more systemic approach toward
balancing the interests of property, privacy, and disclosure.
In this concluding section, I sketch out a brief architecture
of what I would call a "controlled disclosure" regime-one that
seeks to balance out the incentives at play in intellectual prop-
erty, but one that also recognizes the pillars of discovery, dis-
closure, and open governance in order to address the growing
issue of source code secrecy. This section explores a spectrum
of solutions, from systemic to case-by-case solutions, which
can be loosely clustered into "ex ante" solutions (which aim
toward proactively incentivize disclosure of source code for lim-
ited public access) and those which might be construed as "ex
post" solutions (which aim to particularize disclosure in a spe-
cific dispute). The idea here is to sketch out a wide range of
tools for lawyers and litigators addressing these issues (recog-
nizing, of course, that many of these are only superficial fixes to
a deeper set of problems).
A. Strategies Toward Transparency
1. Reforming Intellectual Property: Channeling and
Election Doctrines
The most systemic avenue of reform could involve address-
ing the current state of overlap between copyright, patent, and
trade secret protection of software (and source code specifi-
cally). Here, the paradox of software secrecy is exacerbated by
the longstanding judicial principle that the same aspects of
software should not be protected by overlapping patent and
copyright protections.426 And yet when it comes to source
code, or even broader aspects of software, more recently this
overlap seems to be not only welcomed but also under-
theorized.42 7
Most cases of overlap do not present a problem for intellec-
tual property owners.428 As Laura Heymann has explained,
overlap is similar to a "belt-and-suspenders form of enforce-
ment, allowing the intellectual property owner to resort to a
second mode of protection should the first fail or expire."429 In
the case of software, as this Article has argued, the overlap
426 Samuelson, supra note 14, at 1.
427 Id. at 1, 3-4 (citing Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) as evidence).
428 See Heymann, supra note 134, at 240.
429 Id. at 240.
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(coupled with the shifting boundaries of protection) has led to a
reliance on secrecy over disclosure, even in cases with strong
public interest implications, largely because the law has facili-
tated it.
Scholars, including Mark McKenna and Christopher
Sprigman, have recognized the role played by "channeling" doc-
trines, which operate to police the boundaries between various
areas of intellectual property law, particularly with respect to
subject matter.430 The functionality doctrine in trademark law
is a good example of this because it acts to ensure that aspects
that are functional are "channeled" into patent, rather than
trademark, law for protection.
43 1
However, software-and the way that the law has governed
it-lacks a comparable "channeling" influence, to the detriment
of the public. Consequently, some have argued, particularly in
the context of design patents, that an election doctrine may
remedy the issue of overlap.432 The same may be true here. As
Christopher Buccafusco and others have described, the "elec-
tion" requirement historically required that a creator choose a
single form of protection for the work.433 This view, they argue,
stemmed from the court's perception that a work with multiple
components may require that different regimes apply to these
different parts.434 Yet as Buccafusco points out, the absence of
a doctrine for election "has increasingly meant that IP owners
use different IP regimes to protect the same aspects of the same
works, leading to overlapping protection."43 5 This allows the IP
owner to "leverage the advantages of all of these systems simul-
430 Mark P. McKenna & Christopher Jon Sprigman, What's In, and What's Out:
How IP's Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 491, 542
(2017). The notion of channeling versus overlap has been addressed by scholars
mostly in the context of design patents. See Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate
Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 873, 875-76 (2009); Heymann,
supra note 134, at 240.
431 McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, supra note 430, at 876.
432 See Christopher Buccafusco, Mark Lemley & Jonathan Masur, Intelligent
Design, 68 DuKE L.J. 75, 81 (2018).
433 Id. at 127 (citing Jason J. DuMont & Mark D. Janis, U.S. Design Patent
Law: A Historical Look at the Design Patent/Copyright Interface, inThE COPYRIGHT/
DESIGN INTERFACE: PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE 351 (Estelle Derclaye ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2018)); Douglas R. Wolf, The Doctrine of Elections, 9 CARDOzo ARrS &
ENT. L.J. 439 (1991) (noting that the doctrine of election has been "substantially
abandoned").
434 See Buccafusco et al.'s discussion of a 1974 case involving a watch design,
In re Yardley, where the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected the elec-
tion doctrine. Buccafusco et al., supra note 432, at 128 (discussing In re Yardley,
493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974)).
435 Id. at 128.
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taneously, rather than accepting the limitations of a given sys-
tem as the price of obtaining its benefits."436
One solution, therefore, is to create a regime that essen-
tially requires software owners to elect between doctrines, to
force owners to choose at the outset a particular area of protec-
tion, or, relatedly, agree to relinquish one area of law if the
owner selects one over the others.437 One could imagine a
channeling regime at the outset (when a creator seeks protec-
tion) or an election doctrine later on (if one chooses to litigate
an infringement claim).
This argument has been made previously in the context of
software, and it has intuitive appeal at first glance.4 38 This
framework for straightforward segregation would suggest that
patents should protect functional implementation of concepts,
copyright protects various modes of expression, and trade se-
crecy should be available for the protection of functional ele-
ments when patent protection is unavailable or undesirable.4 39
Under an election-based theory, one's choice would be limited
to individual features of a product, rather than the product as a
whole, enabling software-which is a collection of various ele-
ments-to have different areas of protection, depending on the
attribute that is being protected.440
Yet if we look closely, we see some difficulties with an elec-
tion or channeling approach in the context of software. As
many have pointed out, trade secrecy became a dominant form
of protection not because of a pointed intellectual property
strategy but because of the sheer mass of code that is out
there, always changing, and because trade secret protection is
so informal and easy to assert without challenge.44 1 Moreover,
it is also a powerful weapon in litigation, particularly compared
to copyright, since claims do not require evidence of copying
and can be narrowed further during discovery. Further, with-
out a corresponding legislative fix that requires disclosure in
the context of a deposit, a developer can still copyright code
436 Id. at 128-29.
437 Heymann, supra note 134, at 241.
438 See Buccafusco et al., supra note 432, at 129 (citing Michael J. Kline,
Requiring an Election of Protection for Patentable/Copyrightable Computer Pro-
grams, 6 CoMP. L.J. 607 (1986)).
439 Maier, supra note 145, at 151.
440 See Buccafusco et al., supra note 432, at 132, making this argument in the
context of design patents.
441 See, e.g., Maier, supra note 145, at 162 ("[I1t is clear that a computer
program including logic, structure, and organization can qualify for trade secret
protection as long as it is not generally known.").
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without disclosing it. 442 And, given the lessons of history, a
regime that requires full disclosure might actually have the
opposite effect of incentivizing trade secrecy even further.
The same is effectively true for software patents, even if one
obtains protection. Evidence shows that the Federal Circuit,
even when it accepts software patents, has been loathe to re-
quire disclosure of source code as a precondition to patentabil-
ity. 4 4 3 And there are other areas where patent law's
requirements have been more lax than others. More than fif-
teen years ago, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argued that recent
patent law decisions had begun to demonstrate a striking will-
ingness to excuse software inventions from the enablement and
best mode requirements, limiting the goal of disclosure that is
at the heart of the patent system.444 In a variety of cases, the
Federal Circuit held that software patentees need not disclose
source or object code, flow charts, or other detailed descrip-
tions of their programs.44 5 The collective result of these cases,
they argue, is an effective nullification of the disclosure re-
quirement for software patents.446 "[S]ince source code is nor-
mally kept secret," they explain, "software patentees generally
disclose little or no detail about their programs to the
public. "
447
442 See Note, Copyright Protection, supra note 96, at 1740.
443 See Ajeet P. Pal, Note, The Low Written Description Bar for Software Inven-
tions, 94 VA. L. REV. 457, 479 (2008) (noting that there is a much lower bar for
disclosures of software-related inventions compared to biotechnological
inventions).
444 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002).
445 Id. at 1162-63 (discussing Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908
F.2d 931, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1990) and Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543,
1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Indeed, Burk and Lemley point out that in multiple cases,
the Federal Circuit has been so relaxed that it has permitted applicants to meet
the requirements for written description and best mode, even when the specifica-
tion fails to even use the terms "computer" or "software." Id. at 1164. Despite the
relaxation of the requirements for disclosure, however, the authors are careful to
point out that obviousness can be a rather tough bar for software patents to
satisfy. See id. at 1167-68 (applying this analysis to Amazon's 'one-click' shop-
ping feature). For more discussion of how obviousness operates in the context of
software, see Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law, 22
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 75, 95-98 (2008).
446 Burk & Lemley, supra note 444, at 1164-65.
447 Id. at 1165. In fact, one commentary from 1996 described source code
listings as "primarily a relic of the early days of computer program patents when it
was unclear what would suffice for sufficiency of disclosure." See id. at n.42
(citing MELVIN C. GARNER ET AL., Advanced Claim Drafting and Amendment Writing
Workshop for Electronics and Computer-Related Subject Matter, in ADVANCED CLAIM
AND AMENDMENT WRITING 1996, at 227, 275 (PLI Sixth Annual Patent Prosecution
Workshop Course Book, 1996)).
Id. at 1165-66.
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As a result, as a few leading experts in the field, Richard
StaIlman and Mitch Kapor, pointed out, even when software
patenting was readily available, it did not affect the preexisting
domains of trade secrecy.
448
By withholding the source code, companies keep secret not a
particular technique, but the way that they have combined
dozens of techniques to produce a design for a complete sys-
tem. Patenting the whole design is impractical and ineffec-
tive. Even companies that have software patents still
distribute programs in machine code only[,]
concluding that in no area do software patents reduce trade
secrecy.
44 9
2. Reforming Copyright: Deposit and Demarcation
Possibilities
Even if a systemic approach is not available, what about
reforming copyright law? As we know, the Copyright Office will
register software without requiring the deposit of the source
code and, generally speaking, copyright registration is only re-
quired when a person intends to file suit for infringement.
4 50
Deposit requirements, too, are not always enforced and reme-
dies for noncompliance have been referred to as largely "tooth-
less."4 51 Nevertheless, this section discusses two possibilities:
the first a system that reinvigorates disclosure through deposit,
and the second a system that focuses on demarcating source
code for discovery and other purposes.
First, given the indeterminate benefits of relying on fair use
and reverse engineering in addressing source code secrecy, it
makes sense to consider a simple legislative fix regarding
source code protection in copyright law. Here, it may be worth
revising copyright's formalities, like registration and deposit, in
certain cases.4
52
As this Article has discussed, publication formalities
abound in copyright law-with the notable exception of
software.45 3 Until 1976, federal protection under copyright
could not attach until something was published, except in one
context: source code, which is protectable without publication,
comprehensive deposit or disclosure.
4 54
448 Garfinkel et al., supra note 228, at 54.
449 Id. at 54.
450 See Note, Copyright Protection, supra note 96, at 1741 & n. 120.
451 Gibson, supra note 20, at 208.
452 See id.
453 See id. at 205-06.
454 Id. at 206; see infra Part IC.
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For various reasons, I would not favor a publication re-
quirement for all forms of source code, even under copyright
law. Complete transparency of code, particularly in cases
where the source code addresses issues of vital public impor-
tance like electronic voting, requires some forms of seclusion
and security to protect against hacking, gaming, or other forms
of interference.455 Moreover, a fully transparent society brings
significant risks of invasions of privacy, voyeurism, and theft of
intellectual property.4 56 Even disclosures oriented to the pub-
lic interest can become compromised by enabling other, less
publicly-minded individuals to "game" or abuse the
algorithm.
45 7
At the same time that these concerns exist, it may make
sense for us to revisit formalities nonetheless. For example,
even if a uniform publication requirement seems unnecessarily
overbroad and undesirable from a security perspective, there
may be room to explore the possibility of a more pronounced
deposit requirement with state officials or special masters in
cases of strong public interest.4 58 In such circumstances, it
may be feasible to make the code available for inspection under
certain circumstances warranting public interest.
4 59
Indeed, the sui generis approach explored by Samuelson
and others in their famous Manifesto argued that a registration
and licensing system, coupled with an electronic repository for
state-of-the-art software, would enable beneficial exchanges
and facilitate low-cost transactions of software reuse.4 60 A re-
pository would facilitate greater public access, making more
knowledge available to software engineers and benefiting the
public as a result.46 1 Others have also argued that a compul-
sory licensing regime might be appropriate for certain applica-
tions as well. 4
6 2
455 Id. at 206-07.
456 PASQUALE, supra note 347, at 142.
457 Sandvig et al., supra note 399, at 9 (noting that even Reddit, despite its
culture of transparency, does not share all of its source code with the public).
458 See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485,
532-33 (2004).
459 See Gibson, supra note 20, at 208-09. Indeed, Ruckelshaus expressly
authorizes this sort of disclosure. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1015-16 (1984) (allowing for government disclosure of trade secrets to elimi-
nate research duplication and to streamline pesticide registration process).
460 Samuelson, supra note 261, at 2425.
461 Id. at 2429.
462 See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39
STAN. L. REv. 1329, 1371 (1987); Samuelson, supranote 261, at 2414-15; see also
Anthony J. Mahajan, Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Reverse Engineering
After ProCD: A Proposed Compromise for Computer Software, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
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Decades ago, the difficulty of finding the right mode of
protection, it seems, actually motivated one agency in Japan,
the Ministry of Industry and Trade, to propose a similar sui
generis regime of protection that would last only fifteen years
and required deposit of source code.4 6 3 Most interestingly, it
also proposed an arbitration system that empowered it to grant
licenses to users when justified by the "public interest."
464
That proposal died as the result of negotiations with the U.S.
Government, which expressed concern regarding its potentially
lowered standard of protection.
Second, even aside from these options for limited disclo-
sure, there are certainly middle pathways that can be explored
in the marketplace and the courtroom.4 65 It bears noting the
curious parallel that emerges here between source code (which
might not turn out to be as original as the developer might
warrant) and the kind of concerns that animated the filtration/
abstraction tests that illuminated the early cases of nonliteral
infringement. Just as the notion of nonliteral infringement im-
plicates the risks of protecting more abstract work that comes
from the public domain, literal infringement carries the same
risk.
The idea, above, that is captured by the notion of filtration
is that there is a spectrum of original and nonoriginal content
in software. And for this reason, it may be possible to develop a
demarcation system that offers some degree of openness to
capture the complexity of code. Consider Creative Commons
as an example, which in the copyright context enables a menu
of options regarding openness for reuse.466 Here, we could
easily imagine public copyright demarcations that mark
software according to: (1) full release of source code; (2) partial
release of source code generally; (3) restricted release to certain
parties.467 Given the comparative popularity of the GPL model
in open source projects, this may turn out to be an area of
fruitful possibility.
3297, 3331-32 (1999) (suggesting a "compromise" between compulsory licensing
and a complete ban on reverse engineering).
463 Oman, supra note 100, at 31.
464 ICL
465 For an excellent account of reinvigorating copyright's formalities, see
Sprigman, supra note 458, at 554-64.
466 See CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/about/ [https://per
ma.cc/T8NL-B2KS] (last visited Sept. 29, 2018) (introducing a network of copy-
right licenses allowing for greater customization).
467 This list of options modifies the very helpful framework set forth by Ince et
al., supra note 388, at 487.
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3. Reforming Contract Law and Procurement
Throughout this Article, I have mostly emphasized the in-
tellectual property aspects of source code protection. There is,
however, more to the story involving the role played by contract
law in the early years of software's uncertain protectability.
Since Congress did not amend the Copyright Act to include
computer programs until 1980, and since patent protection
emerged only after 1994 as a result of In re Alappat, trade
secrecy became undergirded with a strong reliance on contract
law (in the form of shrinkwrap licenses) for protection.4 68 As a
result, contract law has mostly been used to foreclose things
like reverse engineering and imposing robust controls over
subscribers that have been interpreted to foreclose some forms
of auditing.4 69 While this section begins by agreeing with many
of the critiques of shrinkwrap license enforceability, I also wish
to identify two potentially fruitful areas of challenge: the first
involving a challenge of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to
permit third-party auditing, and the second involving the po-
tential for contractual reform with government entities.
Although there has been a healthy and robust debate re-
garding the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses among schol-
ars, courts mostly held the licenses unenforceable until the
landmark Seventh Circuit case of ProCD v. Zeidenberg.470 Al-
468 See Mahajan, supra note 462, at 3297, 3310 & n. 110.
469 Lemley, supra note 267, at 1246-47.
470 Mahajan, supra note 462, at 3310 (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)). There is vast literature on the topic of enforceability.
See, e.g., David A. Einhorn, Shrink-Wrap Licenses: The Debate Continues, 38 IDEA
383, 401 (1998) (concluding that there is a circuit split regarding the enforceabil-
ity of shrinkwrap contracts); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A
Brief Defense of Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RuTGERS COMP. &
TECH. L.J. 335, 337 (1996) (arguing that courts and legislatures should validate
the use of end user license (shrinkwrap) agreements); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1253 n.53 (1995)
(discussing the enforceability of shrinkwrap contracts); Mark A. Lemley, Shrink-
wraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRIcS J. 311, 317 (1995) (stating that "shrinkwrap
licenses.., do not fare well in the courts"); Apik Minassian, Comment, The Death
of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV.
569, 608 (1997) (arguing that the Seventh Circuit inappropriately applied the
Copyright Act in ProCD to enforce the shrinkwrap agreement); Gary H. Moore & J.
David Hadden, On-line Software Distribution: New Life for 'Shrinkwrap" Licenses?,
13 COMP. LAw. 1-10 (Apr. 1996) (arguing that online shrinkwrap licenses "stand[ ]
a far greater chance of being enforced than [their] hard-copy cousin[s]"); Christian
H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software "Licenses" Really
Sale, and How Will the Software Industry Respond?, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 555, 640
(2004) (remarking that "only one significant case in the last five years has refused
to enforce a shrinkwrap"); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between
Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE
L.J. 479, 537 (1995) (arguing that shrlnkwraps may be enforceable).
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though I would definitely sympathize with the arguments re-
garding unenforceability, it is important to note the need for
other avenues to protect researchers in their efforts to increase
transparency through auditing. The world's leading computer
science review community-the Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers (IEEE)-requires technically, managerially,
and financially independent esting for any software that might
cause "catastrophic consequences," defining that to include
anything that causes a "[lioss of human life, complete mission
failure, loss of system security and safety, or extensive finan-
cial or social 1oSS."471
Indeed, shifts in recent case law suggest growing areas of
protection for independent auditing. Recently, the ACLU sued
on behalf of four researchers who maintained that the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act-a national antihacking law-pre-
vented them from scraping data from sites and from creating
fake profiles to investigate algorithmic discrimination on the
basis of race and gender.472 The testers' concern was that the
law permitted researchers to be vulnerable to criminal and con-
tractual penalties because the research might involve violating
one of the sites' Terms of Service.473 Ironically, in real space,
even though the use of crowdsourcing or human testers might
be totally uncontroversial, the use of computer programs to
replicate human behavior is often barred by contract.
474
But the outcome of the Sandvig case was a strong state-
ment in favor of protection for auditing techniques. There, the
471 IEEE STANDARDS ASS'N, IEEE STD. 1012-2016: IEEE STANDARD FOR SYSTEM,
SOFTWARE, AND HARDWARE VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 196, 199 (2016); see also
Nathaniel Adams, What Does Software Engineering Have to Do with DNA?, 42
CHAMPION 58, 65 (2018) (discussing importance of subjecting PG systems to
software engineering best practices and independent reviews).
472 In the case, two researchers attempted to run a sock puppet audit by
creating a number of automated bots that would replicate the browsing habits of
individuals of different races, and then visit a real estate web site and record the
properties that they were shown and advertised. See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 8-10 (D.D.C. 2018); complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
at 23-24, Sandvig v. Lynch, No. 1:16-cv-01368 (D.D.C. June 29, 2016); see also
Annie Lee, Online Research and Competition Under the CFAA: The Revocation
Paradigm of Interpreting Access and Authorization, at 26-29 (draft on file with
author), Sandvig et al., supra note 399, at 13.
473 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 24-25, Sandvig, No.
1:16-cv-01368.
474 See Sandvig et al., supra note 399, at 15. Currently, federal courts disa-
gree on the question of whether individuals who violate the Terms of Service
restrictions can be prosecuted under the "access" provision of the CFAA, which
provides for fines and punishment of anyone who "intentionally accesses a com-
puter without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains
... information from any protected computer" 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2018).
1261
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
court joined the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, which
have stated that the CFAA prohibits "only unauthorized access
to information" (e.g. hacking).475 By narrowing the reach of the
CFAA, the Court rejected a broader interpretation adopted by
the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits that the prohibited activ-
ities involved an unauthorized use of the information that went
beyond authorization for specific purposes under the Terms of
Service.4
76
Even outside of reforming the private, contractual nature
of Terms of Service agreements and their interpretations, an-
other potential area of success involves reforming contractual
language with government parties.47 7 In these contexts, con-
tract law can serve as a tool for access, rather than the oppo-
site. Previously, researchers reported that some cities, the City
of San Francisco among them, rarely fought language in con-
tracts with third-party vendors that recognized that the algo-
rithms must be kept from the public.4 78 Yet there is some
evidence that this is changing and that more and more entities
are looking to enhance openness through government contrac-
tual requirements that narrow, rather than expand, trade
secrecy. 479
In an important study performed by Robert Brauneis and
Ellen Goodman, the authors note that "governments do not,
and need not, uniformly accede to contractor wishes for non-
disclosure and data ownership."48 0 In Florida, for example, a
pretrial risk assessment tool developed by the Arnold Founda-
tion for use in the state court system was governed by contrac-
tual language that required the Foundation to specifically
designate trade secret material or risk waiving the right to ob-
ject to disclosure. By simply shifting the burden to the con-
tractor to identify and mark its protected material, filtering out
what is protected from what is public, the risk of overclaiming
is reduced. It is also important to note that even though the
Foundation would have preferred a broader scope of nondis-
475 Sandvig, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 22-26 (emphasis added).
476 I& at 22.
477 Joel Reidenberg discussed procurement as a potential avenue of reform in
his landmark Lex Informatica, supra note 15, at 589.
478 Abraham, supra note 1.
479 See the work being done by Jason Schultz in advising government entities.
E-mail from Jason Schultz to IPProfs (Nov. 28, 2018) (on file with author); AL-
GORITHmIC ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY TOOLKIT, AI Now, 16-27 (2008), https://ainowin-
stitute.org/aap-toolkit.pdf [https:/perma.cc/4F62-N2YE].
480 Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 338, at 164.
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closure, it still readily agreed to a more transparent
formulation.
48 '
Indeed, as Brauneis and Goodman point out, when the
government is doing the procuring, it is often in a more power-
ful position to ensure greater transparency. This means that
governments can adopt a default position that presumes that
all contractor-provided information is public in nature, or, al-
ternatively, that the intellectual property produced under the
contract is owned by the state. Indeed, in Illinois, their re-
search revealed that at least one related contractor agreed to
transfer ownership of all intellectual property rights under the
contract to the state. In cases where a jurisdiction designs
custom algorithms, the authors argue that it would be entirely
appropriate to ask for ownership of the source code, or, at the
very least, a nonexclusive license that authorizes the jurisdic-
tion to authorize others; relatedly, a jurisdiction should also
assert rights over any resulting reports that rely on particular-
ized data.48 2 In all cases, the authors urge jurisdictions to link
their disclosure provisions to requests for full documentation,
so that further investigation can take place if needed.
4. Reforming Governance: Open Code Strategies
The term "open code governance" was first used over twelve
years ago by Danielle Citron in her sterling exploration of the
topic to denote a world where source code used by government
was publicly disclosed.483 Yet, as I have argued in this Article,
the issues that she raised with respect to closed code govern-
ance have only become further exacerbated in a world where
algorithmic decision making replaces the norm of human judg-
ment.4 8 4 At the same time that she sounded the alarm on
closed code in automated judgments, however, we have also
seen a concomitant rise of commitment, at least during
the Obama era, toward greater code transparency in
government.
48 5
In studying ways to reframe the source code paradox that
is the central theme of this Article, we can turn to some of the
core tenets of open government initiatives and see whether
some examples might shed light on particular ways to en-
481 Id. at 165.
482 Id. at 166.
483 Citron, supra note 8, at 358.
484 Id. at 357-58.
485 See Open Data Policy Guidelines, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION, https://sunlight
foundation.com/opendataguidelines/ [https://perma.cc/8NT2-QBSPI (last vis-
ited Sept. 29, 2018).
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courage greater transparency.4 36 A recently proposed law in
Washington State called for public agencies to compile an "al-
gorithmic accountability" report, requiring the system (and its
data) to be available for independent verification, testing, and
research to understand the potential for bias, inaccuracy, or
disparate impact.48 7 This is a perfect example of how law can
address the problem of opacity to enable better transparency.
In the criminal justice context, Erin Murphy has proposed
a system that would empower a centralized national oversight
board to review and ensure defendants' access to private or
proprietary data regarding certain forensic techniques.48 8 The
City Council law-and the accompanying hearing-that
opened this Article is just one example of a growing and larger
trend toward more openness in government through requiring
source code disclosure and enabling black box testing (which
allowed for mechanisms to test inputs and generate results
(outputs)) .489
One part of "technological due process"490 (to use Citron's
language), for example, might involve the creation of interactive
models that allow citizens to see how certain decisions might
change according to the input of a changing continuum of vari-
486 For more on transparency, see generally OPEN GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION,
TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION IN PRACTICE (Daniel Lathrop & Laurel Ruma eds.,
2010) (discussing online tools for government transparency and participation);
Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Tneir Alterna-
tives in the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. PITr. L. REV. 443, 480 (2012) (analyzing
transparency advocacy campaigns); Free & Open Source Software in Government
with Code.mil, DIGITALGOV (June 5, 2018), https://digital.gov/event/2018/06/
05/free-open-source-software-in-government-wth-codemil/ [https: //perma.cc/
YF4J-6GV6] (discussing Code.mil, an effort to catalog open source efforts within
the Department of Defense); Open Government Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESI-
DENT BARACK OBAMA, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/open [https://per
ma.cc/76ZP-YMW2] (last visited Sept. 29, 2018) (discussing President Obama's
Open Data Initiatives).
487 See DJ Pangburn, Washington Could Be the First State to Rein in Auto-
mated Decision-Making, FASTCOMPANY (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.fastcompany
.com/90302465/washington-introduces-landmark-algorithmic-accountability-
laws [https: //perma.cc/NEK7-5NV8].
488 See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty,
and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 783-84
(2007).
489 See Testimony of Helen Nissenbaum, Julia Powles & Thomas Ristenpart,
Hearing on Automated Decision Systems Used by Agencies, supra note 3, at 1
[hereinafter Nissenbaum et al.] (follow "Hearing Testimony 10/16/17" hyperlink,
page 41 of pdf); see also Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 338, at 164-75 (dis-
cussing other ways in which governments can "promote transparency in their use
of predictive algorithms").
490 See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249, 1260-67 (2008).
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ables.49 1 Or it might involve the creation of audit trails that
enable individuals to see notice of the basis of automated gov-
ernment decision making, particularly where public benefits
are concerned.4 9 2 That is why the New York City Council law
was so significant, because it aimed for a level of accountability
that had not yet been demonstrated at the hands of local gov-
ernment. As a group of professors explained:
A Bill like this has the potential to address several stark gaps
in our regulatory landscape. When data is fed into a com-
puter system and used to allocate public services, penalties,
or policing, people deserve to know that the system is func-
tioning in accordance with the City's aims and values. That it
is not arbitrary, unfair, or incorrect. That it does not amplify
inequality. This means being able to find out what data is
used, how it is processed, and what else is taken into consid-
eration in decision-making, both In general and in individual
cases. There should be opportunities to test and contest the
input, processing, and output.
4 9 3
Of course, that does not mean that the Bill solved every
issue of government opacity. For example, it failed to offer any
degree of transparency regarding the data that was being used
by an automated system, among other areas of oversight.
4 94
Nor did its commitment to transparency take precedence over
proprietary claims in every instance.
495
Nevertheless, there are powerful reasons for a commitment
to open code, particularly in areas of governance, but even in
private industry. Open source advocates argue that greater
exposure to diverse minds will only improve the code, benefit-
ing innovation more broadly.49 6 And the market often favors
open source projects as well, like the Apache web server, the
Linux operating system, or the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC),
which contains a variety of widely-used compilers for use with
various programming languages.497 Even Microsoft has a
491 See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 338, at 174-75. In Europe, the
GDPR has provided individuals with a "right to explanation." See Commission
Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) Recital 71, Art. 13, Art. 15, Art. 22;
Bryan Ware, Is the 'Right to Explanation' in Europe's GDPR a Game-Changer for
Security Analytics?, CSO (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.csoonline.com/article/
3251727/is-the-gdpr-s-right-to-explanation-a-game-changer-for-securitY-ana-
lytics.html [https: //perma.cc/7HE2-J6JVI.
492 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Pro-
cess forAutomated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REv. 1, 28 (2014).
493 Nissenbaum et al., supra note 489, at 1-2.
494 See id. for an excellent discussion.
495 Id.




shared source initiative, which enables a select group of re-
searchers, universities, and government actors to view selected
portions of the Microsoft code (albeit under restricted
conditions). 
498
Part of these initiatives, understandably, are motivated by
the desire for better software security.499 But part of it might
also serve as an example to other entities about ways to share
code responsibly with known parties. Frank Pasquale has also
proposed making algorithms available to expert third parties
who would essentially hold them in escrow, thus allowing them
to be studied but not made public.
500
Indeed, during the Obama era, the government sought to
develop a number of open government initiatives to support
ideas of transparency, participation, and collaboration.50 '
Back in 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a
groundbreaking memorandum that articulated a clear commit-
ment to Open Source Software, requiring that executive agen-
cies conduct market research and, in justified cases, prefer
open source software over other choices, due to cost and other
considerations. 502 It touted open source's added reliability and
security, due in no small part to its "continuous and broad
peer-review."50 3 The memo also predicted that the ease of mod-
ifying open source would enable the DOD "to respond more
rapidly to changing situations.'"
50 4
Seven years later, in August 2016, the government re-
leased its Federal Source Code Policy, which required that all
new custom source code be shared with other agencies for
reuse, and that at least 20% of all new government custom
498 See id. (discussing Microsoft's Shared Source Initiative). But see Anne-
Kathrin Kuehnel, Microsoft, Open Source and the Software Ecosystem: Of
Predators and Prey-The Leopard Can Change Its Spots, 17 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L.
107, 107 (2008) (questioning whether Shared Source is truly a step toward an
embrace of Open Source philosophy).
499 See Source Code Definition, supra note 45, at 5.
500 See Sandvig et al., supra note 399, at 9 (citing Pasquale, Beyond Innova-
tion, supra note 410).
50L See Fenster, supra note 486, at 483; Norm Eisen & Ben Noveck, Why an
Open Government Matters, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Dec. 9,
2009, 3:16 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/09/why-
open-government-matters [https: //perma.cc/PAW8-TVLW].
502 See Memorandum from Dep't of Def., Clarifying Guidance Regarding Open
Source Software (OSS) 4 (Oct. 16, 2009), http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/O/
Documents/FOSS/2009OSS.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LPT-PEWC] (noting that
OSS met the definition of "commercial computer software" in almost all cases and
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code be released to the public as open source software.50 5 It
also created code.gov as a way to encourage greater citizen
participation and to release its open source projects to the
public.50 6 Although the comprehensive nature of the memo
took some by surprise, open source projects had been percolat-
ing for years before at the FDA, DOD, and CFPB.50 7
Of course, the core objection to open code governance has
to do with the political tides, which often turn in either direc-
tion. Consider the fate of open code governance in our current
Federal Administration. Although the lead government official
on the project, Alvand Salehi, argued that this was not a parti-
san issue, and observed "Code.gov is here to stay," there are
few signs suggesting that the current administration has pri-
oritized the issue, even though the web site still exists.508




507 See Memorandum from Tony Scott & Anne E. Rung to the Heads of Dep'ts
& Agencies, Federal Source Code Policy: Achieving Efficiency, Transparency, and
Innovation Through Reusable and Open Source Software § 2, https://sourcecode
.cio.gov/ [https://perma.cc/N4CL-XWMD] (last visited Sept. 29, 2018); see also
Petitions, GITHUB, https://github.com/WhiteHouse/petitions [https://perma.cc/
H4TM-TDS8] (last visited Sept. 29, 2018) (discussing Obama administration's
decision to release source code for application that allows individuals to directly
petition governments); Petitions Under the Obama Administration, THE WHITE
HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, https: //petitions.obamawhitehouse.archives
.gov/Ihttps://perma.cc/D4QK-QTPR] (last visited Sept. 29, 2018) (implementing
APIs which enable users to gather petition signatures on third-party platforms)).
Even the FDA built OpenFDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://open.fda.gov
[https://perma.cc/56MH-wNYX (last visited Sept. 29, 2018), which was an API
that enabled individuals to inquire about adverse drug reactions. The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau also used open source software. See Matthew Bur-
ton, The CFPB's Source Code Policy: Open and Shared, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PRO-
TECTION BUREAU (Apr. 6, 2012), https://www.consumerflnance.gov/about-us/
blog/the-cfpbs-source-code-policy-open-and-shared/ [https: //perma.cc/LL5E-
2BAE].
508 See Tom Cochran, Farewell to Obama, Our First Digital President, RECODE
(Dec. 1, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.recode.net/2016/12/1/13765002/presi-
dent-obama-digital-trump-administration-open-source [https://perma.cc/
2M3X-5YMN] ("It is imperative that our government work with best-of-breed ser-
vices and technologies to move our nation forward, and the introduction of open
source models has allowed our government to do just that."); Alex Handy, As
Trump Moves in, Code.gov Appears to Leave, SOFiWARE DEV. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2017),
http: / /sdtimes.com/code-gov/trump-moves-code-gov-appears-leave [https://
perna.cc/ERD9-GGCR] (noting that code.gov was down for a short period, then
returned to full functionality); Clare Malone, How Trump's White House Could
Mess with Government Data, FvETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 15, 2016, 6:29 AM), https://
fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-trumps-white-house-could-mess-with-govern-
ment-data/ [https://perma.cc/32XG-J9A3] (discussing the possibility that the
practices of the Trump administration will "erode the quality of government data
collection and systems").
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Nevertheless, aside from potential inertia at the federal
level, it appears that many municipalities are well underway in
opening up their code. One example that is particularly in-
structive involves efforts by municipalities to adopt information
technologies and policies to make their data sets available to
the public. 5 09 For example, the New York City Mayor's Office of
Data Analytics (MODA) uses transparent, open source code for
its data analytics and makes many of its projects public.5 10 In
October 2016, Boston launched boston.gov, releasing its
source code to the public and promising the public that any-
thing it builds going forward will be "open by default."5 11 New
York and its Metropolitan Transit Authority even set up a con-
test for software developers who develop apps based on govern-
ment data sets.5 12 San Francisco enacted the first open-data
ordinance requiring city departments to make their data sets
open to the public.
5 13
Aside from private and public initiatives toward shared
source, policymakers might also explore a more robust engage-
ment by government into creating incentives for more open
code initiatives. Ken Bamberger's excellent work on risk man-
agement technologies proposes the idea of regulators who
might issue forms of "approval regulation," in which he de-
scribes a process by which technology providers would offer full
transparency regarding their particular technologies in ex-
change for some form of legal safe harbor.51 4 Or we could
imagine a world by which government funding decisions would
be explicitly tied to more transparent forms of governance
or data-sharing with third parties to ensure greater
accountability.51 5
509 Fenster, supra note 486, at 484-85; see also Jennifer Shkabatur, Cities @
Crossroads: Digital Technology and Local Democracy in America, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
1413, 1443 (2011) (addressing efforts by municipalities to provide digital
services).
510 See Testimony of Don Sutherland, DEP'T OF INFO. TECH. & TELECOMM., at 2
(Oct. 16, 2017) (on file with author).
511 See Ben Miller, What's New in Civic Tech: Uncertainty in the Age of Thmp,
Open Source Projects Abound, GOV'T TECH. (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.govtech
.coM/civic/Whats-New-ln-Civic-Tech-Uncertainty-in-the-Age-of-Trump-.html
[https://perma.cc/6VAN-HQRB]. For a great discussion of various open-code
projects in governance, see OPEN GOVERNMENT, supra note 486.
512 Fenster, supra note 486, at 484.
513 Id. at 485.
514 See Bamberger, supra note 15, at 736.
515 See Nissenbaum et al., supra note 489.
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B. Strategies Toward Disclosure
1. Reforming Trade Secrecy: Identification and Filtration
As this Article has suggested, part of the issue that inspires
the paradox of source code secrecy stems from a fundamental
problem regarding an overbroad delegation of authority to the
trade secret owner. The identification of a trade secret is an
incredibly subjective determination, and the plaintiff essen-
tially enjoys total deference in deciding what to include and
how to describe the matter at issue.516 Indeed, even the factors
that are normally relied upon to determine whether a trade
secret exists (the extent to which the information is known
outside and inside the business; the extent of measures taken
to protect the secrecy of the information; its value and its cost
of development; and the ease with which it could be acquired or
duplicated by others) have little to do with the underlying sub-
stance of what is protected.517
As a result, courts display a systemic tendency to conflate
the question of whether a plaintiff has identified an alleged
secret with the question of whether the information is actually
a trade secret.5 1s Without a precise identification of the source
code elements, a defendant is essentially prevented from com-
paring the claims against information in the public domain,
thereby hampering their defense.519
In a fascinating, comprehensive study, two software law-
yers, Tait Graves and Brian Range, explained that it is "com-
mon for a trade secret plaintiff to alter its list of trade secret
claims as the case proceeds-sometimes dramatically, by re-
placing entire categories of information or technology, or by re-
combining slippery, multi-element 'combination trade secret'
claims into new subsets."520 For example, the plaintiff might
claim an "entire process"-consisting of its entire source code,
516 See Graves & Range, supra note 393, at 73.
517 See, e.g., GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG, 836 F.3d 477, 492 (5th Cir.
2016) (listing factors); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM. LAW INST. 1939)
(outlining the factors). To determine whether a trade secret exists, the Restate-
ment dictates examination of six factors: "(1) the extent to which the information
is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees
and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to
guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to
his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing
the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be
properly acquired or duplicated by others." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
518 See Graves & Range, supra note 393, at 71-72.
519 Id at 68-69.
520 Id. at 68.
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or its entire chip design-or it might revise its claim in different
mixes of subsets, what Graves and Range refer to as "gerry-
mander[ing] a claim so that the defense cannot focus its re-
search efforts on defeating the final version."
52 1
In one representative case from the Fifth Circuit, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had produced enough evidence for
a jury to conclude that "at least some portion of its ... [source
code] constituted a trade secret."522 The court simply reached
its conclusion based on assertions regarding the uniqueness of
the technology and its reliance on restrictions on the source
code's circulation.523 At the end of the day, the court's reason-
ing risks becoming somewhat circular in nature: something is
secret because it is said to be secret, not because the informa-
tion, in actuality, is secret or because its secrecy is proven with
particularity.
524
Certainly, more nuance or more willingness on the part of
courts to examine the material would be very valuable for two
reasons: first, as a substantive check on the nature of what is
claimed to be protected, and second, as a signaling function to
suggest that courts may be less deferential to future claim-
ants.525 Without a precise identification of the elements of
software code or hardware architecture, a defendant is unable
to compare the claims against information that is already in the
public domain and therefore is unable to mount an effective
challenge.526 The problem is made even worse by the fact that
courts rarely quote descriptions of trade secrets, and therefore
many published opinions do not serve as guides for others to
follow. 5 2 7
521 Id. at 77. They further explain: "If we take, for example, seven software
algorithms and assume that five are in the public domain, the plaintiff might alter
the claim several times to create subsets of the seven where at least one of the
included algorithms Is secret, in order to claim the non-secret algorithms as
secret as well." Id.
522 GlobeRanger, 836 F.3d at 492.
523 Id (listing the six factors set forth in Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 (AM.
LAW INST. 1939)). Note that the six-factor test is arguably obsolete now, given the
increased reliance on UTSA and DTSA factors in jury instructions. See Corre-
spondence from Tait Graves to author (Jan. 27, 2019) (on file with author).
524 GlobeRanger, 836 F.3d at 492.
525 See generally Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 796 N.W.2d 685, 703-05 (S.D.
2011) (holding that "claims manuals, training materials, and salary administra-
tion materials" constituted protected trade secrets); In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735,
740 (Tex. 2003) (holding that geological seismic data involving the land was a
protected trade secret).
526 See Graves & Range, supra note 393, at 68-69.
527 Id.
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I would argue for a more nuanced approach to literal forms
of infringement regarding source code, and one that might in-
terpret questions of source code protection through the lens of
the filtration tests outlined in the previous generation of
software case law.5 2 8 Expert testimony, for example, is used
under AltaL529 Gates, for example, emphasized the importance
of filtering out all unoriginal elements of a program, and there
is no reason not to subject source code to a more aggressive
mode of filtration as well.53 0 Further, in the non-software con-
text, there is mounting case law that requires parties to de-
scribe, define, and identify, with increased particularity, the
trade secrets in question rather than offer a blanket assertion
of confidentiality, even before the expert discovery process has
commenced.53 1 To some extent, some of that nuance is already
starting to occur in some software infringement cases, though
not yet in the criminal context.
One powerful solution to address the issue of trade secret
identification could be to adopt California's version of the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act, which requires trade secret plaintiffs to
provide a reasonably particular identification of alleged secrets
prior to pursuing discovery and provides remedies for bad faith
trade secret claims.532 Courts in several states-Delaware, Illi-
528 See Gen. Universal Sys. Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 142-43 (5th Cir. 2004)
("[The court filters out unprotectable expression by examining the structural
components at each level of abstraction to determine whether they can be pro-
tected by copyright."); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 836
(10th Cir. 1993) (noting that a court "must filter out those elements of the pro-
gram that are not protected by copyright").
529 See Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712-13 (2d Cir.
1992); Samuelson, supra note 147, at 1770-71 (noting that fitration narrows the
scope of copyright protection by removing "public domain elements of programs,
such as commonplace programming techniques, ideas, and know-how").
530 See Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 837-38 (citing Comprehensive Techs. Int'l,
Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 736 (4th Cir. 1993); Comput. Assoc.
Int'l, 982 F.2d at 710; Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465,
1474-75 (9th Cir. 1992); E.F. Johnson Co. v Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp.
1485, 1499 (D. Minn. 1985)).
531 See, e.g., Synygy, Inc. v. ZS Assocs., Inc., No. 07-3536, 2015 VL 899408,
at *6-9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2015) (requiring further definition of the scope of a trade
secret during discovery);see also Michael P. Broadhurst & Ann E. Querns, Define
Trade Secrets Before and During Litigation, BLANKROME (May 12, 2015), https://
www.blankrome. com/index. cfm?contentlD=37&itemlD=3582 [https://perma
.cc/DU5W-LZ2N] ("A series of decisions in Synygy v. ZS Associates, No. 07-3536
(E.D. Pa. March 3, 2015), highlight the critical importance of defining an enter-
prise's trade secret information .... ").
532 See Graves & Range, supra note 393, at 71, 76, 83; CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 3426. 1(d) (2018) (defining trade secret under California Uniform Trade Secrets
Act). Massachusetts has also adopted a similar statute. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch.
93, § 42D(b) (2018) ("In an action ... alleging trade secrets misappropriation a
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nois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and possibly Florida, among
others-have adopted similar requirements. 533 But so far, Cal-
ifornia is the only state to codify its rule, enacted in part be-
cause of its concern over discovery abuses engaged in by trade
secret plaintiffs. 534 In a 2005 case, a California appellate court
observed:
The letter and spirit of section 2019.2 10 require the plaintiff,
subject to an appropriate protective order, to identify or des-
ignate the trade secrets at issue with "sufficient particularity"
to limit the permissible scope of discovery by distinguishing
the trade secrets "from matters of general knowledge in the
trade or special knowledge of those persons... skilled in the
trade." . . . Where, as here, the alleged trade secrets at issue
consist of incremental variations on, or advances in the state
of the art in a highly specialized technical field, a more exact-
ing level of particularity may be required to distinguish the
alleged trade secrets from matters already known to persons
skilled in that field.
53 5
Even when the discovery and trial process unfolds, Graves and
Range evince a strong set of recommendations that force the
plaintiff to be specific in identifying its alleged secrets, includ-
ing directing courts to be wary of high-level, general lists of
trade secrets.5
36
In one influential California case, Altavion v. Konica Minolta
Systems, Laboratory Inc., the court spent a fairly long time
exploring the adequacy of the trade secret identification.
537
There, even as it offered a broad and inclusive take on trade
secrecy, it also drew up three tiers of "specificity and secrecy,"
ranging from the most secret (source code) to the least secret
(the idea of the use of barcodes to enable self-authentication of
documents).5 38 At the middle tier were the design concepts
used for the company's digital stamping technology, which
could be ascertained by an end user but were still protectable
as trade secrets.53 9 What is instructive about that case is the
court's willingness to delve into the substance of what consti-
party must state with reasonable particularity the circumstances thereof, includ-
ing the nature of the trade secrets and the basis for their protection.").
533 See Graves & Range, supra note 393, at 82 (collecting examples).
534 See id. at 83 (noting the legislative discussion of abuses).
535 See icL at 84 (quoting Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 132 Cal. App. 4th 826, 835-36 (2005)).
536 See Graves & Range, supra note 393, at 91-96.
537 Altavlon, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab. Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 26, 43-46
(2014).
538 Id. at 56.
539 Id. at 48-49.
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tuted the protectable trade secret as opposed to simply defer-
ring to the owner. One could imagine a situation where an
expert might postulate particular tests for filtering the public
domain, open source content from its protectable, secret
matter.
Since trade secrecy can attach to a number of different
aspects of code-object code, algorithms, information or for-
mulas detailed in source code, software architecture, and data
structure, among other categories, Graves and Range recom-
mend identifying each category specifically, and sequestering it
from auto-generated code, open source material, or basic code
that is mandated by the type of program, because all of that
information is already nonsecret in nature.540 In addition, the
lawyers recommend that the plaintiff literally specify the exact
lines of code claimed to be secret by identifying the allegedly
misappropriated lines by number or highlighting. 
4 1
Other strategies might involve requiring the plaintiff to ref-
erence how much of the source code already remains in the
public domain, in addition to considering the conventional fac-
tors to assess trade secret protection.5 42 Indeed, on the ques-
tion of source code discovery and the public domain, courts
can exercise greater scrutiny.5 4 3 In one civil case, a court re-
quired a plaintiff to explicitly identify the trade secret compo-
nents of the source code, reasoning that merely providing the
defendants with a "reference library" to establish what portions
of the code were in the public domain impermissibly shifted the
burden to the defendants. The court quoted from an earlier
case that made the argument that:
[A] plaintiff "ha[s] to be able to identify with specificity what
information [it] consider[s] to have been a trade secret[.]... If
the plaintiff can't do that now, it can't proceed on that theory,
because the defendants have a right during discovery to test
whatever the plaintiffs theory is.... Plaintiff is the only one
who can know what it believes its trade secrets are.... And it
540 See Graves & Range, supra note 393, at 93-95.
541 See id. at 94-95.
542 Parsons v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 910 A.2d 177, 184-85 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2006).
543 One court has held that it is plainly insufficient for a plaintiff to establish
source code protection by identifying only those aspects of its source code that
were not trade secrets because they were in the public domain, covered by third
party licenses, or unprotected. MSCI Inc. v. Jacob, 945 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864-66
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
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is unfair to... the defendants to conduct discovery without
knowing what the assertions are.
' 5 44
By requiring greater identification and particularity, judges can
empower more transparency in litigation, effectively increasing
access to source code that already lies within the public
domain.
2. Reforming Discovery: Toward Controlled Disclosure
A final, modest set of solutions focuses on invoking the
familiar themes of discovery and disclosure, enabling greater
procedural due process through transparency while recogniz-
ing the very liberal use of protective orders in trade secret
cases.5 4 5 It is well settled in IP cases that a trade secret holder
can either establish a privilege to ensure seclusion or obtain a
protective order to avoid disclosure to the public.5 4 6 The task
before us is to ensure that this principle translates to issues
that implicate the public interest in transparency, particularly
where automated decision making is concerned.
Typically, the burden rests with the party resisting discov-
ery to show that the requested information is a trade secret.5
4
7
After the owner shows that its disclosure would be harmful, the
burden then shifts to the opposing party to show that the trade
secret is relevant and necessary to prepare the case for trial.
5 4 8
The idea is to ensure that each party can effectively litigate its
case, compelling discovery in situations where judicial resolu-
tion would be impossible but for the substance of the trade
secret. 549
Courts generally prefer not to deny discovery merely be-
cause of the risk that the trade secret will be disclosed, but
instead will try to consider the interests of both parties and the
544 Id. (quoting Sit-Up Ltd. v. IAC/InterActlveCorp., No. 05 Civ. 9292 (DLC),
2008 WL 463884, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008)).
545 See Stadish v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 359 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (noting utility of protective orders in trade secret case).
546 See Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 190 P.3d 322, 330 (N.M. 2008).
547 See Sea Coast Fire, Inc. v. Triangle Fire, Inc., 170 So. 3d 804, 808 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
548 Id. at 809.
549 See id.; MSCI Inc. v. Jacob, 945 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). In
such cases, the party requesting the information has to show "how the lack of the
information will impair the presentation of the case on the merits to the point that
an unjust result is a real, rather than a merely possible, threat." In re Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 392 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex. App. 2010) (quoting In re Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730, 732-33 (Tex. 2003)); see also Laffitte v.
Bridgestone Corp., 674 S.E.2d 154, 163-64 (S.C. 2009) (finding that plaintiffs
experts did not establish the specific need for disclosure of formula of rubber tire
composition).
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interests of justice.5 5 0 As Graves has observed, in most civil
cases involving trade secrets, protective orders are effectively
mandated "so the concept hat [a] claimed [trade secret] is dis-
coverable is already, implicitly, decided."55 1 At the same time,
however, litigation around discovery matters can be costly and
maddening at the same time. As former Judge Grewal has
observed:
In a typical patent infringement case involving computer
software, few tasks excite a defendant less than a require-
ment that it produce source code. Engineers and manage-
ment howl at the notion of providing strangers, and
especially a fierce competitor, access to the crown jewels.
Counsel struggle to understand even exactly what code exists
and how it can be made available for reasonable inspection.
All sorts of questions are immediately posed. Exactly who
representing the plaintiff gets access-and does this list in-
clude patent prosecution counsel, undisclosed experts, and
so-called "competitive decision makers"? Must requirements
and specification documents that explain the functionality
implemented by the [test] code be included? What compila-
tion, debugging and analysis tools are required? What about
the test database and user manuals? Make files? Build files?
... Put simply, source code production is disruptive, expen-
sive, and fraught with monumental opportunities to screw
up."5
52
While Grewal added a note of humor to the monumental
task of source code discovery, his observations offer two key
insights. First, while source code production can be madden-
ing, time consuming, and costly, it is by now relatively common
in software cases.55 3 Second, given that source code produc-
tion is not an uncommon occurrence, litigators have ready-
made tools at their disposal to address the merit of software-
related disputes while ensuring that the source code remains
550 See Bleacher v. Bristol-Myers Co., 163 A.2d. 526, 528-29 (Del. Super. Ct.
1960) (collecting cases).
551 See Correspondence from Graves to author (Jan. 27, 2019) (on file with
author).
552 Andrew Schulman, Source Code cfL09: Discovery, SOFTWARE LITIGATION CON-
SULTING, http: //www.softwarelitigationconsulting.com/source-code-book/
source-code-ch-09-discovery/ [https://perma.cc/M9U2-72D2] (last visited Oct.
4, 2018) [hereinafter Source Code & Software Patents] (quoting Apple Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., No. C 11-1846 LHK (PSG), 2012 WL 1595784, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. May 4, 2012)).
553 The Northern District of California has developed a model protective order
source code, available at Model Protective Orders, UNITED STATES DISTRIcT COURT:
NORTHERN DISTRIcT OF CALIFORNIA, https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/model-protec-
tive-orders [https://perma.cc/LW2K-B6481 (last visited Apr. 26, 2019).
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protected and yet disclosed in a litigation dispute.554 Parties
are by now familiar with drafting protective orders and other
litigation-related tools to protect the seclusion of source code.
There is no need to reinvent the wheel; it has already been
turning for decades.
It is well-settled that courts can typically easily safeguard
trade secrets during litigation; preliminary relief, like prelimi-
nary injunctions and TROs to prevent disclosure, is often
granted.5 55 Given the above, the lack of disclosure in the crimi-
nal context is particularly striking. If the matter at issue were
about patent infringement, for example, where money and the
marketplace were at stake, a court would routinely allow for
further investigation and order the source code to be turned
over to opposing counsel.556
It is important to note that a majority of the most stringent
limitations of trade secret disclosure comes from a primary
concern-competition-that is not always at issue in the con-
texts I have discussed. As one court explains, "[tihe main con-
cern of parties seeking to impose AEO [Attorney Eyes Only]
restrictions is fear that dissemination of sensitive information,
particularly to decision-makers of its competitors, would
threaten serious competitive harm."557 If this is true, then the
investigative (rather than competitive) goals I have identified
only weigh further in favor of disclosure. Thus, one cluster of
solutions involves protective orders, in-camera review, trade
secret analysis by mutually-agreed-upon third-party experts or
special masters, and other solutions.558 In cases of extreme
sensitivity, it is common for courts to issue protective orders
limiting access to trade secrets only to counsel and their ex-
perts.55 9 For example, in the election context, laws limit access
to election officials or hold the code in escrow with an estab-
554 For a list of relevant questions and considerations, see Northern District of
California's Model Protective Order for Litigation Involving Patents, Highly Sensi-
tive Confidential Information, Northern District of California, supra note 553.
555 See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 149, at 382.
556 In fact, the Rules of Practice for Patent Cases before the Eastern District of
Texas require patent defendants to make the following available for inspection:
"[s]ource code, specifications, schematics, flow charts, artwork, or other docu-
mentation sufficient to show the elements of an 'Accused Instrumentality."' PAT-
ENT INITIAL DIscLosuRrs 3-4, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS, www.txed.uscourts.gov/?=patent-rules [https://perma.cc/955L-QD
BT].
557 Sioux Pharm, Inc. v. Eagle Labs., Inc., 865 N.W.2d 528, 538 (Iowa 2015).
558 Chessman, supra note 43, at 213.
559 See Tailored Lighting, Inc. v. Osram Sylvania Prods., 236 F.R.D. 146, 148
(W.D.N.Y. 2006) (issuing protective order due to risk of economic injury); see also
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) ("The unique character of
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lished third party and enable third parties to petition for ac-
cess, thereby protecting the integrity of the system.
560 The
Tenth Circuit recently observed that the disclosure of trade
secrets on an "'attorneys' eyes only' basis is a routine feature of
civil litigation involving trade secrets."56 1 Processes like inter-
position allow for a trade secret to be revealed to a neutral third
party who will inspect the trade secret in order to determine
whether it is necessary to prove a case.
5 62 Another idea is to
encourage courts to hold evidentiary, in camera hearings with
expert testimony to determine whether the source code quali-
fies as a trade secret.563 Expert testimony could be introduced
to analyze the contents of the source code and to determine
both whether it constitutes a trade secret and the parameters
surrounding disclosure.564
For example, in a case involving algorithms, a district court
upheld a detailed protective order, disclosing the source code
information only to counsel and expert consultants and provid-
ing for additional security measures (such as the requirement
that the information must be password protected, locked when
not in use, and connected to a computer that cannot be con-
nected to the internet).565 The case-which is hardly unique-
clearly shows that source code can be disclosed and protected,
on a limited basis, in a judicial dispute. And a review of other
cases suggests that courts have great acuity in addressing the
issue.566 In fact, in many conventional source code cases, it is
the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude to
fashion protective orders.").
560 Gibson, supra note 20, at 190-91 (citing CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19205 (West
2003)).
561 Paycom Payroll, LLC. v. Richison, 758 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2014)
(quoting In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 935 (2d Cir. 2010)). See for
example, Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 190 P.3d 322, 333 (N.M. 2008) ("If the
parties are not competitors, the trial court should issue an appropriate protective
order and hold an evidentiary, adversarial hearing on the trade secret status of
the information.").
562 26 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 5652, at 150 n.74 (1st ed.).
563 See Sea Coast Fire, Inc. v. Triangle Fire, Inc., 170 So. 3d 804, 808 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2015); see also Hammock v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 635 A.2d 533,
538-39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), rev'd, 662 A.2d 546 (N.J. 1995) (noting
difficulty with reviewing either judge's orders).
564 See Sea Coast Fire, 170 So. 3d at 808 (citing Revello Med. Mgmt., Inc. v.
Med-Data Infotech USA, Inc., 50 So. 3d 678, 680 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (noting
that if the judge is inexperienced in examining source code, he can appoint a
neutral computer expert to review the program)).
565 Superior Edge, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. 12-2672 (JRT/FLN), 2014 WL
7183797, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2014).
566 The EPA statute, for example, allows a submitting company that has desig-
nated certain information as "trade secrets or commercial or financial informa-
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important to note that source code has been turned over to
authorities and still maintained its status as a trade secret.567
Finally, it bears noting that although the Federal Rules of
Acquisition prohibit government employees from disclosing
trade secrets, a number of other federal statutes extend per-
mission to government agencies to disclose trade secret infor-
mation when it is necessary to protect the public from harm to
its safety and welfare. 568 The SEC, in addition, is governed by a
statutory provision that gives it the authority to disclose trade
secrets if it serves the public interest.569 Even in the FOIA
context, where trade secrets are granted an exemption, the
Supreme Court has unanimously held that the exemption is
discretionary for agencies, creating no mandatory bar to disclo-
sure.570 To take one example, the Honest and Open New EPA
Science Treatment Act of 2017, in draft, would require the EPA
to make documents that contained confidential business infor-
mation available with redactions to the general public and
without redactions to anyone who would sign a confidentiality
agreement.57 1
In other words, the prospects for discovery and disclosure
may be mixed, but there is some growing evidence to suggest
that courts and legislators may be more willing to order source
tion" to institute a declaratory judgment action in federal district court if the
company learns that the EPA plans to disclose that information. See Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 992 (1984) (citing Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act of 1972, § 10(a), 86 Stat. 989 (1972)).
567 Courts have held that the taking of evidence of trade secrets can be done in
camera, with no risk of violating the policy values that favor public trials. See
State ex rel. Ampco Metal, Inc. v. O'Neill, 78 N.W.2d 921, 926-27 (Wis. 1956);
House v. Commonwealth, No. 2007-CA-DG, 2008 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1220,
at *19) (requiring source code disclosure in breathylzer case). But see State v.
Kuhl, 741 N.W.2d 701, 708-09 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007) (reaching the opposite con-
clusion and deferring to trade secret protection).
568 See Stephen R. Wilson, Public Disclosure Policies: Can a Company Still
Protect Its Trade Secrets?, 38 NEw ENG. L. REv. 265, 278 (2003) (mentioning
statutes governing the Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protection
Agency, as examples.); see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking a Balance: When
Should Trade-Secret Law Shield Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOwA L. REV.
791, 826-35 (2010) (addressing the circumstances under which the government
can request disclosure).
569 Wilson, supra note 568, at 279.
570 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979) ("We therefore
conclude that Congress did not limit an agency's discretion to disclose informa-
tion when it enacted the FOIA."); Carol A. Ellingson, The Copyright Exception for
Derivative Works and the Scope of Utilization, 56 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1980) (discussing
the derivative works exception). Interestingly, one wrinkle in such cases is that in
some circumstances, trade secret holders have argued that they have a right to
procedural due process, under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 362 (1976)
including an opportunity to be heard before the trade secret is disclosed.
571 See HONEST Act, H.R. 1430, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).
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code disclosure in justified cases. As Rebecca Wexler wryly
observes, "disclosure subject to a protective order is better than
no disclosure at all."5 7 2 And review of source code, when it
happens, can often mean a tremendous difference for due pro-
cess and accountability, changing people's lives as a result.
573
CONCLUSION
In Lear v. Adkins, the Supreme Court precipitously wrote,
"federal law requires that all ideas in general circulation be
dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a
valid patent."574 Today, it is clear that trade secrecy's domi-
nance over source code has been a significant cause for con-
cern in cases involving the public interest. And, as I have
shown, it is the failures of intellectual property law that have
facilitated this result. To protect civil rights in the age of auto-
mated decision making, I argue, we must limit opportunities
for seclusion in areas of intellectual property, criminal justice,
and governance more generally. The solution, therefore, does
not require a complete overhaul of the existing system, but
rather a more nuanced, granular approach that seeks to bal-
ance the interest of disclosure and public access with the sub-
stantial values of protection, privacy, and property.
572 Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System 53 (Apr. 14, 2017) (unpublished draft).
573 In one case, a review of Alcotest revealed that the source code had disabled
catastrophic error detection, necessitating court intervention to secure its correc-
tion. See Ram, supra note 379, at 687 (citing State vs. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 159
(N.J. 2008)). In another example from Colorado, programmers encoded over 900
errors in an algorithm that addressed the public benefit system; as a result, both
cancer patients and pregnant individuals were wrongly denied Medicaid benefits,
among other errors, costing the state several hundred millions of dollars, not to
mention the individuals that were also directly affected. See Testimony of NYCLU,
Hearing on Automated Decision Systems Used by Agencies, supra note 3, at 4
(citing Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 490, at 1268-69) (follow
"Hearing Testimony 10/16/17" hyperlink, page 44 of pdl).
574 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969).
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